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CATCH SHARE MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMERCIAL GROUNDFISH FISHERY  
IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
by 
Rachel Gallant Feeney 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2015 
This dissertation tests theories about catch share approaches to fishery management, examining 
their validity and limits relative to the Northeast groundfish sector program, and potentially 
modifies them in light of research outcomes. Participants of the groundfish fishery based in New 
Hampshire are the particular focus of research, but broader impacts are considered. Studies of 
this catch share program have been limited to date, and studies of catch share programs generally 
have focused on a particular dimension (e.g., biological, social, economic) rather than integrate 
across dimensions, despite increasing needs to do so for management. Here, six key aspects of 
fishing are investigated: fishing practices, social capital, bycatch, economic performance, safety, 
and well-being. Thus, this work is a novel contribution to the field of impact assessment 
research, both in its topic and scope.  
The primary research question is: How has the advent of catch shares impacted the Northeast 
commercial multispecies fishery, particularly in New Hampshire? This is answered through a 
case study that involved a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches, using semi-structured 
interviews of 2 informants, including members of groundfish sectors, common pool members, 
former fishermen, and fish dealers. Although social research often involves a process of theory 
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generation, in the case of the Northeast groundfish fishery, and catch share programs more 
generally, a number of theories have already emerged that are ripe for testing. It was 
hypothesized here that fishing under the control rules governing sectors has resulted in: more 
efficiency and flexibility for fishermen to decide where, when, and how to fish; greater social 
capital among fishermen; reduced bycatch; and improved economic performance, safety, and 
well-being. 
The groundfish fishermen of New Hampshire revealed that the theorized benefits of catch share 
programs do not necessarily hold true. Of the six key aspects of fishing investigated here, only 
the benefits related to fishing practices, bycatch and safety aligned with what has occurred in this 
local fishery, but even some of those benefits have qualifiers. The informants who were sector 
members generally felt that fishing in a sector was more efficient and flexible than the former 
Days-At-Sea program had been, generally due to shifting catch limits from a trip basis to an 
annual one. This had allowed more concentration of effort during times with greater potential for 
profitability (e.g., fish availability, favorable markets). Reducing bycatch was an important goal 
of the informants, and the sector participants indicated that their level of bycatch had decreased, 
primarily through eliminating the trip limits and discards of legal-sized fish. Some informants 
went above and beyond regulations to avoid bycatch in recognition of the need to steward stocks 
for the future. However, some sector members identified new pressures to discard when 
unobserved, driven largely by the high lease costs of choke stocks. There were no major changes 
in safety, because the informants largely strive to be safe no matter the management program. 
However, removal of trip limits for sector participants created flexibility and less pressure to fish 
in unsafe conditions. 
xii 
Theorized benefits for social capital, economic performance, and well-being did not hold true. 
Despite being a novel focal point for industry organization, informants felt that sectors have not 
been catalysts for social capital. Rather, sectors have been based on and built off of pre-existing 
social capital. In some cases, social capital was reduced as increased organizational 
responsibilities were seen as a burden and fishing became more competitive and secretive. 
Economic profitability and predictability had not been realized, though the concomitant decline 
in, and persistently low, catch limits for certain key species (e.g., cod, yellowtail flounder) 
vanquished any potential that catch shares had for the economic success of this fishery. The need 
to lease quota of constraining stocks to harvest the available fish in one’s own portfolio has been 
a substantial and new cost, with risky debt obligations, for several informants. Business 
predictability declined for a majority of informants. Catch shares has, however, transformed the 
business climate of the groundfish industry, with more focus on maximizing one’s utility. With 
declines in fishery participation, and dim potential for positive economic performance, the sense 
of well-being and future outlook for self and fishery had diminished since the advent of the catch 
share program. Job satisfaction decreased for most of the sector members, and a majority of all 
informants said that they would not advise a young person to enter fishing. The New Hampshire-
based fishermen have, on the whole, not fared as well as could be assumed based on theory, 
exemplifying the consequences of catch shares, the potential for declining performance by those 





The use of catch shares as a fisheries management tool is growing in frequency. The National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) defines a catch share fishery management program as one that 
allocates, “a specific percentage of the total allowable fishery catch or a specific fishing area to 
individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities” (NMFS, 2011a). The term “catch 
share” refers to fishery management strategies that include Limited Access Privilege Programs 
(LAPPs; e.g., Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs)), Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURFs), 
and cooperatives (e.g., sectors). The first U.S. fishery to implement catch shares was the 
Wisconsin Great Lakes Individual Transferable Quota Program in 1971. Today, there are 16 
active catch share programs in U.S. federal fisheries and more in state waters (NMFS, 2011a). 
The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) created one of the more recent catch 
share program (“sectors”) for the Northeast Multispecies “groundfish” fishery (initial programs 
in 2004 and 2006; fishery-wide program in 2010). 
NMFS has been particularly supportive of catch share program development, indicating that this 
approach fosters sustainable fishing by ensuring harvests remain within annual catch limits, 
creating a greater sense of cooperation among quota holders, and promoting a culture of 
stewardship behavior among fishermen (NOAA, 2010). Examining the impacts of catch shares is 
a growing field of research. Some investigators have indeed noted more sustainable harvests and 
more stable fishing economies (Essington, 2010e.g., ; Levy, 2010). Branch (2009) reviewed 227 
papers on catch share programs, and just 18% of those reported negative biological, economic or 
social impacts. Largely, there were positive effect on target species, but mixed or unknown 
effects on non-target species and the ecosystem. However, where quota can be leased and fishery 
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operations merged, fishery participation has consolidated to the determent of fishing 
communities (e.g., Brandt, 2005). 
For the Northeast groundfish catch share program, a high level of controversy existed among 
fishery participants over potential negative economic and community impacts from the transition 
to a primarily output-controlled program. If the NEFMC is to successfully manage this catch 
share program or establish additional ones, it must be informed of and consider the human 
dimensions of its decisions. This dissertation tests theory generated about catch shares, 
examining their validity and limits relative to the management of the Northeast groundfish 
fishery, and potentially modifies them in light of research outcomes. The fishery participants 
based in New Hampshire are the particular focus of research, but broader impacts are considered. 
There have been relatively few studies of this catch share program to date, and generally, most 
examinations of such programs have focused on a particular dimension: biological, social, or 
economic. Thus, this work is a novel contribution to the field of impact assessment research, 
both in its topic and scope. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question is: How has the advent of catch shares impacted the Northeast 
commercial multispecies fishery, particularly in New Hampshire? Through a case study, this 
dissertation examines a broad range of key aspects of the fishery within a narrow group of 
fishery participants. 
RESEARCH GOAL AND OBJECTIVES 
The goal of this work is to contribute to understanding the broader question of what biological, 
social and economic changes have occurred within the Northeast groundfish catch share 
program. The effects of fishery regulatory programs are often nuanced and complex. Thus, 
thorough evaluation must examine a number of factors. The research objectives are to: 
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1. Measure quantitative and qualitative changes that have occurred relative to the Northeast 
Multispecies sector program that relate to six key aspects of fishing: fishing practices, 
social capital, bycatch, economic performance, safety, and well-being; 
2. Focus on the New Hampshire fishing industry, but determine the applicability of the 
results to the Northeast Multispecies fishery generally; and 
3. Involve a multi-stakeholder team to collect data, conduct the analysis, and then 
disseminate the results to end users, particularly in the management and fishing arenas. 
GROUNDFISH MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
Marine fisheries are intriguing, because while fish are owned "by the people" collectively, people 
have little control over the wild ocean. What can be controlled is human interaction with the 
marine ecosystem - setting limits on who can fish where, for what and when. Managing fisheries 
sustainably requires a careful balance between conservation and fishing effort, and robust 
information about stock abundance and potential impacts of regulatory options. Because fish are 
a public resource, there are many stakeholders involved (e.g., fishermen, scientists, regulators, 
environmentalists, consumers), and decisions can often be contentious. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act is the federal law that, since 
its enactment in 1976 (as the “Magnuson Act;” Table 1), regulates fishing in U.S. federal waters 
("MSFCMA," 2007). The Regional Fishery Council system, created through this law, includes 
the New England Fishery Management Council, which now manages about 25 stocks that occur 
throughout the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank and Southern New England. The Councils develop 
fishery management plans (FMPs) that must meet the approval of NMFS, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and ultimately the Department of Commerce and the 
U.S. President. The NEFMC is comprised of 18 voting members, including the Regional 
Administrator of NMFS; the principal state official with marine fishery management 
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responsibility from each of the New England coastal states - Maine, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut; and 12 members nominated by the governors of 
these states (and approved by the Secretary of Commerce). There are also four non-voting 
members representing the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. 
Department of State, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission. All FMPs must 
comply with the MSFCMA, the National Environmental Policy Act, and other federal statutes 
(NEFMC, 2013b). 
There are 16 stocks of nine fish species
1
 managed within the Northeast Multispecies groundfish 
complex by the NEFMC. The groundfish fishery has full- and part-time participants from Maine 
to New Jersey. Most vessels are less than 90’ long, fishing with a variety of gear types, primarily 
otter trawls and gillnets, but also hook and line, jigs, and rod and reel. In Fishing Year (FY) 
2009,
2
 the year prior to full catch share implementation in the groundfish fishery, total 
groundfish landings equaled 70.6M pounds, with revenues of $85.1M (Kitts, Bing-Sawyer, 
McPherson, Olson, & Walden, 2011). 
The depletion of a number of groundfish stocks led the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
implement rebuilding plans for overfished stocks though the creation of the Northeast 
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan in 1986 (Table 1). The FMP has been modified many 
times since in an effort to promote sustainable fisheries. In 1994, a limited access program was 
introduced, along with allocating the number of Days-at-Sea (DAS) that a vessel could go 
fishing per year (and other measures). In 1996, the Sustainable Fisheries Act mandated that 
stocks had to be rebuilt to a biomass that would support Maximum Sustainable Yield by 2014 
                                                 
1
 Acadian redfish, American plaice, Atlantic cod, haddock, pollock, white hake, winter flounder, witch flounder, and 
yellowtail flounder. 
2
 A fishing year runs May 1 to April 30. 
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("SFA," 1996). Although vessel buy-back programs, reductions in DAS allocations, closed areas, 
trip limits, and many other effort controls were implemented and revised over subsequent years 
to achieve that goal, several key stocks continued to be depleted.  
In May 2004, Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP cut DAS to the point where the 
viability of many fishing ports was in jeopardy. Additionally, Amendment 13 allowed leasing 
and purchase of DAS among fishermen to help keep fishing businesses solvent, and provisions 
were made to allow fishermen to form harvest cooperatives (NEFMC, 2003). The Georges Bank 
(GB) Cod Hook Sector was the first such cooperative to form (in 2003). The second cooperative 
was formed in 2006, the GB Cod Fixed Gear Sector (NEFMC, 2006). Amendment 13 included a 
mid-point review of the stock rebuilding goals, and required subsequent adjustments if necessary 
(NEFMC, 2003). 
AMENDMENT 16 DEVELOPMENT 
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP was initiated by the NEFMC in September 
2006 to serve as the mid-point review of the rebuilding program for several stocks (the legal 
obligation to rebuild stocks by 2014). As of 2007, eight of the 16 groundfish stocks were 
considered overfished and/or overfishing was still occurring (Tromble, Lambert, & Benaka, 
2009). Federally, the MSFCMA was reauthorized that year, which implemented a requirement to 
end overfishing by 2010, using Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) and Accountability Measures 
(AMs),
3
 and to rebuild overfished stocks within ten years, unless the life history of the species 
necessitates a longer time frame ("MSFCMA," 2007). Amendment 16, already under 
development, became the vehicle to incorporate the new federal mandates (Table 2). 
                                                 
3
 Accountability Measures are effort controls implemented either mid-season to ensure a catch limit is not exceeded 
or in a following season to correct for prior overages. 
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Early versions of Amendment 16 included a proposal for a LAPP (IFQ) catch share program. 
The MSFCMA mandates that a two-thirds majority vote of fishery permit holders is required to 
enact a LAPP in New England (and in the Gulf of Mexico). Due to the projected time such a 
program would take to develop and be approved, the NEFMC eventually voted to drop this 
alternative, so that legal requirements for ACLs and AMs implementation deadlines could be met 
(through litigation, it was later affirmed that the sector program is not a LAPP (Maysonett, 
2011)). Aspects of many different stakeholder proposals were pulled together to form the 
elements of the fishery-wide catch share program that emerged, where the ACL is allocated to 
groups (sectors) of fishermen. This expanded the sector concept that had been introduced to the 
fishery a few years earlier with the formation of the two sectors based on Cape Cod (NEFMC, 
2009a).  
Perhaps the most controversial component of the expanded sector program was how the ACL 
would be divided among sectors, i.e., the allocation formula. Several alternatives were 
considered. One was to use the accumulated catch histories over the previous five years 
associated with each permit enrolled in a sector for the first time. Thus, the new sectors would 
use FY 2002-2006 for their catch history (NEFMC, 2009a). This was a different time period than 
the two existing sectors, FY 1996–2001 (NEFMC, 2003). However, some stakeholders felt that 
certain components of the industry would be unfairly disadvantage, those that had not targeted 
groundfish in FY 2002-2006. Other alternatives proposed using a combination of landings 
history and the number of Category A DAS assigned to a permit or broadened the time period to 
FY 1996–2006 (NEFMC, 2008). After much public debate on the allocation formula, the 
preferred alternative was to have the allowable catch for a stock that is allocated to a sector be 
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calculated based solely on the FY 1996-2006 landings history that is attached to each permit that 
joins a sector in a given year. 
In a “watershed decision,” the NEFMC voted to approve Amendment 16 in June 2009 (NEFMC, 
2009b). Amendment 16 was enacted in May 2010, expanding the number of allowable sectors in 
the fishery to 19, including the two that were already in operation (NEFMC, 2009a). Fishermen 
also had the option to enroll in the “common pool,” to choose to not join a sector but fish under a 
Total Allowable Catch managed by NMFS. Amendment 16 also revised rebuilding plans for 
several stocks, implemented ACLs, AMs, additional mortality controls, and bycatch reduction 
measures (NEFMC, 2009a). 
May 1, 2010, marked a dramatic change for multispecies regulations in the Northeast. Since 
1994, fishermen had been catching fish using DAS with other effort control measures. However, 
the majority of commercial multispecies fishermen with qualifying catch history opted to join the 
newly formed sectors (landing 98% of the groundfish that year; NMFS, 2015b). Concurrent with 
the transition to catch share management, catch reductions were required to end overfishing on 
certain stocks. Thus, allocations to sectors and the common pool were lower than what prior 
landing history alone would dictate. This resulted in some uncertainty and general distrust of 
entering into sector agreements by the industry, but sectors were generally considered preferable 
to the common pool option (M. Vasquez, personal communication, 2011). 
GROUNDFISH SECTORS DEFINED 
A fishing sector is an organization comprised of at least three distinct entities (none of whom 
have an ownership interest in the other two entities) that hold limited access multispecies 
groundfish permits. Each sector is governed by a board of directors, and coordinated by a sector 
manager. A sector is assigned a common annual allocation of fish, or Annual Catch Entitlement 
(ACE), an upper limit of catch for each stock. Members must agree on an allocation rationing 
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system amongst the members as established in its annual sector operations plan, which must be 
approved by NMFS. Sectors have significant flexibility to form internal agreements and 
organizational structures, though members are jointly and severally liable for fishing within 
catch limits. 
The amount of ACE given to a sector each year for each stock is determined approximately as 
follows. The catch of a given stock attributed to each permit for FY 1996-2006 is calculated as a 
percent of the fishery-wide catch of that stock for those years. This produces the Potential Sector 
Contribution (PSC) associated with each permit. For each stock, the PSC for a given permit is 
then multiplied by the total ACL available to groundfish sectors, resulting in the total weight of 
each stock for the permit. The total weight of a stock allowed for a sector (i.e., the ACE) is the 
sum of the total allowed for each permit enrolled in the sector (NMFS, 2010b). 
Sectors must have approved operations plans approved in advance by NMFS to receive ACE. A 
sector has the option to hold and fish the ACE in common, or each fisherman may fish the catch 
history he brought to the sector. So far, all sectors have chosen to distribute allocation to 
members proportional to the individual fishing history of each member (NMFS, 2015a). Trading 
of ACE between sectors is allowed to create some flexibility, but each sector has a right of first 
refusal agreement (internal trades are prioritized).  
Sectors are allowed exemptions from certain fishing effort restrictions that were in effect under 
the DAS program. This includes no daily trip limits for target species, though trip limits remain 
for certain non-target stocks that are in need of rebuilding (e.g., Atlantic wolffish, sturgeon). 
Under DAS, the Gulf of Maine cod trip limit had been 800 lb. since 2004, and excess cod needed 
to be discarded at sea (i.e., as “regulatory discards”). Under sectors, day gillnet vessels are no 
longer limited to a 50-net limit and do not need to declare out of the fishery for 120 days each 
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year. They can also share gillnets at sea. Sector vessels may also now access some of the areas 
that are closed seasonally (NEFMC, 2009a). 
Full retention is required of all legal size multispecies stocks; the fish that were regulatory 
discards under DAS are now landed and count towards the ACE. In fact, all discards are counted 
against the total allocation, which gives an incentive to minimize discards. There is frequent and 
detailed sector- and vessel-level monitoring and reporting to track ACE usage (NEFMC, 2009a). 
COMMON POOL DEFINED 
Another option exists for fishermen, enrolling their permits in the “common pool.” Common 
pool vessels fish with several of the effort controls that were required under the DAS program, 
though they harvest within a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limit that applies to all enrolled in the 
common pool. Starting in FY 2012, the common pool has been managed with trimester (versus 
annual) TACs for its target stocks to help ensure that limits are not exceeded. The common pool 
catch accounts for about 1% of the total commercial catch in the fishery, i.e., most of the effort 
has been in sectors (Murphy et al., 2012). The common pool is not considered a catch share 
program. The Potential Sector Contribution of each enrolled permit contributes to the TAC, but 
specific amounts of quota for each stock are not allocated as they are to sectors. It is important, 
however, to understand the performance of the common pool as well as sectors, because joining 
the common pool is the only other option for groundfish fishermen. 
PERMIT CATEGORIES 
Vessels fishing in the groundfish Days-at-Sea program had Category A permits, and the majority 
of the catch history in the fishery used to calculate PSC is associated with these permits. Most of 
the active groundfish fishermen have Category A permits, however other permit categories exist. 
For example, Handgear A (HA) permits may be fished using handgear: rod and reel, handlines 
and tub trawls. The nature of fishing with handgear gave rise to many regulations that are distinct 
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from gillnets or trawls, the typical gears associated with Category A permits. Both of these 
permit types may be enrolled in a sector or the common pool and are limited access permits, 
meaning that they may only be issued to vessels that have previously held them or transferred to 
vessels under strict constraints (GARFO, 2012). 
SECTOR FORMATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
There are two sectors, Northeast Fishery Sectors (NEFS) XI and XII, comprised primarily of 
permit holders based in New Hampshire. Like most sectors, NEFS XI and XII were established 
by an existing industry organization, in this case, the Northeast Seafood Coalition (NSC). When 
it became evident that sector management was the option that the NEFMC was going to 
recommend as the next approach for groundfish management, the NSC held a series of industry 
leader meetings to form a vision for sector organization. Those leaders divided the fishery into 
12 sectors, and began to formulate operations plans with the assistance of NSC staff. Due to the 
deadlines involved, the initial operations plans for the new sectors were submitted by the NSC to 
NMFS for approval. Subsequently, each of these sectors became an independent organization, 
though the NSC still coordinates some administrative functions through the Northeast Sector 
Service Network (NSC, 2014). As sector management places significantly more administrative 
responsibilities on the fishing industry than before, the two NSC sectors comprised mainly of 
New Hampshire-based permit holders (NEFS XI and XII) decided that it would be more efficient 
to operate as essentially one sector. They are overseen by one board of directors and hired one 
sector manager, Dr. Joshua Wiersma, who had been working for the NSC on sector formation (J. 
Wiersma, personal communication, 2011). Since the two sectors act essentially as one, they are 
considered as a unit in this research. 
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CONTINUED MANAGEMENT CHANGE 
The data collection for this research (interviews) occurred amid ever-evolving regulations. The 
catch share program began with including a dockside monitoring program, but this component 
was cancelled after the first year, because it was deemed to be too redundant with at-sea 
monitoring (NOAA, 2011). Thus, at the time of the interviews (fall 2012), the informants had 
participated in a brief dockside monitoring program. The NEFMC approved Amendment 17 in 
July, 2011 to allow state-operated permit banks to obtain ACE and transfer it to sectors 
(NEFMC, 2011a). As of May 2012, the State of New Hampshire had a permit bank that the 
fishermen could begin obtaining quota from. Throughout the period since 2010, NMFS has 
implemented several actions to help rebuild stocks and meet federal mandates. Amendment 18 is 
under review, which includes measures to prevent permit holders from acquiring or controlling 
an excessive share of fishing privileges via an accumulation limit (NEFMC, 2015). Annual catch 
limits have been volatile and/or quite low for several stocks. For example, the commercial catch 
of Gulf of Maine cod was 6,705 mt in FY 2009, but the commercial sub-Annual Catch Limit in 
FY 2010 was 4,567 mt. Catch limits for this stock have lowered almost every year since, in an 
effort to end overfishing and rebuild the stock. In FY2015, the sub-ACL was just 207 mt 
(NMFS, 2015b). The constraints that ACLs have put on this fishery cannot be overstated, the 
impacts of which are very difficult to tease out from those of the catch share program. 
PRIOR INQUIRY 
Inspiration to commence this dissertation came in large part while pursuing a Master of Public 
Administration degree at the University of New Hampshire. A class project during the fall of 
2010 involved the creation of a case study blog about NEFS XI and XII (Feeney, 2010; 
Appendix A). Video interviews were created of four people associated with the New Hampshire 
groundfish fishery, including two fishermen, a sector Board member (who is also the wife of a 
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fisherman), and a representative of Yankee Fishermen’s Cooperative. A presentation by the 
sector manger, Dr. Wiersma was video recorded and posted. Stakeholder views were noted on 
the six key aspects of fishing that were investigated in greater depth through this dissertation. 
Through creation of the blog, an opportunity was discovered for research, to complete the case 
study. This dissertation was also informed by a survey of the initial 24 members of NEFS XI and 
XII, administered by Dr. Wiersma during FY 2010 (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011; 
Appendix A). The outcomes of these prior inquiries helped form each hypothesis rationale 
(Chapter II) and contextualize the research outcomes (Chapters IV-X). 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Given the complex and ever-shifting nature of fisheries and fisheries management, selecting the 
most appropriate mode of social inquiry can be daunting. The research question was answered 
here through a mixed methods case study. Reliance on either quantitative or qualitative 
approaches alone can be misleading, so to enable thoughtful consideration of diverse ways of 
conceptualizing impacts and testing theory, a blend of approaches was used. This can lead to 
deeper inference than use of a single approach alone (Greene, 2007: 13).  
In choosing the project scope and approach, the need for sufficient training in research was 
balanced with the need to answer the research question thoroughly. As noted above, six key 
aspects of fishing were selected for analysis: fishing practices, social capital, bycatch, economic 
performance, safety and well-being. To date, most research on catch share program performance 
has focused on a particular aspect, such as economic performance or whether fish stocks have 
improved. A strength of multi-faceted research, as employed here, is that it can assist fishery 
managers in understanding the ever more complex array of forces driving fishery performance, 
and ultimately aid in future decision-making. The field of impact assessment research is moved 
forward by acknowledging and examining the complexity of systems. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Although social research often involves a process of theory generation, in the case of the 
Northeast groundfish fishery, and catch share programs more generally, a number of theories 
have already emerged that are ripe for testing. A range of hypotheses are examined here that are 
both theoretical and specific, support the research objectives, and relate to the overall 
performance of the fishery. These hypotheses are based on impacts of catch shares derived from 
empirical research, policy statements of managers, benefits proposed through the Amendment 16 
development process, and preliminary observation. The rationale for each hypothesis is explored 
further in Chapter III. 
It is hypothesized that relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea program, fishing under the catch 
share (sector) program has: 
1. Fishing Practices. Improved efficiency and flexibility for fishermen to decide where, 
when, and how to fish. 
2. Social Capital. Improved social capital (i.e., greater networking, reciprocity and trust) 
among fishermen in the conduct of business, in harvesting sector allocations, and 
reducing bycatch. 
3. Bycatch. Reduced bycatch through incentives and flexibility to harvest more selectively. 
4. Economic Performance. Improved economic performance (e.g., profit margins, business 
predictability) for fishing participants, though the fishery would consolidate to fewer 
permit holders and vessels actively fishing. 
5. Safety. Increased operational safety for active vessels. 
6. Well-Being. Improved well-being, decreasing stress and concern about the conduct of 
business and the future of the fishery. 
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The null hypothesis is that the implementation of catch shares caused no substantial changes to 
the multispecies fishery for these six factors, beyond what would have occurred if the DAS 
program had continued fishery-wide. 
LIMITS IN SCOPE 
There are many important social and economic facets of fisheries. Given the importance of the 
research question to the region, a detailed assessment of each Northeast sector may be warranted, 
as well as a thorough analysis of the common pool, but that is simply beyond the scope of this 
dissertation project. The New Hampshire sectors are not innately more suitable for the research. 
They were selected, because the research team has the most familiarity and connections with this 
geographic area and its fishery participants, and thus the greatest likelihood of project success. 
The impacts on each sector have likely been unique, given the diversity in membership, 
geography, and groundfish ACE allocations. However, some common themes likely hold true. 
RESEARCH TEAM 
This project was coordinated and led by Rachel Feeney who designed the interview questions 
and conducted all of the interviews, data coding and analysis, and writing. Dr. Joshua Wiersma, 
the NEFS XI and XI sector manager from 2010-2014, served as a project advisor and liaison to 
the fishing industry. He was particularly helpful in identifying the research population, recruiting 
informants, designing interview questions and groundtruthing outcomes. Audio recordings of 




CHAPTER I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Although this dissertation focuses on the present day commercial fishing industry in New 
Hampshire, particularly the changes that have occurred relative to the implementation of 
groundfish catch share management in May 2010, one needs to think beyond the last few years 
to more fully understand why the industry is shaped as it is today and what the future may hold. 
This includes examining historical, ecological, logistical, social, and political aspects of fisheries, 
and how fishermen through the generations made decisions based on the constraints and 
opportunities of their time. Several questions arise. How has the coastal New Hampshire 
ecosystem shaped fisheries and vice versa? What have been the political, logistical, and social of 
the industry through time? Why are the New Hampshire ports small fishing hubs today relative 
to Portland and Gloucester? Although it is often assumed that Portland and Gloucester have 
always had more sizeable fisheries, historical records reveal that was not always the case. Precise 
historical reconstructions are a challenge though, as records on landings prior to about 1990 are 
known to under-report the size of the fisheries, by species and gear type. 
FOUNDED ON A FISHERY 
Europeans were first drawn to the Gulf of Maine, and particularly to the Piscataqua region, for its 
abundant cod stocks. The Isles of Shoals and adjacent coastal areas were used by scout fishermen 
in the 16
th
 century, but it was the exploration of the Piscataqua River by Martin Pring and 
William Brown in 1603 that caused colonization to become serious (Saltonstall, 1941: 8). A 
decade later, voyagers Samuel Champlain and John Smith noted the abundance of timber and 
fish resources in the Piscataqua region. Though no visits to the area were recorded between 1614 
and 1623 (Saltonstall, 1941: 10), the Council for New England of Plymouth, England was 
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issuing land grants to settle the region. Captain John Mason, governor of Newfoundland from 
1615 to 1621, received one for the land surrounding the Piscataqua River (Van Deventer, 1976: 
5-6). In 1623, David Thompson and William and Edward Hilton were outfitted by the Laconia 
Company, which Mason founded to organize merchants from the west of England. Hilton was 
given a land grant by the Council between 1623 and 1628 to establish fishing stations at what is 
now called Hilton Point in Great Bay (Van Deventer, 1976: 5). Thompson first fished on 
Mason’s land grant out of what is now called Ordiorne Point, just south of the mouth of the 
Piscataqua. However, in 1624, Thompson moved south to an island in Massachusetts Bay (now 
called Thompson Island) to establish fisheries there. Others in his party remained in the 
Piscataqua area (Adams, 1825: 9-12). 
What was it about the Piscataqua estuarine ecosystem that inspired settlement by these pioneers, 
and why would Hilton establish fishing settlements ten miles upriver? Hilton must have observed 
sufficient fish resources available in Great Bay to warrant settlement, though he did have an 
additional interest in lumber. By comparison, Great Bay is scant of wild commercial harvests 
today (Short, 1992). The Piscataqua region that we know, now 400 years since and populated by 
418,000 people
4
 (Bureau, 2010), has had significant human impact through time, including 
sawdust, fish waste, sewage, and industrial chemicals. Environmental concerns remain, 
including: effluent, shellfish closures, loss of eelgrass habitat, and shoreline development (Short, 
1992: 1). These early European settlers came in the midst of the Little Ice Age (1450-1850), so 
the forested river ways and estuaries likely provided colder and more oxygenated habitat for 
anadromous fish and estuarine nurseries than today (Francis, Wolfe, Fuller, & Foster, 2002).  
                                                 
4
 2010 U.S. Census data for Rockingham and Strafford Counties. 
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The juxtaposition of abundant fish resources, the rocky Isles of Shoals, and the Piscataqua 
Estuary, with its river systems that reached far inland must have been too good to pass up. The 
five rivers that feed the Piscataqua estuary provided over 100 miles of access to fresh water and 
inland timber resources (Van Deventer, 1976: 4). The Laconia Company was allured by the 
prospects of valuable fur, mines, and vineyard industries, but it was lumber and cod that they 
soon agreed with the earlier account of Capt. John Smith to be “as good as gold as the mines of 
Potosi and Guiana: with less hazards and charge and more certain and facility” (Barbour, 1986). 
The warm and sunny New Hampshire climate was more favorable than that of Newfoundland for 
drying and salting haddock and cod, such that fishing could be a year-round venture (Adams, 
1825: 9-12). 
Raw fishing stations along the New Hampshire coast transformed into settlements by 1631, and 
trade of fur and fish back to England became the first profitable ventures (Belknap, 1812: 150). 
Obtaining a sufficient supply of salt was essential to establishing fisheries, and it was 
manufactured through the erection of salt works (Adams, 1825: 9-12). Edward Godfrey was an 
early successful fisherman. By 1632, he owned a fleet based at Strawberry Banke comprised of 
six shallops, five smaller boats, and 13 skiffs. The towns of Dover, Hampton, and Exeter, as well 
as Strawberry Banke, were formally laid out by 1641. In Dover and Exeter, individuals were 
given exclusive rights to fish commercially with weirs (Van Deventer, 1976: 88). Although 
Mason’s heirs did not inherit his holdings upon his death in 1635, the Laconia Company 
continued to support the natural resource industries (Van Deventer, 1976: 6, 88). Taking 
advantage of abundant timber and the natural transit system of the Great Bay rivers, shipbuilding 
and the mast trade became important industries in Portsmouth harbor by the mid-1600s, 
alongside fishing (Saltonstall, 1941: 12). At the mouth of the Piscataqua River, the fishing 
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settlement of “Strawberry Banke” increased in size, and by 1653 was renamed Portsmouth, since 
it was considered one of the finest ports in the region (Saltonstall, 1941: 11). The New 
Hampshire coast provided dozens of sites for small fisheries, but Belknap noted in 1812 that the 
Isles of Shoals, New Castle, Rye, and Hampton were “where the cod fishery was chiefly 
attended” (Belknap, 1812: 158). 
The colonial fishing ports of New Hampshire likely resembled those developing in 
Massachusetts, in terms of fishing technology and techniques, but the Puritans to the south 
lacked a labor force that Strawberry Banke did not. The fishing life was not conducive to Puritan 
“landsmen” ideals, and their workers needed to be imported from England, which slowed the 
establishment of fisheries relative to New Hampshire (Vickers, 1994: 91-4). The people of 
colonial New Hampshire came to fish, not to seek haven from religious and political oppression. 
As one late 17
th
 century parishioner responded to complaints from his Piscataqua minister that 
the flock was forsaking piety: “Sir, you entirely mistake the matter; our ancestors did not come 
here on account of their religion, but to fish and to trade” (Saltonstall, 1941: 12). 
During the 17
th
 century, coastal New Hampshire towns were primarily focused on establishing 
permanent settlements (Saltonstall, 1941: 25), though still dependent on shipments of supplies 
from northern Europe (Belknap, 1812: 150-70). The outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642 
was a key turning point for New England fisheries, launching their independence. The extension 
of credit and equipment by English capitalists, such as those of the Laconia Company, had been 
critical to the development of markets (Jenness, 1795: 58-69). Although prices, access to credit, 
and traditional trade routes relative to the English market suffered, markets expanded to the 
Iberian Peninsula, and colonial fisheries became more self-reliant. To the Caribbean slave 
holding islands, low-grade cod was in demand (Vickers, 1994: 98-9). In New Hampshire, 
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Barbados rum and molasses were in demand, and briefly, African slaves. Fish and ship masts 
were key exports to both Europe and the West Indies (Saltonstall, 1941: 13). Thus, new trade 
routes emerged. 
The cod fishery was carried out both inshore and offshore. The inshore fishery was conducted 
with light, swift whale-boats, rowed either with two or four oars and steered with another. In 
winter, the whale-boats would fish by day, but in spring and summer, they would fish until full. 
Schooners typically made three trips to the “Banks” per season, were 20-50 tons, and carried six 
or seven men and a few boys. The spring trip to the Banks caught “large, thick” cod, which when 
salted and boiled, turned red in color and were reserved for Saturday dinner at the finest New 
England tables. The cod from the summer-fall trips were divided into two types: “merchantable” 
and “Jamaica.” The merchantable fish were white, thin, and less firm than the spring catch, but 
were good enough to export to Europe. The Jamaica fish was the smallest, thinnest and “most 
broken.” These were exported to the West Indies (Belknap, 1812: 157-70). Modern studies of 
cod spawning indicate that the condition of cod vary seasonally with spawning, resting, and 
feeding (Rideout & Burton, 2000). This likely explains the varying quality of the catch. Ipswich 
Bay, the primary inshore grounds, is an important spring spawning ground today (Howell, 
Morin, Rennels, & Goethel, 2008), whereas the Georges Bank stock spawns in winter and is 
feeding (i.e., “thick”) by spring (Kovach, Breton, Berlinsky, Maceda, & Wirgin, 2010). 
Located six miles offshore, the Isles of Shoals had a generally sunnier and drier climate, which 
enabled high quality codfish curing. By the 1650s, the Isles fisheries were turning steady profits, 
such that fishermen could obtain larger estates on the mainland. Wealth was amassed, 
developing a mercantile class and providing a local source of capital to expand the economy. The 
1660s was the high point for the Isles fisheries, with as many as 1,500 fishermen working on the 
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seven islands during the height of the season (Van Deventer, 1976: 88-9), exporting 12,000 
quintals (1.3M lbs) of dry cod from the region per year (Table 4) (NHPP, 1667). This equates to 
about 4 M lbs of round cod (K. Alexander, personal communication, 2012).
 5
  By comparison, 
1.2 M lbs of cod were landed in New Hampshire ports in FY 2010. 
The period between 1680 and 1850 was marked by episodes of fisheries expansion tempered 
with wartime contractions as vessels, markets and manpower were redirected. But soon, conflicts 
with the Abnaki tribe and King Philip’s War brought commerce to a relative standstill. By 1692, 
the population on the Isles had dropped to about 100. The colony traders were exporting just 
2,200 quintals (246,000 lbs.) of cod and mackerel per year in the mid 1690s, mostly bound for 
Barbados (Van Deventer, 1976: 89-90). Trading patterns were generally similar between 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, though by 1700, exports from Massachusetts ports, 100,000 
quintals (11.2 M lbs.), far outpaced those of New Hampshire, 1,300 quintals (146, 000 lbs.; Van 
Deventer, 1976: 90). The close of Queen Anne’s War in 1713 rebuilt English trade routes and 
sources of capital, but by then, colonial fisheries and merchants were well established on their 
own (Saltonstall, 1941: 25). Peace benefited both colonies. Portsmouth had an early rebound, 
with 100 vessels and 400 “seafaring men and fishermen” based in the Piscataqua River by 1720 
(Van Deventer, 1976: 91) (Table 4). From 1690 to 1725, the number of Gloucester schooners 
headed for the Banks rose from nothing to 49, and by 1775, there were almost 150 vessels and 
900 men employed. This exceeded any other port in Essex County (Vickers, 1994: 192) and 
likely overshadowed the effort from New Hampshire as well. 
New Hampshire had many conditions that favored prosperous fisheries. Portsmouth was a fine 
deep water seaport. The colony was closer to North Atlantic fishing grounds than Massachusetts. 
                                                 
5 Conversion factors between dried cod and round cod (head and guts removed) vary, but one pound of dried cod 
equals roughly three pounds of round cod. 
21 
Fish was consistently one of the most profitable exports. Many Piscataqua families gained wealth 
through fisheries. The 1708 records of New Hampshire fish merchant George Vaughan reveal 
profitable fisheries in Great Bay for cod, haddock, perch, flounder, sturgeon, herring, salmon, 
alewife, pike, trout, bass, crabs, cockles (clams), and oysters (Vaughan, 1708). The use of fish as 
currency in Portsmouth during the 1720s illustrates its importance to the economy (Van 
Deventer, 1976: 92). However, the New Hampshire oak and white pine resources accessible 
from Great Bay had fostered a niche for shipbuilding and maritime trades, which diversified the 
New Hampshire economy. Up until the Revolution, the “infinite thick woods” produced 200 foot 
pines that launched Portsmouth to predominance in the mast trade (Saltonstall, 1941: 55). 
Unsettled political relations with Indians and distant powers made investments in fisheries 
uncertain. Gloucester, with its aggressive seafarers, slipped ahead in fisheries, forever parting the 
trajectories of the two ports (Van Deventer, 1976: 93). 
FIRST SIGNS OF RESOURCE STRAIN 
The New Hampshire Fisheries Gazette published a notice in March 1774 of what may be the first 
public act in the state to constrain fish harvests due to stock depletions. The “Act to Preserve the 
Fish of the Piscataqua River,” prohibited fishing with seines or “setting line” anywhere in the 
river or its branches where “the tide ebbs and flows.” The public was authorized to destroy all 
such gear found therein. It also established a seasonal closure from December to April for bass 
and bluefish. The consequence for being caught fishing was a penalty of three pounds, half to be 
paid to the government and half to the informant. Commerce of smelts, bass, bluefish and cod 
“in contrary to the Act” would also be fined. Resource concerns were expressed in the Preamble: 
…the fishing in Piscataqua River, and in the harbor near the mouth of said river, 
with setting lines and seins hath already in a great measure obstructed and turned 
the course of the codfish and smelts in said river, and the fishing for bass and 
bluefish in winter, hath almost extirpated the bass and blue-fish in said river, so that 
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these useful fisheries are in eminent danger of being lost, unless prevented by an act 
of the general-Assembly ("An Act to Preserve the Fish in Piscataqua River," 1774). 
The Act exemplifies what Richard Judd has argued, that the conservation movement in America 
began not by the upper echelons of society, but by the common people concerned with fair 
access to public resources (Judd, 1997: 263). The New Hampshire Division of Archives and 
Records Management contains over 20 petitions of concern submitted to the Governor between 
1764 and 1815, some signed by over 100 people. Most complaints regarded anadromous fish 
passage and gear conflicts. Signatories saw diminished alewife stocks as an increasing number of 
mills were constructed. The petitions show struggles between fishermen with different levels of 
capital using different gear types: seines, scoop nets, and spears ("Petitions to the Governor, 
Council, and Legislature," 1764). Their concerns are not far off from what is heard at public 
fishery management meetings of today. 
EARLY AMERICA 
Trade out of Portsmouth harbor shrank rapidly during the American Revolution, as only a few 
vessels got permission to procure necessary provisions during wartime. Governor Wentworth 
was a loyalist and delayed the engagement of New Hampshire against England. It was the 
merchants and ship captains who took initiative, angered by restrictions on commerce 
(Saltonstall, 1941: 89-92). Once the United States was established, the nation was determined to 
grow its post-colonial economy, taking advantage of what were still largely perceived to be 
unlimited ocean resources (McEvoy, 1988: 213). 
The fishing banks are an inexhaustible source of wealth; and the fishing business is a 
most excellent nursery for seamen. It therefore deserves every encouragement and 
indulgence from an enlightened legislature (Belknap, 1812: 159). 
The period between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 has been called the “golden 
age” of lumbering, shipbuilding and fishing for Portsmouth (Saltonstall, 1941: 225). As the 
principal port city in the New Hampshire, by population and commercial importance, Portsmouth 
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served as the center of the customs district, which was thriving (Wilcox, 1887: 105). By the 
1790s, fifteen years into independence, the fishing industry had rebound to 27 schooners and 20 
boats employing 250 fishermen. There were nearly 3 M lbs. of dried cod exports per year 
between 1789 and 1791, primarily to the West Indies (Table 4) (Belknap, 1812: 159). 
Americans had a geographic advantage on the Banks, because the spring westerlies carried their 
vessels to fishing grounds earlier in the season than the Europeans could. New England air was 
clearer for fish drying than in foggy Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (Belknap, 1812: 159). There 
was a steady increase in foreign trade, but the War of 1812 caused another disruption. Although 
shipbuilding continued, fisheries prospered, and the “coasting” trade (shipping) rose in 
importance, voyages to the West Indies became rare and tariffs discouraged imports from 
Europe. With the decline in foreign trade, more men turned to domestic cod and mackerel 
fisheries for employment (Saltonstall, 1941: 96). Customs records indicate that up to 81 fishing 
vessels operated out of the Piscataqua in 1841 (Table 4) (Saltonstall, 1941: 197). 
Prominent in the 19
th
 century fisheries revival, Captain Thomas E. Oliver of Newcastle owned or 
had shares in more than 89 vessels between 1809 and 1856 (Marvin, 1937). He left detailed 
business records between 1815-1845 that offer a picture of the fishing and coasting industries of 
the time. Records from 1839 for example, indicate that over 2,164 quintals (242,000 lbs.; Table 
4) of “small” and “large” cod were landed from fishing grounds in the Bay of St. Lawrence, the 
Bay of Fundy, and Labrador (Oliver, 1815). He owned a fish yard that processed dried and salted 
fish products. Oil was extracted from cod, haddock, and pollock livers for medicines (Saltonstall, 
1941: 197). Along with fishing, he shipped fish to cities such as Baltimore, Norfolk, and 
Charleston (Ware, 1930). Purchases of cod, haddock, hake, and pollock from vessels such as the 
Providence, Nancy, Expedience, and Polly indicate that he transported other cargo south besides 
24 
his own fish (Oliver, 1815). His vessels returned with produce, tar, and other merchandise 
headed for Providence, Boston, and Portsmouth (Saltonstall, 1941: 197). 
The whaling industry in New England fueled much of the growing 19
th
 century economy 
(Roberts, 2007: 91), and the Piscataqua River was a primary locale for shipbuilding to support 
whaling. Despite sightings of whales feeding on alewives in the river, it was only during the 
downturn of the West India trade in the 1830s that Portsmouth took to whaling. Even so, just 
four whaling vessels ever operated out of Portsmouth: Plato, Triton, Ann Parry, and Pocahontas. 
In 1835, the Triton was the first to return from a whaling voyage to the South Atlantic, the 
preferred whaling waters, with 1,350 barrels of whale oil, 120 barrels of sperm oil, and 10,000 
lbs. of bone. The whaling days were short-lived though. The last vessel to be sold out of 
Portsmouth was the Ann Parry in 1848 to a company in Salem, Massachusetts who repurposed it 
to serve the California gold rush (Saltonstall, 1941: 197-9). Today, the local alewife runs are 
likely too low, and the Piscataqua River too depleted and industrial (noise, activity) to attract 
what whales remain in the Gulf of Maine. 
The New Hampshire coast was burgeoning as a summer destination in the early 19
th
 century, due 
to its fair climate and accessibility from Portland and Boston. Meteorological records show that 
Portsmouth had about 50% fewer rainy days and less rainfall, slightly cooler summer 
temperatures, and the least number of days with bleak easterly winds relative to its neighboring 
hubs. Summer tourism grew quickly in Rye, Hampton, Seabrook, and particularly on the Isles of 
Shoals (Jenness, 1795: 5-6). Though the Isles of Shoals had waned as a fishing hub after the 17
th
 
century (Jenness, 1795: 171), a few fishing families remained, apart from a brief period during 
the Revolutionary War when they were ordered to evacuate (Bolster, 2002: 13). In the 1840s, 
Star Island housed seven fishing families, and as legend goes: 
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…if a school of mackerel came into the cove at [Sabbath] meeting time, the 
congregation would rush out of the meeting house for their boats, with Elder 
Plummer not far in the rear (Laighton, 1930: 14). 
Seasonal residents lived amid the fishermen after 1848, when the first hotel was established on 
Appledore Island (Bolster, 2002: 13). Although the Isles of Shoals has waned as a resort 
destination today, the New Hampshire coast has remained important for tourism and recreational 
fishing. Area fishermen throughout the centuries have benefited from the presence of fish-hungry 
tourists. 
Industrialization brought the advent of steam-powered vessels in the 1850s, which caused a sharp 
downturn in the Portsmouth ship building industry, because it did not evolve with the times. By 
then, the Seacoast economy had diversified significantly, and the region shifted toward inland 
ventures (Saltonstall, 1941: 225-6). From 1867 to 1879, the fishing fleet of the Portsmouth 
Customs District still numbered as high as 125 vessels. During those years, Portsmouth dealers 
handled 154,000 cod, 494,000 mackerel, 17,000 herring, fish oil, shellfish and other fresh fish 
(Wilcox, 1887). 
The rise of fisheries in Portland had a slower start than in New Hampshire or Gloucester. 
Although it was proximal to good inshore grounds and the Nova Scotian banks, the demand for 
fish in Portland remained small until the advent of refrigerated transport put metropolitan 
markets for fresh product within reach. Both Portland and Gloucester had invested in filleting 
plants, which New Hampshire had not (Ackerman, 1941: 223-7). In 1887, the principal fishing 
ports in New England, in order of value were: Gloucester, Portland, Boston, Provincetown, and 
New Bedford (Table 5) (Goode & Collins, 1887). New Hampshire ports remain to this day, not 
among the top tier. 
 
26 
STATE INTERVENTION IN FISHERIES 
Towns were once the center of natural resource regulation, under a philosophy of common use 
and democratic access, but over the 18th and 19th centuries, communities that shared watersheds 
or marine fishing grounds began to compete for resources. With an industrializing economy, 
anadromous fish harvesters held little influence over more powerful mill owners that controlled 
river water supplies, despite their petitioning (Judd, 1997: 161). It was primarily over concern for 
the salmon and shad runs in the Merrimac and Connecticut rivers, where interstate waters were 
involved, that New Hampshire took the lead in establishing a fish commission (NHFG, 1966: 
34), but other New England states soon followed. On June 30, 1865, Henry Bellows and W. A. 
Sanborn were appointed by the New Hampshire Legislature to inquire into the “restoration of 
sea-fish (i.e., anadromous species such as salmon or shad) and introduction of new varieties of 
fresh-water fish into the waters of the state.” A stocking program for black bass, land-locked 
salmon and other species was started, but with an initial budget of under $100. High dams on the 
Connecticut and Merrimack Rivers were cited as the biggest challenge, which had excluded 
“sea-fish” for 20 years prior. The New Hampshire commissioners doubted that Massachusetts 
would agree to incur expenses related to restoring fish passage (NHFC, 1869: 643-4). 
In 1922, Jackson described the ecology of the Great Bay estuary, identifying the “Cod Grounds,” 
an area where “a considerable school of codfish,” weighing six to 15 pounds each, gathered in 
the late fall and early spring (likely to spawn). There also could be found cunners, sculpins, 
flounders, and skate. He also observed “frostfish,” whiting, and pollock, and shorelines of 
eelgrass beds “teaming with shrimp.” He attributed the damming of almost all the rivers that 
drain into Great Bay as the limiting factor on the distribution of fish. Salmon had not been 
present for many years due to the dams, and the Lamprey River eel run was just a fraction of its 
former glory. Other species that had disappeared by then include the common sturgeon, shad, 
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mackerel, bluefish, and striped bass. He also noted that all of Great Bay froze over in winter 
(Jackson, 1922). 
Although some strides were made for fish passage around dams (Judd, 1997: 161-8), 
commissioners by the mid-1930s had made the most progress with restocking. By then, the state 
Department of Fish and Game had formed, and in 1934, their “most important problem was to 
raise large numbers of legal fish to restock our lakes and streams.” Federal funds were secured to 
enlarge hatcheries and create rearing stations. Annually, state efforts were introducing about 
400,000 juvenile Atlantic salmon and smelts into lakes and rivers (NHFG, 1934). 
State involvement in marine fishing was not formalized until 1965, when the New Hampshire 
General Court charged the Fish and Game Department with the “regulation and promotion” of 
recreational and commercial salt-water fisheries. Money from licenses and fines was designated 
for the Marine Fisheries Fund to promote research and regulations. The first marine biologist 
was hired at that time. For 100 years prior, state efforts had concentrated on restoring inland 
fisheries, but unfortunately, little head-way had been made. The major stumbling blocks were 
pollution and dams, which had both increased, and pollution was affecting marine fisheries as 
well. However, commissioners in the mid-1960s were encouraged. Pollution had “finally become 
recognized as a problem of grave national concern,” and remediation funds were becoming 
available (NHFG, 1966: 31-5). Unfortunately, water quality in the estuaries is still a significant 
concern today. For the Piscataqua Estuary, 11 of 12 indicators of environmental quality had 
negative or cautionary trends in 2009, up from seven in 2006 (PREP, 2009). Harvest of shellfish 
and anadromous fish has remained quite low for several decades (NMFS, 2012).  
MODERN GROUNDFISH FISHERIES 
Perhaps the most impactful change in fisheries was the introduction of otter trawls and steam 
engines. Fishing trips to the Banks likely faded with the sunset of the schooner fishery in the late 
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1800s, and the 19
th
 century New Hampshire fleet transitioned to primarily day-boats that fished 
near shore. Although beam trawls had been occasionally used, they were clumsy to manage and 
had low fishing power relative to the otter trawl, which emerged in the 1880s (Roberts, 2007: 
157). This active method of harvest, later enhanced when U.S. vessels used steam engine power 
in the 1920s (Roberts, 2007: 156), caused much consternation among traditional fishermen who 
prophesied the doom of stocks. Concerned fishermen again turned to their governments for help 
for regulations, though within a few years, trawlers had become commonplace (Roberts, 2007: 
140-58). 
Today, New Hampshire fishing businesses are almost exclusively owner-operated, and likely 
have been since the end of the Banks schooner fishery in the 1800s. Though strong labor unions 
existed throughout the 20
th
 century in New Bedford, Gloucester and Portland (White, 1954: 42-
9), unionization was strongly opposed in New Hampshire. By and large, the era of mercantile 
capitalism in early America that had superseded colonial capitalism was giving way to 
independent fishermen, particularly in New Hampshire. 
Although there have been federal fishing reports ever since the U.S. Commission on Fish and 
Fisheries was established in 1871 (NOAA, 2007), regular accounting of landings by species, gear 
type and state was first done annually in 1950 by what was by then renamed the U.S. Bureau of 
Fisheries. Over the 62 years since, federal landings data (now collected by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service) indicate that the New Hampshire fisheries increased and became more 
diversified in terms of species caught and gear type used (Table 7, Table 8) (NMFS, 2012). The 
data are problematic for several reasons however, and likely underreport true catch for many 
fisheries. First, prior to about 1990, the landings data were not very accurate. Port agents would 
randomly interview fishermen at the dock, and fishermen would give estimates of catch. True 
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weights were not measured. Second, for all vessels under five net tons, the government recorded 
landings before the 1990s generically, with terms such as “fish for food, other” rather than by 
species. For small vessels under a certain weight, landings were not specified to the state level, 
but lumped together regionally or nationally. Vessels used by New Hampshire fishermen were 
generally of this weight category. Third, many of the fishermen based in New Hampshire would 
land fish in Portland, Gloucester or Newburyport, and their activity was attributed to Maine and 
Massachusetts. Likewise, fishermen from the southern tip of Maine would use the shore-side 
facilities of Portsmouth (D. Goethel, personal communication, 2012). Thus, weights were not 
being recorded accurately, and landings did not reflect the true activity of home ports. 
The landings from 1996-2006 are relatively well groundtruthed, because the formula used as the 
basis for setting Potential Sector Contribution (see Introduction) for the groundfish catch share 
program used catch history during that time (NEFMC, 2009a). When in 2008, the NEFMC set 
those years for the measurement of fishing history, many fishermen checked their federal 
landings history with their own records and worked with NMFS to resolve discrepancies. 
Unfortunately, many fishermen were accustomed to disposing of business records once the ten-
year tax liability window had expired. For them, there was no way to verify records for the years 
1996-1998 and have suffered with lower PSCs than they might have received (D. Goethel, 
personal communication, 2012). Even with data quality caveats, the landings do reveal a diverse 
industry active between 1950 and 2010, harvesting a wide variety of species (Table 7, Table 8). 
Gillnets and otter trawls are used to catch about 95% of groundfish today (NMFS, 2012). 
Although the landings data (Table 8) show that trawl gear did not migrate to New Hampshire 
until the 1970s, Frank Goss fished out of Seabrook from just after World War II into the 1960s 
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entirely with trawl gear, and there were at least two eastern rigs
6
 based in Portsmouth in the 
1960s. Once monofilament line became available in the 1960s, gillnets became prevalent (D. 
Goethel, personal communication, 2012), as seen in the time series of landings by gear type 
(Table 8). By 1978, there were just one or two larger groundfish vessels based in Portsmouth (J. 
M. Acheson, Acheson, Bort, & Lello, 1980).  
Today, there are about 130 federal fishing permit holders that have a homeport or landing port in 
New Hampshire and about 55 of those hold limited-access commercial groundfish permits 
(NMFS, 2013). The current commercial groundfish fishery in New Hampshire is comprised of 
vessels that are all less than 56 feet in length and fish primarily within about 30 miles of shore, 
focused between the Isles of Shoals and Cape Ann. Only a few fishermen use handlines to catch 
groundfish today, as it is generally considered an unprofitable venture (D. Goethel, personal 
communication, 2012). They primarily use gillnet and otter trawl gear and land fish in 
Portsmouth, Hampton, and Seabrook, as well as out of state in Portland, Newburyport, and 
Gloucester. An offshore lobster fleet emerged in the 1980s, and there are now more lobstermen 
than groundfish fishermen in the state (NMFS, 2013). 
The advent of fishermen’s cooperatives in the late 20th century greatly increased the within-state 
landings (Table 7, Table 5). Prior, what fish were not peddled locally got trucked to Boston or 
landed in Gloucester (J. M. Acheson, et al., 1980: 235). Fishermen based in all the New 
Hampshire ports would regularly bring their catch to shore in skiffs. Several fishermen pitched 
their catch into trucks, drove to Newburyport, and sold it to individual dealers. After the mid-
1970s, the Tri-Coastal Cooperative in Newburyport became a common destination for New 
                                                 
6
 An eastern rig is the fishing vessel that replaced schooners. It was powered by a diesel engine and dragged a 
conical otter trawl net. These vessels were common into the 1970s, when they were replaced with steel hulled 
vessels Seaport, M. (2012). Roann - Eastern-Rig Dragger. from http://www.mysticseaport.org/. 
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Hampshire fish. The Portsmouth Fishermen’s Cooperative formed in 1980 as a means to support 
a local industry (J. M. Acheson, et al., 1980: 235), and the Yankee Fisherman’s Co-operative in 
Seabrook was founded in 1990 (YFC, 2012). 
Activity at the Tri-Coastal Cooperative declined after Amendment 7 to the groundfish FMP was 
adopted in 1996 and decreased local fishing activity, but by then, many of the Hampton and 
Seabrook fishermen were using Yankee. Fishermen turned to cooperatives, in part, because some 
dealers were less than straightforward in their business practices. A sense of rugged 
individualism persists today, which is why many of the New Hampshire fishermen were wary of 
joining a groundfish sector (D. Goethel, personal communication, 2012). 
The New England fishing communities are more stable and diverse than northern neighbors such 
as Newfoundland, whose fishing economy was reliant on one product, cod. Without 
diversification, the Canadian communities were highly vulnerable to supply and demand and 
turned to the state for aid (Sider, 2003: 306). The inshore cod fishery was abandoned by the 
1950s, and the state, in turn, encouraged the abandonment of small communities for a centralized 
industrial fleet. The “professionalization” of the fishery into open ocean trawlers barely lasted 20 
years, ending with the dramatic cod collapse of the 1990s. Cod stocks remained low for some 
time (Sider, 2003: 3-5), though scientists have noted a recent upticks in the population (Rose & 
Rowe, 2015). Similarly, the New Hampshire groundfish fishery may soon become non-existent, 
unless it can outlast the current decline in Gulf of Maine cod. 
SUMMARY 
However overfished the cod stocks may be today, the cod of Ipswich Bay have been important to 
New Hampshire fishermen since the 1500s, and fishing activity has been constant since the early 
1600s. The Piscataqua and Hampton-Seabrook estuaries have been invaluable resources, both for 
the species they have contained and for the inland access their rivers have provided. Although 
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fishing communities in New Hampshire and Massachusetts were established simultaneously, 
Gloucester invested heavily in fisheries, while Portsmouth diversified into shipping, ship 
building, the mast trade, and land-based ventures. By the mid-1700s, many of the rivers had been 
dammed inland, and initial concerns about resource decline came from the affected fishermen. 
The first state intervention in fisheries was to mitigate freshwater user conflicts, but despite over 
150 years of concerted efforts, many of the anadromous and shellfish fisheries remain depleted. 
Marine fisheries have expanded and contracted throughout the centuries. Fisheries began by 
catching cod both inshore and on the Banks with sail power, but transitioned to steam in the late 
1800s and then to diesel in the early 1900s. Hooks were overshadowed by trawls and then by 
gillnets in the mid-20
th
 century. Today, the New Hampshire groundfish fishery is small and the 




CHAPTER II. THEORY 
NATURAL RESOURCES SOCIAL THEORY 
Theoretical constructs are commonly built and refined over time through scientific observation 
of cases. Within the study of how humans use the natural resources of their environment, it has 
been observed that, in the absence of external constraints, individuals tend to act rationally. They 
desire what is considered good. The assumption is that individuals use resources for their own 
best interest. Depletion occurs when the sum of the impacts by individual users is greater than 
what the resource can sustain. External constraints (e.g., regulations) then become necessary to 
ensure resource sustainability. 
To understand individual and group behavior in the face of scarcity, social scientists observing 
these phenomena over the past half-century have developed theories with descriptors such as 
“rational choice,” “collective action,” “common property,” and “participatory governance” (e.g., 
Abel, 1991; R. Hardin, 1982). Generally, they explain how societies use properties held in 
common, such as fish resources, and what conditions best promote (or hinder) sustainability - 
how people use their norms and institutions to interact with the natural environment. 
RATIONAL CHOICE 
According to rational choice theory, also called “choice theory,” individuals are purposive and 
intentional actors with a hierarchy of preferences. They seek specified outcomes that are 
consistent with their preferences. Yet, due to the scarcity of resources, individual action is 
constrained by opportunity cost, what needs to be given up to achieve preferred outcomes. 
Actions are also constrained by social institutions external to the individual, such as norms or 
laws, and by the sufficiency of information an actor possesses for decision-making. Thus, 
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individual outcomes vary by preferences, opportunity costs, institutional constraints and 
information. In theory, self-interested individuals without group norms or rules will act to exploit 
the common good to their own benefit. Even though individuals behave rationally, the group can 
become worse off collectively. Self-interested behavior in the acquisition of finite resources can 
lead to conflict among individuals, and an erosion of community social capital and benefits. 
Where constraints are unavoidable, actors will make cost-benefit calculations to rationally 
choose actions that advance their preferences (Friedman & Hechter, 1988; Malena, 2009). 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Just because a common interest exists, individuals will not necessarily take action voluntarily for 
the collective good. The possibility of achieving a group benefit may be an insufficient reason to 
generate collective action. There must be either incentives or rules (Friedman & Hechter, 1988). 
Mancur Olson (1971) described the “logic of collective action” as the tendency, based on the 
cost-benefit decision process of self-interested rational individuals, to “free ride” on the 
collective good, rather than agree to restrain their actions. This tendency is especially prevalent 
in larger groups where, Olson argues, it is less likely that any individual will obtain the supply of 
benefits they consider optimal, unless they free-ride. Thus, collective action (e.g., regulation) is 
typically required to provide common good for all. With collective action, there may be fewer 
conflicts among individuals, but the share of the good each individual can access is likely 
considered sub-optimal (M. Olson, 1971: 33-6). 
At what point does a group agree to take collective action? First, the benefits that result from the 
free-riding practices of an individual must be observed by others and cause them to free-ride as 
well. There becomes a point, with more free-riding, when the benefits to the free-riders become 
less than the benefits they would receive by taking collective action. When this is realized by 
enough (or sufficiently powerful) individuals, collective action occurs (R. Hardin, 1982: 8-9). 
35 
COMMON PROPERTY 
Biologist Garrett Hardin, regarded as a pioneer of common property theories, argued in the 
1960s that the ultimate solutions to resource scarcity problems are not technical but moral (G. 
Hardin, 1968). Building off the work of earlier scientists, he described a “tragedy of the 
commons,” where in a world of finite resources, it is not possible to maximize both the human 
population and the acquisition of individual human good simultaneously. People acting rationally 
seek to maximize their individual good by consuming a resource, which decreases the amount of 
said resource available to the rest of society. Freedom to maximize individual use of resources 
will ultimately cause the detriment, or “tragedy,” to society when the resource fails to sustain 
individual benefits. To avoid the tragedy, society may take collective action for mutual benefit. 
The “tragedy of the commons” has become the ubiquitous descriptor of the natural resource 
dilemma in the decades since the publication of Hardin’s seminal article. 
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
There is growing recognition that good governance requires the active participation of the 
governed, the public and their organizations. Participation can result in greater transparency, 
responsiveness and effectiveness of government and the empowerment of the citizenry. Benefits 
to political actors (e.g., managers) include greater stability, legitimacy and public support. In 
other words, rules to minimize selfish behavior have greater public acceptance and buy-in when 
the public is included in decision-making processes (Malena, 2009: 3-6). 
MOVING BEYOND RATIONAL CHOICE 
The traditional solution to the tragedy of the commons is government ownership of resources, 
the view that top-down organizations would best promote sustainability and enforcement of 
regulations (Ophuls, 1977: 226-7). Nobel laureate and economist Elinor Ostrom showed how 
governments can be subject to powerful lobbying by factions, have imperfect knowledge, and be 
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unable to enforce rules (Pennington, 2012). The opposite solution is the complete privatization of 
access rights, “removing wildlife from common property resource treatment” and rejecting the 
belief that “wildlife should be viewed as the common heritage of all mankind” (Smith, 1981: 
468). Privatization, can create concentration of rights and untenable transaction costs when 
limited resources are monetized (Pennington, 2012). 
Ostrom forwarded a different approach. People have more complex motivations and abilities to 
solve social dilemmas than rational choice theorists have assumed. Communities of users can 
develop effective rules and enforcement mechanisms for sustainable resource use. Rather than 
impose its will “top-down,” government can provide information and assist with enforcement of 
rules generated by a participatory processes. Polycentric governance of common-pool resources 
can foster participation at different levels by multiple entities: private, community, and state 
(Ostrom, 1990: 8-23). What is key is the active participation of resource users, building trust in 
the system, and taking the time to develop rules that are well-matched with ecological processes 
(Ostrom, 2010). 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FISHERIES 
Theories developed within the social sciences can be used to understand the actions of individual 
fishermen harvesting a stock held in common and to identify management strategies that would 
optimize benefits. The vast ocean, once thought timeless and eternally abundant, is in fact not 
immune from the tragedy of the commons. Through time, the driving force of fisheries decline 
has been the rational need to feed and provide for an ever-growing human population and an 
assumption that the world is capable of absorbing human impact. Acting in the absence of rules, 
and long before theories were constructed on the subject, the tragedy of the commons was 
realized in fisheries. Open-access fisheries, lacking defined rights and regulations such that 
anyone could harvest resources, were becoming untenable. 
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To reduce conflict among users and prevent resource depletion, various forms of rights systems 
have emerged globally through collective action, in an effort to reign in the common property 
challenges (Falque, De Alessi, & LaMotte, 2002, xxi-xxv; McCay, 2004). The U.S. National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA," 1970) has required participatory governance of common-
property resources for over four decades and the Magnuson-Stevens Act implemented the 
Regional Fishery Management Council system, a public forum for stakeholders and managers to 
make recommendations for federal fisheries management. The Councils emerged during an age 
when resource management had become more participatory, with a growing number of 
stakeholders and a recognition that natural resource dilemmas are too complex for top-down 
approaches alone (Berkes, 2003). 
In 2010, the NEFMC and NMFS took a step towards localized management when the groundfish 
sector program was expanded fishery-wide, delegating some management decisions to sectors of 
fishermen, some defined geographically and others defined by gear type or common interest. 
With voluntary enrollment and government by a board of directors, sectors are participatory in 
nature. The decision-making process to create the sector program spanned three years and 
involved over 70 public meetings. As an alternate management approach, the Council considered 
developing a Limited Access Privilege Program (e.g., IFQs), but since the MSFCMA requires a 
two-thirds majority vote of fishery permit holders to enact a LAPP, the NEFMC voted to drop 
this alternative due to the projected time such a program would take to develop. Time 
requirements to bring the stock rebuilding aspects of groundfish management into compliance 
with federal law trumped (see Introduction; NEFMC, 2007a). Though the Councils strive to 
practice participatory management, NMFS still has ultimate authority. 
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CATCH SHARE PROGRAMS 
Catch share fisheries semi-privatize a common property resource by allocating a specific portion 
of the total available catch to shareholders for their exclusive benefit, though participants lack 
ownership of the fish and the ability to decide the total catch limit (NRC, 1999). These shares of 
public wealth are usually gifted to individuals or to groups of fishermen (e.g., cooperative, 
sector) at the outset who can prove recent participation. Shareholders can benefit economically 
by participating in the fishery, actively fishing and/or leasing quota. They can also reap a one-
time gain by selling their shares. Those with ready access to sufficient capital can accumulate 
wealth by leasing in or permanently buying additional quota. In theory, where shares are 
tradable, they will go to the most efficient producers, and the excess capital and labor in the 
fishing industry will be redistributed to other parts of the economy (Wingard, 2000). 
In the midst of fiery debate about their benefits and costs to fishermen and society, catch share 
programs have been instituted since 1971 in 16 U.S. federal fisheries (NMFS, 2011a), often 
through years of public deliberation. The public, deliberative process of the U.S. Regional 
Fishery Council system has been critical to approaching a balance among diverse stakeholder 
interests. Lessons emerge from observing the impacts of catch share programs in specific 
fisheries. In many cases, programs have been designed and adjusted to address concerns specific 
to the particular fishery as managers learn from unanticipated consequences (Fina, 2011). 
Key administrators under President Obama have been particularly supportive of catch shares, 
and have exerted considerable pressure on the Councils to improve upon and create additional 
catch share programs to managing fisheries. To support the consistency and effectiveness of 
catch share programs around the country, NOAA convened a Catch Shares Task Force, which 
sought stakeholder input on a national catch shares policy, which went into effect November 4, 
2010. NOAA explicitly states that catch share programs: 
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 Are “powerful tools” to manage fisheries sustainably, by harvesting within annual catch 
limits and eliminating overfishing;  
 Create “greater cooperative and stewardship behavior by fishing participants;”  
 Maintain or rebuild fisheries; and  
 Sustain fishermen and vibrant working waterfronts (NMFS, 2011a; NOAA, 2010). 
Assessing the impacts of catch share programs is a developing field of research, and the multi-
faceted approach used in this dissertation is particularly novel. Thébaud et al. (2012) found, in 
reviewing 51 peer-reviewed studies world-wide between 2000-2011, great heterogeneity 
between studies in the indicators analyzed, making theory generation challenging. Studies tend to 
focus on a particular aspect (e.g., ecological, economic) rather than integrate across dimensions 
(as this dissertation strives to accomplish), despite increasing requirements to do so for 
management purposes. The literature is relatively rich in analysis of some programs, such as the 
North Pacific halibut/sablefish IFQ program, now almost 20 years old. In contrast, lessons are 
just emerging from the nascent sector program of the Northeast groundfish fishery. In many 
cases, programs have been designed and adjusted to address concerns specific to the particular 
fishery as managers learn from unanticipated consequences. The public, deliberative process of 
the fishery Council system has been critical to approaching a balance among diverse stakeholder 
interests (Fina, 2011). 
Research suggests that, under catch shares, annual catch limits can be realized and the “race to 
fish” reduced relative to the prior management approach. In 15 North American fisheries, the 
discard rate of unwanted bycatch was significantly reduced, and fishing activity (e.g., landings, 
discard rates, and the ratio of catch to catch quotas) has been more stable over time since catch 
shares were implemented (Essington, 2010). In a study of 11,135 fisheries world-wide from 1950 
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to 2003, about 27% were identified as collapsed in 2003, but of the 121 that were managed with 
catch shares, just 9% were collapsed (Costello, Gaines, & Lynham, 2008). Catch share programs 
can, in theory, provide a mechanism to manage fisheries sustainably and with improved 
economic performance (Sanchirico & Hanna, 2004). 
Not all studies have concluded positive economic, social, and/or ecological results. The 
dissenting critics question aspects such as the economic promise of rights-based fisheries and the 
social consequences of consolidation (e.g., Copes, 1986; McCay, 2004). The transition to a catch 
share program is often posed as the market solution to excess capacity in a fishery, or “too many 
boats chasing too few fish.” However, the initial allocation is not market based. Wealth that is 
owned by the citizenry is transferred as a “right” to a limited few (Bromley, 2005). Matters of 
social equity have also been raised by critics. The economics of catch share programs raise 
fundamental questions about what is equitable in the distribution and redistribution of wealth 
gained from a common property resource. The income of fishing laborers (e.g., crew) may be 
reduced to account for the new costs of redistributed quota (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009). 
Fishing is a cherished way of life for many coastal communities, and with the redistribution of 
quota shares, small communities are said to suffer consequences from quota migrating to larger 
ports with more access to capital investments in the fishery. When fishing leaves ports, cascading 
impacts are felt by families and shoreside support businesses (NRC, 1999). 
Factors external to a catch share program may preclude achievement of management goals, while 
resulting in significant social impact (Wingard, 2000). Several such factors are relevant to the 
Northeast groundfish catch share program. One is the level of scientific uncertainty that persists 
with the Northeast groundfish stocks (Palmer, 2014). Thus, efforts to harvest within the quota 
may be in vain if managers set ACLs higher than realistically sustainable levels. Although catch 
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shares may promote advance planning, uncertainty about future catch limits make this difficult 
for fishing businesses. Catch share programs create an economic externality in that they require 
substantial public resources to administer, costs that are borne by the taxpayer rather than by 
those benefiting from the program. 
RATIONALE FOR HYPOTHESES 
This dissertation tests several theories about catch chares. The rationale for each hypothesis 
under investigation is explained through a discussion of the theory, literature, and evidence from 
preliminary work. It was reasonable to expect to see evidence of if and how each factor of 
fishing had been impacted by the catch share program, given that the interviews occurred over 
two years after the implementation of the program. 
FISHING PRACTICES 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has improved efficiency and flexibility for fishermen to decide 
where, when, and how to fish. 
Catch share programs are theorized by economists to allow more flexibility for choice in 
individual fishing practices, which leads to more efficiency within the industry (Copes, 1986). 
By timing fishing when prices are high, rather than be constrained by trip limits or time/area 
closures, the economic potential of allocations can be maximized. The transition to the fishery-
wide catch share program in the Northeast Multispecies fishery was concomitant with the 
exemption of sector vessels from daily trip limits and some closures. Amendment 16 describes 
that the motivations to form or join a sector include “freedom from restrictive regulations not 
needed to meet conservation objectives” (NEFMC, 2009a: 99). Trip limits had varied over the 
years prior to FY 2010, but in FY 2009, there was a Gulf of Maine cod trip limit of 800 pounds 
per day. By transitioning to an annual catch limit, it was theorized that fishermen would have 
more flexibility in how they would fish the available catch, leading to more efficient operations. 
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Preliminary work in 2010 for this dissertation revealed that the ability to lease quota may add 
some flexibility by allowing continued fishing once the ACE associated with one’s own permits 
is caught (Feeney, 2010; Appendix A). A majority of NEFS XI and XII members interviewed by 
J. Wiersma had improved catch per unit effort. For the gillnetters, this stemmed in part, from 
fishing more gillnets per day than under DAS (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011; 
Appendix A). 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has improved social capital (i.e., greater networking, reciprocity 
and trust) among fishermen in the conduct of business, in harvesting sector 
allocations, and reducing bycatch. 
The concept of “social capital” is becoming increasingly popular within the social and political 
science arenas. Social capital is a broad term that has many definitions depending on the 
perspective that is particularly relevant to the case in question. A central premise is that by 
making and sustaining connections with one another, people are able to achieve things together 
that they would not be able to do individually, or could only do with difficulty (Field, 2003). The 
term calls attention to the importance of social ties in increasing productivity. Robert Putnam, a 
prominent political scientist on the subject defined social capital as: 
…connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000). 
Trust within a community arises when there is mutual expectation of cooperative behavior based 
on shared norms and values, and when individuals can subordinate their own interests to those of 
the community. The ability for a group to cooperate depends on the degree of trust that exists. It 
is much easier to create cooperative agreements within communities where a large amount of 
social capital exists (Paldam & Tinggaard Svendsen, 1999). Because fishing within a sector 
requires some degree of cooperation among fishermen to not exceed their joint catch limits, 
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examination of social capital within the New Hampshire fishing community is particularly 
important to the research reported here. 
It has been observed that the participatory aspect of catch shares can lead to an increase in social 
capital and cooperation among fishing participants, but the initial catch allocation formula can be 
a source of contention among participants (Grafton et al., 2006). The Northeast groundfish sector 
program was designed to devolve some of the administrative responsibilities to sectors, such as 
ensuring that a sector does not exceed its annual allocation and enforcing rules adopted through 
its sector operations plan (NEFMC, 2009a: 98-121). The first sector that formed in 2004 was 
comprised of fishermen on Cape Cod who were already members of the same industry 
association, building on social capital already established through shared interests and places 
(McCay, 2004). The region-wide sector program was built off a similar model of voluntary 
membership, with fishermen aligning largely via pre-existing networks.  
Holland and colleagues have explored social capital within the Northeast groundfish fishery 
through a survey administered just prior to sector implementation, which can serve as a baseline 
measure (D.S. Holland, Kitts, Pinto da Silva, & Wiersma, 2013; D. S. Holland, Pinto da Silva, & 
Wiersma, 2010). At that time, a high degree of trust and information sharing was demonstrated 
within the industry, and it was hypothesized that the longevity of a sector may depend on the 
degree of social capital within it. Olson and Pinto da Silva (2014) found sector managers to be 
important in linking members within a sector, in linking between sectors, and with fishery 
managers. Preliminary research for this dissertation revealed that fishermen may be showing a 
degree of cooperation and willingness to make sectors be successful to a greater degree than 
expected, as they have traditionally been independent competitors. The new organizational 
construct may also be allowing new industry leaders to emerge (Feeney, 2010; Appendix A). 
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BYCATCH 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has reduced bycatch through incentives and flexibility to harvest 
more selectively. 
Marine life that is caught accidentally in fishing gear is bycatch. “Bycatch” is an umbrella term, 
encompassing both regulatory and economic discards. These terms are defined legally by the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: 
The term "bycatch" means fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not 
sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards and regulatory 
discards. 
The term "economic discards" means fish which are the target of a fishery, but which 
are not retained because they are of an undesirable size, sex, or quality, or for other 
economic reasons. 
The term "regulatory discards" means fish harvested in a fishery which fishermen 
are required by regulation to discard whenever caught, or are required by 
regulation to retain but not sell ("MSFCMA," 2007). 
All federally-managed fisheries must take steps to minimize bycatch “to the extent practicable,” 
meaning that non-target fish must be avoided. If that is impossible, management measures must 
minimize bycatch mortality (NMFS, 2009). 
Catch shares programs can be designed to reduce regulatory discards relative to a trip limit 
approach, if all legal sized fish must be landed. In addition, discards of under sized fish or of 
non-target species can be counted against total quotas. These measures help ensure that catch is 
sustainable. However, where there is insufficient enforcement and/or monitoring, inaccuracies in 
the catch data have detrimental effects on stock assessment and future management decisions. To 
maximize benefits from a quota, harvesters have an incentive to “high-grade” when unobserved 
(Copes, 1986). Discarding lesser valued fish in search of the best fish can undermine long-term 
fishery yields. Thus, measures designed to ensure long-term fishery benefits, can create 
unintended externalities borne by future generations of fishermen and consumers. 
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Multispecies fishery catch share programs are particularly prone to bycatch problems, because 
catch rarely conforms to the proportion of stocks in an allocation portfolio (Copes, 1986). The 
harvest limit can be reached for stock A, while stock B that is caught simultaneously remains 
unharvested. Without selective devices, continued fishing results in overharvest of stock A. 
Ideally, the quota available for both A and B would match what is caught. In practice, natural 
variability in the ecosystem can lead to variation in the mix of concomitant stocks when fishing 
activity takes place (Leal, 2002). 
The Northwest Atlantic has long been a source of bounty for groundfish species, but many of 
these stocks are now considered overfished and remain at persistently low levels of abundance, 
despite several decades of restrictions on fishing gear, closed areas, number of fishing days, and 
other effort controls, including trip limits for depleted species. In practice, there was significant 
waste, since those stocks were often unavoidable. In 2010, the catch share program took a new 
approach with Annual Catch Limits for the multispecies fishery. Managers hoped that by 
introducing output controls, rebuilding targets would be met for more species (NEFMC, 2009a). 
However, efforts to rebuild stocks may be in vain if a significant amount of bycatch remains, 
particularly if leasing quota comes at a high cost. 
The sector program aimed to increase efficiency for sector vessels and reduce regulatory 
discards. There is scant peer-reviewed literature on changes to discards, apart from stock 
assessment reports (see Chapter VII). There is some evidence that bycatch may be reduced for 
species previously subject to trip limits, but not on non-target species like windowpane flounder 
(T. Nies, personal communication, 2011). 
The preliminary work for this dissertation indicated that discards on observed trips may be 
reduced, but discarding may occur when vessels do not carry federal observers (Feeney, 2010; 
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Appendix A). Additionally, informants interviewed by J. Wiersma indicated that avoiding 
bycatch was challenging, but they were adjusting fishing areas to avoid unwanted fish (J. 
Wiersma, personal communication, 2011; Appendix A). 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has improved economic performance (e.g., profit margins, business 
predictability) for fishing participants, though the fishery would consolidate to fewer 
permit holders and vessels actively fishing. 
In theory, catch shares improve the economic efficiency of fishing by allowing market forces to 
balance capacity with resource availability. The flexibility gained by an approach focused less on 
input controls can lead to maximizing the economic gains from allocations, timing fishing when 
prices are high (Sanchirico & Hanna, 2004). Where shares are tradable, as in the Northeast 
Multispecies fishery, fishery participants lease or permanently transfer quota to adjust the size of 
their fishing businesses to remain solvent. Those wishing to leave the fishery, temporarily or 
permanently, may lease or sell their quota to others who wish to enter or gain more harvest 
rights. Excess capital (e.g., vessels) is removed from the industry, and the remaining participants 
realize higher profits, by reducing operating expenses and increasing revenue through developing 
and improving product quality for consumers (Leal, 2002).  
Consolidation was a stated goal of the groundfish catch share program, as outlined through 
Amendment 16 (NEFMC, 2009a). By letting the market redistribute the allocation, rather than 
managers, consolidation has occurred in several catch share fisheries as the “winners” buy a 
viable quantity of quota from the “losers” (e.g., Eythorsson, 2000; McCay, 2004). An influx of 
quota coming to the market at the beginning of a program depresses quota prices, setting up a 
“buyer’s market” - the buyers stand to gain significantly more than the sellers. Despite low 
prices, acquiring quota poses a substantial financial burden as shareholders must enter capital 
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markets and be strapped with debt obligations. Creditors view investment in fisheries as highly 
risky, given the unpredictability of Annual Catch Limits, so credit for quota purchases can come 
with high interest rates. Under debt obligations, quota shareholders are exposed to risk when 
fishery regulators reduce ACLs to rebuild fish stocks; they lose income and cannot repay their 
debts. Debt-laden industry members, if organized, may create enough political pressure on 
managers to prevent near-term reductions in harvest levels that may be necessary for long-term 
fishery viability, a biological consequence (Bromley, 2005). 
Just prior to FY 2010, a telephone survey of groundfish permit holders across the Northeast 
revealed dissatisfaction with the Days-at-Sea program and declining profits, though there was 
little optimism for the future under sector management. Of 542 respondents, 300 were active in 
the fishery at the time, representing over 50% of all active permit holders. When asked about 
their prospects under catch shares, 78% of respondents felt that their income from groundfish 
would continue to decline, while just 4% predicted an increase. A majority of respondents (75%) 
indicated that crew incomes were declining, and it was getting harder to find and retain skilled 
labor. Given their economic condition, 62% of the respondents felt that they could only remain 
in business another two years, and 78-81% was either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their 
actual earnings or the predictability of their earnings. Most felt that the current regulatory 
program had increased business costs, with 74% of respondents forecasting that the imminent 
management changes would increase costs further (D. S. Holland, et al., 2010). 
For many years before the catch share program in the Northeast, the groundfish fishery had been 
a limited access fishery, and restrictive stock rebuilding measures resulted in progressively 
decreased effort in the fishery (Kitts, et al., 2011). In addition to expanding the catch share 
program fishery-wide, Amendment 16 instituted restrictive catch limits. Given the short time 
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horizon since the sector program started, the impacts of catch shares may not be discernible by 
just examining econometric data. It may be difficult to discriminate between the impacts of catch 
shares and the concomitant reductions in harvest levels to meet rebuilding targets. Direct query 
of fishery participants can help to understand nuance and determine causality. 
The preliminary work for this dissertation indicated that fish prices in 2010 were higher than 
normal, due to lower volume on the market. However, the quota was very expensive to lease and 
fishermen have been going out of business due to lack of quota. The Yankee Fishermen’s 
Cooperative was experiencing 50% less revenue as of November 2010 relative to the year prior, 
and may have trouble remaining solvent (Feeney, 2010; Appendix A). Additionally, informants 
interviewed by J. Wiersma indicated that profits were down for 42% of informants, in part, due 
to new costs for monitoring and administration. Some fishermen had already adapted by 
diversifying into other fisheries to remain viable (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011; 
Appendix B). 
SAFETY 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has increased operational safety for active vessels. 
NOAA has cited improved safety as a benefit of catch shares (NMFS, 2011a). It has been 
theorized that by reducing the “race to fish,” fishermen have less incentive to fish in dangerous 
weather and sea conditions and without rest (Woodley, 2002). However, Windle et al. (2008) 
observed through a literature review that some catch share programs have not decreased accident 
and fatality rates, and that where operators rely on leasing quota, or are working under contract 
in vertically-integrated businesses (e.g., processors controlling fishing activity), there may be 
increased pressure to fish in unsafe conditions. In the Northeast Multispecies fishery, removing 
some time constraints on effort (e.g., DAS counting, daily trip limits) may be increasing safety. 
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However, preliminary research for this dissertation revealed that fishing may be occurring 
further offshore, and the bureaucracy involved in sectors (e.g., increased observer coverage and 
reporting) has been creating more distractions at sea than before (Feeney, 2010; Appendix A). 
These are issues that may disprove the hypothesized safety benefits of catch shares in the New 
Hampshire case. 
WELL-BEING 
Relative to fishing under the Days-at-Sea system, fishing under the catch share 
(sector) program has improved well-being, decreasing stress and concern about the 
conduct of business and the future of the fishery. 
In the context of this dissertation, measurements of well-being focus on the personal stress of the 
informants, their job satisfaction, and the degree of concern about the current and future state of 
the fishery. Well-being has also been defined more broadly by the NMFS Northeast Fisheries 
Science Center to include individual, family and community physical, mental, and psychological 
condition (Clay, Kitts, & Pinto da Silva, 2014). If the sector program improved economic 
performance and safety, made fishing practices more efficient, increased social capital, and 
reduced bycatch, a likely product would be an improved sense of well-being for participants. 
There is a paucity of empirical studies of well-being relative to catch share programs, though 
impacts on well-being are often implied in the economic literature. Adverse consequences of 
catch shares can include consolidation of permits and quota, job loss, and displacement of 
smaller-scale harvesters, all decreasing well-being for those exiting the fishery (McCay, 2004). 
Studies of the Pacific halibut/sablefish IFQ fishery have shown that despite efforts to retain the 
historic nature of the fleet, there was a disproportionate transfer of quota out of fishing 
communities with populations under 1,500. These communities are remote, particularly 
dependent on fishing, and have little alternate economic opportunities without access to 
sufficient quota. Fishermen in the smaller communities tend to have less capital to purchase 
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sufficient quantities of quota to stay economically viable (Carothers, Lew, & Sepez, 2010; Fina, 
2011). A survey of shareholders revealed that quota sellers tended to be older, have lower 
incomes, and be of native Alaskan decent. With the exit of quota, remote communities can suffer 
the consequences of unemployment and economic loss in shore-side support businesses. In that 
case, solving one dilemma, too many participants, created another, disproportionate impacts to 
small or indigenous communities (Carothers, 2013). 
Pollnac and colleagues have proposed that fishing satisfies a basic human need, self-
actualization, which includes a sense of challenge, adventure and independence, and that these 
aspects keep commercial fishermen fishing despite times of decreased economic performance 
(e.g., Pollnac & Poggie, 2008). A 2012 survey of over 400 commercial fishermen throughout the 
Northeast (New England and Mid-Atlantic) revealed that self-actualization was the only 
component of job satisfaction unaffected by the increase in regulations imposed on fisheries 
since the 1970s (Pollnac, Seara, & Colburn, 2014). 
The preliminary work for this dissertation, in the fall of 2010 (less than six months after program 
implementation), revealed feelings of frustration, in part, because fishermen had little choice but 
to enroll in the sector program. At the time, there was great uncertainty regarding future catch 
limits, hampering informed business decisions (Feeney, 2010; Appendix A). Additionally, 33% 
of informants interviewed by J. Wiersma, indicated that sector management has reduced the 
enjoyment of fishing (J. Wiersma, personal communication; Appendix A). These observations 
are not surprising, given that the program was implemented with a great deal of uncertainty 
among fishermen for how the first year would play out. The theorized improvements to well-




CHAPTER III. METHODS 
PROJECT APPROACH 
Social research includes a number of theoretical approaches to meaning making. This 
dissertation examined a broad question through in-depth analysis of a fairly discrete population, 
a case study of the New Hampshire groundfish fishery. Case studies are particularly well suited 
for working with a small number of people and usually include detailed descriptive data from 
several sources including interviews of primary and secondary informants and researcher 
observations. Drawbacks of case studies include the potential that a case may not reflect a wider 
phenomena and the potential to introduce researcher bias (McQueen & Knussen, 2002: 12-13), 
both of which were carefully acknowledged and accounted for, as noted in this chapter. 
An early step in this case study was to determine whether theory would be generated through 
engaging with the research subject and the empirical data to be discovered therein (e.g., a 
grounded theory approach) or whether testable hypotheses based on previously generated theory 
would be applied to determine their relevance and limits. Because a number of theories about the 
performance of catch share programs have already emerged, and are in some cases being used to 
promote additional catch share programs (Chapter II), it was appropriate to test and potentially 
modify current theory. However, some methods of the grounded theory approach were used, 
such as theoretical coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), as described later in this chapter. 
Quantitative and qualitative research methods were used in conjunction to investigate the 
hypotheses. There are many legitimate approaches to social science research, and each comes 
with its particular strengths and limits. Quantitative methods can be carefully controlled and 
standardized, with random samples from a population that can confidently yield conclusions that 
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can be generalized. However, reliance on purely statistical descriptions of social phenomena can 
be misleading, and quantitative relationships between variables do not necessarily imply 
causality, which is where qualitative analysis can help. Qualitative research has been defined as 
an “interpretive study” in which “the researcher is central to the sense that is made” (Parker, 
1994). Thus, qualitative approaches can require elevated levels of involvement with the subject 
and extra time. Qualitative methods can capture complexity and nuance and adapt to what is 
learned during the research process, but do not alone capture the statistical significance of a 
result. Mixing methods is becoming more common in the social sciences to employ the strengths 
of various approaches, yielding well-rounded analyses (Greene, 2007: 31-48). However, by 
mixing methods, some purely qualitative or quantitative analyses cannot be pursued due to time 
limitations. In the case of this dissertation, qualitative methods were expected to produce insights 
not obtainable through numerical analysis alone, so a balance was struck between approaches.  
Journaling was an important aspect to this project, first in a paper journal and later as memos 
using QSR NVivo 10 software. A journal was used in the project design phase, to brainstorm and 
identify the questions, variables, population, sample, interview structure and approaches to data 
analysis. During project execution, this journal documented how the project methods were 
carried out and served as the decision record for adjusting the project as issues arose. After each 
interview, memos were written describing the informants, their responses, and any questions that 
that might need further investigation. Memos also captured themes emerging from data analysis. 
Journaling occurred almost every time this dissertation was worked on, up through the data 
analysis stage. With the transition to writing, the degree of journaling tapered as reflections on 
the data were recorded and developed in the dissertation itself. The utility of journaling to this 
project is further described later in the chapter. 
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DATA COLLECTION 
Appropriate permissions were obtained to conduct the research from the University of New 
Hampshire Institutional Review Board (IRB; Appendix D). Data collection methods conformed 
to IRB standards and were tailored to address the research questions and hypotheses with the 
least bias. In selecting the population, sample, query method, and interview questions, and in 
conducting sampling, sources of potential bias with various approaches were weighed. Bias 
could exist within the study design or implementation. The research team eliminated what was 
avoidable and minimized what was not. Some biases were unavoidable such that results need to 
be qualified. 
QUERY METHOD 
It was determined that the best method of understanding the dynamics of the New Hampshire 
groundfish fishery relative to the research question was through direct query of fishery 
participants. The New Hampshire groundfish fishermen and fish dealers comprised the target 
population, ensuring that the population contains people that are directly impacted by fishery 
regulations. It was also determined that this population would be best queried through face-to-
face contact rather than group interviews or a survey. In group interviews, response bias can be 
introduced when respondents defer to the dominant speaker or respond according to what is 
socially desirable to the group. Surveys can also have response bias if questions are 
misinterpreted or are inappropriate for the respondent (Weisberg, Krosnick, & Bowen, 1989). 
Thus, the query method selected to reduce several biases was one-on-one in-person, semi-
structured interviews with primary informants asking open-and closed-ended questions. 
VARIABLES 
This study examined six key aspects of fishing: fishing practices, social capital, bycatch, 
economic performance, safety, and well-being are here considered the dependent variables. 
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Factors responsible for the dependent variables changing were the independent variables, such as 
demographics. There is a trade-off in research, between concentrating on one single factor that is 
likely to be the key causal variable and including all possible variables in a study, examining the 
combined effects on the dependent variables. The focused approach risks ignoring important 
causal factors, but a study can get unwieldy with too many variables. This research seeks to 
examine a suite of independent variables sufficient to accurately assess the hypotheses. 
POPULATION IDENTIFICATION 
The next decisions involved bounding the population. How should New Hampshire groundfish 
fishery participants be defined? An objective of the research is to measure change in the fishery 
across time, before and after the catch share program began in Fishing Year 2010. Thus, it is 
important that the population include people who are currently active in the fishery and those 
who were active before FY 2010. This avoids undercoverage bias. People were included in the 
population if, during FY 2009, FY 2010, or FY 2011, they held a limited access Northeast 
Multispecies permit and their homeport, primary landing port, or residence was in New 
Hampshire.  
There were 81 permit holders (i.e., fishermen) who met the criteria for inclusion in the 
population (Table 9), determined using publically available lists of federal fishery permit holders 
obtained from the NMFS Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office. Some permit holders are 
listed by business name, and J. Wiersma and Yankee Co-op staff helped identify an individual 
associated with those businesses. Internet searches also helped find people associated with 
business names. To capture shore-side impacts, fish dealers were also identified. Dealers were 
defined as those holding federal dealer permits that were based in New Hampshire and actively 
purchased groundfish at some point since FY 2009. There were four fish dealers who met these 
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criteria, two of whom were also in the permit holder population. Including this overlap (counting 
these individuals once), the total population was 83. 
The population was stratified into five cohorts: members of NEFS XI and XII, members of other 
sectors, members of the common pool, former fishermen, and fish dealers. To attribute causality 
of variable change to the sector program versus allocation reduction or other factors, the study 
needed to include each cohort for comparison (Figure 1). Sector rosters (publically available) 
were examined to identify population members who had permits enrolled in particular sectors 
during the time period. Members of NEFS XI and XII were grouped into a cohort (n=27; 32%). 
They are the two sectors based in New Hampshire and share a board of directors and sector 
manager. Members of sectors not based in New Hampshire were grouped into the “other sectors” 
cohort (n=11; 13%). Those permit holders not enrolled with a sector were determined to be in the 
common pool (n=22; 26%). Former fishermen were defined as individuals who held multispecies 
permits in FY 2009-2011, but not in FY 2012 (n=21; 25%). A few in the population had permits 
enrolled in more than one category. For simplicity, a determination was made that if an 
individual had at least one permit enrolled in NEFS XI and XII, they were placed into that 
cohort. If an individual had at least one permit in another sector and rest in the common pool, 
they were placed in the “other sector” cohort. Identifying which cohort the individuals belong in 
was not easy, and the assignment of people to cohorts changed throughout the data collection 
process as the research team became more familiar with the population. 
DEVELOPING INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Selecting the number, content, and wording of interview questions involved minimizing 
voluntary and response biases. Interview length needed to be less than one hour, so that 
informants would be willing to complete an entire interview. A mixture of close-ended and open-
ended questions were developed to garner quantitative and qualitative responses. The closed-
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ended questions limit the range of response into dichotomous, multiple category, rating, and 
Likert (level of agreement) scales. Open-ended questions invite the interviewee to express 
feelings, values and opinions in an unstructured format (McQueen & Knussen, 2002). Questions 
were revised several times prior to the interviews to avoid confusing informants and to ensure 
acquisition of the intended data. Some questions were determined to be too formal. Additional 
open-ended questions were added to better understand the closed-ended responses. Some of the 
phrasing was reworded to avoid leading answers. For sensitive subjects, response categories 
were bracketed (e.g., age) or became open-ended (e.g., bycatch). Questions for dealers were also 
created. Some ideas for questions came from the dissertation committee. 
Interview design and questions were tested on a small subset of the sample (four informants 
representing different cohorts) prior to conducting the full set of interviews. The question 
phrasing and order was revised after each, as limitations and mistakes were discovered. For 
example, the interviews included a series of the same questions about fishing activity in FY 
2009, 2010, and 2011. In the first iteration, questions started with FY 2011 and worked back in 
time, because it was assumed that the least response bias would result from starting with topics 
that would be easiest to recall, from the most recent past. After the first few interviews, it was 
clear that informants were having difficulty tracking change back through time, so the questions 
were subsequently asked in chronological order. 
Bias due to social desirability was a concern in designing questions. For example, to meet project 
objectives, it was important to ask about how business profits changed over the past few years. 
Rather than specific dollar amounts, the questions asked for trends, such as “Since May 2010, 
have the profit margins of your fishing business decreased, remained the same, or increased?” 
Trends are also easier to recall than specific numbers. 
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FISHING PRACTICES. Informants were queried about conditions that impact fishing efficiency and 
the level of flexibility. Fishermen were asked how their fishing practices impact Catch per Unit 
Effort (CPUE), i.e., the landings derived from the time spent at sea. Flexibility was measured as 
the ability to adjust fishing practices to local conditions and freedom to make individual 
decisions. Fishermen were asked to identify the area and time of year that they fish, trip length, 
and if there have been changes in terms of gear or fishing area conflicts or lost gear. Sector 
members were asked what exemptions from DAS they are using and if they are able to fish the 
quota they have access to. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL. There is no consensus on how to measure social capital of a community, and 
quantitative assessments are complicated. The networks, reciprocity and trust that exist are 
intrinsically tied to local circumstances (Field, 2003). Thus, different proxies for social capital 
have been used as indicators depending on the particular purpose. Here, the focus is on 
understanding three key aspects of social capital as defined by Putnam (2000): 
 Networks. Communication channels and topics. 
 Reciprocity. Willingness to support fellow fishermen and keep quota within the 
community; willingness to lend and borrow resources. 
 Trust. Cooperation in ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ scenarios; perceptions of honesty. 
Since there is no single independent variable that captures social capital in its entirety, it is 
important to triangulate among many sources of evidence. Thus, over ten questions on social 
capital were asked during the interviews (Appendix B). For example, to determine the degree of 
networking, data were collected on the topics that informants communicate about (e.g., business, 
management), where the communication location (e.g., on land, at sea), and who is included in 
their network (i.e., number of fishermen, where from). 
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BYCATCH. Public access to data and inconsistencies in data recording between the DAS and 
sector fisheries, both pre- and post May 2010 make quantitative measures difficult. Under DAS, 
bycatch includes the non-target catch (ND), sub-legal target catch (SD), and regulatory discards 
(RD) (Table 1).
7
  Under sectors, bycatch includes non-target catch (NS) and sub-legal target catch 
(SS).
8
  Theoretically, total bycatch could be calculated by adding components (ND + SD + RD or 
NS + SS) or each component could be compared to determine, for example, the difference in sub-
legal target catch between DAS and sectors (SD vs. SS). Bycatch could be compared between 
sector and non-sector vessels (both pre- and post May 2010) by backing out the regulatory 
discards of DAS management, determining difference in non-target and sub-legal catch. 
These calculations are difficult for a number of reasons. For sector trips, landings and discards 
are reported by the sector manager on a species, strata,
9
 and season basis. These data are also 
recorded on observed trips. Prior to May 2010, the only discard data was from observed trips, 
and the percent of observed trips was lower at that time. 
Due to the aforementioned challenges, the focus for this dissertation was not a quantitative 
analysis of fishery data. Rather, this dissertation attempts to show whether the incentives and 
flexibility inherent in sector management are acting to change fishermen's behavior to be more 
selective of catch. Informants were asked how bycatch has changed between the DAS and catch 
share program, and if and why reducing bycatch is important. Where possible, comparisons are 
made with publically available bycatch data. 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. Examining economic impacts of this catch share program must 
encompass many factors. Caution should be used in drawing conclusions based on any single 
                                                 
7
 Under the DAS system, regulatory discards are legal-sized fish caught in excess of the daily trip limit, which must 
be discarded at sea. 
8
 Under the sector system, there are no regulatory discards, because there is no daily trip limit. 
9
 Strata are defined by NMFS based on gear type and area fished. 
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measure. The NEFSC Social Sciences Branch conducts periodic evaluations of fishery economic 
performance (e.g., Murphy, et al., 2012), thus a full economic analysis was not conducted in this 
research. Rather, the focus was on characterizing informant views on the economic differences 
between fishing under the DAS and sector programs, to determine if the sector program 
increases overall profits and business predictability. A qualitative determination was made of 
overall profit margins and the strategies fishermen and dealers are employing to mitigate costs. 
The results for the New Hampshire case can be contextualized using the socioeconomic 
performance reports. 
SAFETY. Perceptions of safety were compared between the DAS and catch share programs to 
determine if the control rules governing sectors are indeed creating safer operations at sea. 
Qualitative data identified differences in operational logistics that might impact safety (e.g., 
attention diverted to use of computers at sea, weather window flexibility). 
WELL-BEING. Comparisons of overall well-being were made to determine if catch shares have 
led to improvements as theorized. Informants were asked closed-ended questions that relate 
equity, ethics, stress, fatigue, job satisfaction, and future outlook. With each question, informants 
were asked to elaborate on their rationale. 
ADDITIONAL JOB SATISFACTION QUESTIONS. In May 2012, job satisfaction questions were added 
as developed by R. Pollnac (pers. comm., 2012; Pollnac, et al., 2014). These tested degrees of 
satisfaction with income, fatigue, stress, safety, time spent away from home, sense of adventure 
and challenge of the job, and the opportunity to be one’s own boss. These questions were asked 
about one’s satisfaction as a groundfish fisherman, as well as in their present occupation, if they 
were not groundfish fishing at the time of the interview. Since the questions in this set pertain to 
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several hypotheses, results are detailed in the relevant chapters, rather than just in the well-being 
chapter. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Because the total population is small and the potential variation in responses was unknown, a 
high rate of sampling was desired. Thus, an aggressive goal was proposed of conducting 50 
individual interviews, or 60% of the population. Personal connections with the New Hampshire 
commercial fishing industry were used to build support for the project. R. Feeney discussed the 
project with several industry members individually, and at a meeting of NEFSC XI and XII in 
November 2011 with 15 sector members attending, ten months prior to sampling. All agreed by 
unanimous consent to participate (though not all actually participated). J. Wiersma, as sector 
manager, had worked daily with fishermen and Board members of NEFS XI and XII since May 
2010, and gained the support of the Board for this research. Given the small size of the sectors, 
the close geographical range of home ports (within the New Hampshire coast), and the level of 
past and current interactions of the research team members with the fishery, there was a high 
likelihood of success in reaching this goal. 
Sampling, or the process of conducting the interviews, was conducted between September 6 and 
December 17, 2012. To avoid undercoverage, a random-stratified sampling method was first 
pursued. An Access 2007 database was created for the population with contact information, 
cohort category, and a randomly assigned identification number.  
Sampling has many potential sources of bias. Undercoverage and nonresponse bias were 
minimized by efforts to maximize response rate of all population cohorts. Potential informants 
were contacted first by letter, and then with follow-up phone calls or emails. During sampling, 
contact information was corrected with the help of industry informants. Due to confidentiality 
concerns, no one in the population was asked to contact others, but several volunteered to 
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encourage others. One respondent agreed to an interview only after talking with another 
fisherman who had declined being interviewed due to “interview fatigue,” but was encouraging 
others to participate. As a liaison to the industry, Dr. Wiersma helped encourage his sector 
members to participate. 
After a month, it was clear that the random-stratified sampling was not yielding a sufficient 
response rate for all categories. To meet project objectives, the method was adjusted at that point. 
The entire population became included in the sample; all were invited to participate. The revised 
method may have introduced voluntary response bias, but this was deemed more manageable 
than the potential for nonresponse bias. 
Before each informant was interviewed, the consent was obtained of each informant to 
participate in the study and to use the data. To help them prepare, interviewees were told in 
advance the general topics to be covered, and the approximate interview time length. The 
consent forms detailed expectations of participants, interview topics to be covered, that 
interviews can be terminated at any point, who will have access to the interview record, methods 
to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, etc. Participation was voluntary and subjects were 
allowed to withdraw at any time with no repercussions, though none actually chose to withdraw 
part way through. 
Availability is a particular challenge with interviewing fishermen, since they frequently work 
very long hours for many days in a row. For some, it was difficult to commit to a time. On 
November 17, 2012, the researcher attended another sector meeting and recruited a few 
informants. One would only agree to an interview if it could be completed right then. Being 
flexible to meet informants on short notice was essential to securing some interviews. One 
Portsmouth fisherman called and said, “I can talk to you if you can get to my boat in half an 
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hour.” Fortunately, it took just five minutes to prepare for the interview, because Portsmouth was 
a 25-minute drive away. 
Being able to offer a financial stipend ($50) for participation helped reduce nonresponse and 
voluntary response bias, because it increased the response rate. Although just 50% of informants 
accepted the stipend, it was appreciated as evidence that the researcher valued their time and 
contributions to the project. One respondent said that he would not have agreed to an interview 
unless there was a stipend. The specific amount did not matter; it was “the principle of the 
thing.” 
Interviews were conducted as consistently as possible to create data reliability and avoid any 
procedural variations. Interviews took about one hour and were conducted at a location 
convenient to the informant (e.g., library, coffee shop, home). The interviews began with 
demographic questions. Then, after describing fishing practices since at least FY 2009, questions 
progressed through each of the six factors of fishing selected for analysis. 
When necessary, the interview procedure was adapted to avoid response bias. Categorical 
responses to closed-ended questions were added, so informants could answer truthfully. One 
series of questions was consistently misunderstood, so the researcher had to develop an 
explanation. Informants felt comfortable to speak freely only as they trusted the researcher’s 
objectivity. In a few cases, the respondent became uncomfortable with the questions, thinking 
that the research had foreordained conclusions. These interviews had to pause mid-course to 
discuss the project objectives, reassure the informants, and rephrase questions. These 
conversations also occurred at the beginning of every interview to allay any concerns. To 
reassure informants that the interviews were unbiased, there were times that the researcher 
carefully phrased a question. Asking, “What are the pros and cons of sector management, 
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starting with the pros?” This assured the respondent that they would later be asked to express 
negative views. Interviewees were queried for before-after differences, but care must be taken to 
avoid recall bias. 
Careful recording of data was important. Each population member was coded with an 
identification number. Interviews were audio recorded, and later transcribed by a research 
assistant. The identification number was recorded on transcripts and audio files, rather than the 
individual’s name. Closed-ended responses were recorded manually as well. Each informant 
granted permission to make an audio recording. As soon as possible after an interview, the 
researcher’s own reflections were recorded as a memo in NVivo, as well as anything that the 
informant said off the recording. All data were securely stored. 
In total, 22 interviews were conducted. While additional effort to secure interviews could have 
been expended into 2013, a decision was made to stop the interviews in December to not allow 
too much time to pass between the first and last interviews in the series. Of this total, one person 
was interviewed twice, once representing himself as a fisherman and once representing a dealer 
entity. 
Population demographic data that are available publically are limited to home and landing port 
affiliations, how many of what type of multispecies permits were held in a given year, and how 
those permits were enrolled in the fishery. These data are in federal permit rosters (NMFS, 
2013). The specific sector(s) that an individual had enrolled their permits in is available in the 
public annual operations plan for each sector (NMFS, 2014). All of this data are available online. 






Interview transcriptions were imported into a QSR NVivo 10 project for qualitative coding. 
Transcripts were checked for spelling errors and accuracy by reading each while listening to the 
audio recording. Nodes were made for each person (using the identifying numbers) and each 
interview question. Transcripts were then coded to each question and informant, as well as any 
population members referred to during an interview. Transcripts from preliminary interviews in 
2010 were also coded. Procedures for thematic coding and theory testing were based on Flick 
(2002: 186) and Auerbach and Silverstein (2003: 54-61): 
A. Re-read the transcript, create a memo for the informant, and write a short definition, to be 
modified during further interpretation. Describe each informant and their perspectives, 
focusing less on the demographics and closed-ended responses and more on the open-
ended responses. Record what is meaningful to each informant. 
B. Conduct open coding; focus on responses to the open-ended questions (entire responses 
were already coded with variable nodes). Classify expressions by their units of meaning 
to attach concepts to them. Create Theme Nodes for these concepts. In vivo codes are 
preferred over constructed codes. Each code should have a description of its properties. 
C. Categorize nodes around phenomena relevant to the research question and create nodes 
for categories (tree nodes). 
D. Revise the informant memo to ensure key themes are expressed. 
E. Repeat steps A - D for each informant. Use the codes and categories already developed 
and create new codes and categories if different/contradictory ideas emerge. Note which 
codes are repeating ideas. This helps reveal thematic structure. 
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F. Refine list of codes (i.e., repeating ideas). Identify how many nodes were created, 
including identifying parent and child nodes. Read carefully back through the list of 
codes to check for unnecessary repetition/overlap, logical organization, and that each 
node had text coded to it. Count the final number of nodes. 
G. Identify themes. Create a memo for each hypothesis. Identify repeating ideas within the 
thematic coding that may address each hypothesis. 
Through the thematic coding process, 1,112 thematic nodes were created, including 72 parent 
nodes and 1,040 child nodes. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The quantitative data were coded into integer, ordinal, or categorical
10
 scales (Appendix B) and 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet, including known demographics for the population. A row was 
created for each population member and columns housed the variable data. Data were then 
imported into a Stata IC database. Each variable was given a unique name and definition. Data 
scales for each variable were also defined. 
Quantitative data were summarized and simplified into tables and illustrative graphs. Analysis 
included frequencies, cross-tabulations and descriptive statistics (mean, median, range, standard 
deviation), and was broken down by informant type (e.g., NEFS XI and XII member, former 
fisherman). Because of the low sample size, statistical analyses were used with caution to make 
inferences and evaluate the hypotheses. Using NVivo, memos were created for each hypothesis to 
store the results of related quantitative analyses, as well as focus on indentifying what data could 
be used to describe the population and compare that with the informants. Errors in quantitative 
data entries were discovered and corrected. 
                                                 
10 Integer data includes numeric quantities (e.g., number of permits held). Ordinal data include rank orders (e.g., 
level of importance). Categorical data are non-numeric (e.g., gear type). 
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The quantitative results were not weighted. In this case, it was not appropriate to calculate a 
probability weight and apply it to the data to adjust for survey design and sampling biases. 
Weighting is most commonly used in surveys where independent evidence (e.g., vote outcomes, 
other research) can validate how well the adjustment performed (Hamilton, 1992: 395-397), but 
such validation is not possible here. In addition, the true population percentages of key 
demographic variables were unknown, since the dataset had some missing values (e.g., gender). 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MARRIAGE 
Memos were created for each hypothesis that merged the separate quantitative and qualitative 
memos. In cases where the qualitative and quantitative analyses did not match well, the analyses 
were reviewed for accuracy and refined. A benefit of the mixed methods approach is the ability 
to cross check for quality. The statistics, however, were fairly simple due to the low sample size. 
The research focused on understanding the rationale for each response, provided through 
qualitative analysis. 
“BASELINE” DETERMINATION 
Perhaps the largest challenge in undertaking the research is determining an accurate baseline for 
the New Hampshire multispecies fishery from which to compare changes that have occurred 
since the implementation of sector management. Social data on Northeast fisheries have been 
collected by the NEFSC and external scientists (e.g., D.S. Holland, et al., 2013; J. Olson & Clay, 
2001), and some analyses are contained in fishery management plans. However, there is no prior 
study of the New Hampshire region as proposed here for direct comparison. We can compare 
actual to projected impacts to New Hampshire vessels as were outlined in the Environmental 
Impact Statement of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Fishery Management Plan. Data include 
Annual Catch Entitlement allocations and value, costs for monitoring programs, total and per-trip 
average revenue, impact by boat length and gear type, and average fixed costs by boat length and 
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gear type (NEFMC, 2009a). Bycatch data are compiled in the U.S. National Bycatch Report 
(NMFS, 2011b) and by the ACCSP. Some information may be gleaned from a UNH survey of 
fishermen about use of DAS and the Western Gulf of Maine Closure Area (J. Cournane, personal 
communication via R. Robertson, 2011). Some aspects of the current research are novel and may 
constitute the baseline for future work. 
CHANGES MID-COURSE 
Due to insurmountable sources of bias that became evident mid-course, two substantial project 
changes are noteworthy. First, the research proposal included a network analysis of the New 
Hampshire fishing community that entailed recording how frequently each respondent 
communicates with each individual in the population and about what topics. This component was 
added to the project during the fall of 2011, before the dissertation proposal was finalized 
(January 2012). By May 2012, it was decided to drop this component. The interviews were 
already lengthy, and informants would unlikely take additional time to fill out an 82-row, 8-10 
column spreadsheet. The informants would likely question why the researcher needs to know 
who specifically they talk with, how frequently, and about what subjects. Thus, significant 
efforts would be expended to overcome biases due to social desirability and voluntary response. 
It was determined that the costs outweighed the benefits of this project component. 
Second, to place the results from New Hampshire within the broader fishery context, it was 
originally proposed to interview small groups of members of other groundfish sectors in the 
summer of 2013. Several catch share impact assessment projects are now underway in the 
Northeast, and there was concern about research fatigue among potential informants. Through 
conducting the interviews, it was difficult to schedule meeting individuals locally, so 
accessibility would be an issue for group meetings several hours away. Given the controversy 
over catch shares, one-on-one interviews are most appropriate. There is great potential for 
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research subjects to defer to the dominant group member or provide socially desirable answers. 
An unexpected turn of events occurred in March 2012, six months prior to the start of sampling. 
R. Feeney began working for the New England Fishery Management Council, and was assigned 
in March 2013 to coordinate the next amendment to the Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, 
considering quite controversial measures. While this assignment requires neutrality, the 
researcher became significantly more visible to stakeholders region-wide, and it would be 
difficult for the potential research subjects to differentiate the purpose of the interviews with 
other work. For these reasons, the regional group interviews were not conducted. 
OTHER STEPS TO MINIMIZE BIAS 
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
Catch share management is very controversial among the stakeholders of Northeast fisheries. 
Despite a personal commitment to avoid researcher bias, additional steps can reassure the 
research population and the wider public that this project is objective (Table 6). Some 
organizations that promote catch share management also funded research on its impacts. The 
researcher sought and received funding for this project from a politically neutral organization for 
two reasons. First, it ensures that the funding organization would not attempt to bias the study or 
the communication of its outcome. Second, it would help the public feel confident that the 
research is unbiased. Individuals in the study population are particularly sensitive about the 
motives of funding organizations, so seeking opinion-neutral funding helped reduce 
nonresponse, voluntary and response bias. The researcher spoke directly to potential informants 
about the funding source to assuage fears. 
The researcher considered how to best conduct oneself as an interviewer to garner respondent 
trust. The invitation letter and consent form required by the University of New Hampshire 
Institutional Review Board (UNH IRB) helped build credibility across the population, but its 
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formal tone may have increased nonresponse bias. Each interview began with an explanation of 
the background and goals of the project as well as of the researcher, explaining that the aim is to 
measure what has happened to the New Hampshire fishery, not to promote a certain future 
course of action. Most informants spoke freely, but there were a few that became concerned that 
a certain answer was being needled out. The researcher was able to reassure them and find 
alternate language for the questions. Knowing some members of the population for nine years 
prior to the start of the project helped to build credibility within the community and willingness 
to participate. 
By working for the Council, the researcher has become a central, though neutral figure in the 
fisheries management arena. A few in the population were aware of this employment change, but 
the exact number was unknown. There was some potential for informants to react by declining 
an interview or being untruthful. The researcher decided to not tell the informants about the 
employment unless asked directly. 
ACTUAL BIAS 
Despite attempts to eliminate it, bias exists within this research and has been mitigated as much 
as possible. The sample is not representative of the population as stratified. The total response 
rate is 28%, but the response rate for each category within the population varies between 9.5% 
and 75% (Table 9). The two categories that fall below average are the common pool members 
(23%) and the former fishermen (9.5%).  
Attempts to increase the response rate were not entirely successful. Accessibility was an issue. It 
was particularly difficult to obtain correct contact information for former fishermen. A correct 
phone number was not available for one common pool member and one former fisherman. A 
correct postal address was not available for another former fisherman. One former fisherman 
now lives in Virginia; another lives in Florida. Thus, it is unfeasible to conduct in-person 
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interviews with them. Interviews were specifically declined by four individuals (one common 
pool, one other sector member, one NEFS XI and XII sector member, and one former 
fisherman). Some potential informants were willing to be interviewed, but after repeated 
attempts to contact them, an interview could not be set up. The former fishermen were a 
particularly problematic group to obtain contact info for and to sample. While some have 
retained permits and are active in other fisheries, others have left fishing entirely. Some may feel 
bitter and may not want to participate in anything to do with groundfish. One indicated schedule 
conflicts with his new job.  
It is difficult to know how responses of the self-selected informants would differ from the 
nonrespondents. The sector manager and the staff of the Yankee Fishermen’s Co-op know most 
of the people in the population, and shared what they know about some of these people. The 
sector manager conducted an informal survey of the NEFS XI and XII sector members in 2010, 
and results can be compared. A UNH student has a blog with interviews of a few fishermen. A 
person who declined an interview agreed that data from an earlier interview (in 2010) could be 
used, which had some duplicative questions. Using these other data sources may be helpful in 
minimizing nonresponse bias, but due to the need to ensure the consent of human subjects in 
research, this information was only minimally used. 
The interviews were conducted in a conversational format, such that the exact wording differed 
between interviews. There may be cases where the questions were misinterpreted, though the 
researcher tried to be alert to this. There may be some potential for social desirability bias with 
the questions about bycatch and gear conflicts. Several informants had no problem with 
providing socially undesirable answers, sharing that they discarded thousands of large cod daily 
while fishing under the Days-at-Sea trip limits, caused fishing gear conflicts, fished illegally, or 
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knew of illegal drug activity. The researcher never felt that the informants were being 
purposefully dishonest, but it is difficult to confirm this by relying on the data alone. Through 
comparing responses between informants, no inconsistencies were discovered. 
Hypotheses were being tested through quantitative and qualitative analyses of informant 
interviews. In designing and performing this project, there is a multitude of potential biases that 
need to be considered and corrected to the extent possible. During data analysis, tactics for 
testing and confirming findings help identify actual bias in the data. Where removing bias is 
impossible, results are communicated with appropriate qualifiers. It is important to specifically 




CHAPTER IV. OUTCOMES – FISHERY DEMOGRAPHICS 
This chapter identifies key demographics necessary to understand the research population and 
informants, and provides context for the subsequent chapters that outline the outcomes relative to 
each hypothesis investigated. It should not be assumed, however, that a measured demographic 
change was necessarily caused by the advent of catch shares. Causality is explored in depth in 
subsequent chapters. 
POPULATION AND INFORMANTS IN COMPARISON 
PORT COMMUNITIES 
There were 83 individuals in the research population, including 81 commercial permit holders 
and four groundfish dealers, who met the definition criteria (two dealers were also permit 
holders, see p.54). Individuals hailed from 18 different communities within five states (Table 
13). Homeports (n=17) and landing ports (n=14) ranged geographically from Jonesport, Maine to 
Bath, North Carolina. Portsmouth was the most common homeport (27%) and landing port 
(31%), followed closely by Rye, Hampton, and Seabrook, all in New Hampshire. 
The informants identified a smaller number and range of homeports and landingports, just six 
homeports in New Hampshire and Massachusetts and six landing ports in those states as well as 
in Kittery, Maine. That New Hampshire ports were primary homeports and landing ports to 90% 
and 81% of the informants, respectively, indicates the degree to which the local ports were 
important to the informants. However, this is partially a research artifact. Though the entire 
population was invited to participate in an interview, willing research participants were local to 
New Hampshire, with the exception of one informant based in New Bedford, MA. 
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The vast majority of the population (91%) was male, with just 2.5% female (Table 14). There 
were five cases where just a business name was listed in the permit tables, and the research team 
could not identify an individual with the business name (sex unknown for 6.2%). All of the 
informants were male. 
PERMIT HOLDINGS 
As of FY 2012, the majority (54%) of individuals in the population held one groundfish permit, 
but the most an individual held was five (Table 15). The average number of permits held was 
1.2±0.1 permits. The informants held slightly more permits on average 1.9±0.1 within the same 
range (0-5). Removing those individuals who did not hold a permit in FY 2012 (Npopulation = 20; 
Ninformants = 2), most individuals held Category A permits (population = 77%; informants = 74%), 
followed by Handgear A (HA) permits (population = 15%; informants = 16%). 
Through the time series, the number of permit holders in the population declined. Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 identify how the population and informant stratification by cohort (i.e., members of 
NEFS XI and XII, members of other sectors, members of the common pool, former fishermen, 
and fish dealers) varied longitudinally. In FY 2009, 96% (n=78) of the population and 100% of 
the informants held a permit. However, the number of permit holders declined over time; by FY 
2012, 75% (n=61) of the population and 91.5% of the informants held a permit. For the 
population in FY 2010, 46% opted to enroll in NEFS XI or XII, 12% enrolled in other sectors, 
37% enrolled in the common pool, and 5% held a permit. By FY 2012, there were 37% in NEFS 
XI or XII, 14% in other sectors, and 25% in the common pool. For the informants in FY 2010, 
57% opted to enroll in NEFS XI or XII, 14% enrolled in other sectors, 29% enrolled in the 
common pool, and 0% did not hold a permit (Figure 3, Table 16). By FY 2012, there were 52% 
in NEFS XI or XII, 14% in other sectors, and 24% in the common pool. 
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There are two possible explanations for the 22% decline in permit holders within the population 
between FY 2009 and FY 2012. Individuals could have moved, such that they no longer meet the 
population definition criteria. Alternatively, and more likely, they could have sold or not 
renewed their permit. Resolving this question definitively for the population was beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, as described later in this chapter and in the chapter on 
economic performance (Chapter VII), the number of active fishermen has declined region-wide 
and in New Hampshire. Thus, it is likely that the 22% decline in permit holders within the 
research population is primarily due to permits being sold or not renewed. For the informants, 
none had moved out of state during the time period, but two had become former groundfish 
fisherman during the time period; a sector member sold his last groundfish permit during FY 
2010 due to low catch limits, and one common pool member sold his during FY 2011 due to not 
having enough quota associated with his permits (see Chapter VIII for more discussion on 
attributing causality for fishery declines). 
SECTORS ENROLLED IN 
In FY 2010, the 58% of the population that had permits enrolled in a sector elected to enroll in 
NEFS XI, NEFS XII, the Sustainable Harvest Sector, NEFS II, and NEFS III, with 43% 
enrolling in NEFS XI or XII (Table 16). Two individuals opted to enroll their permits in multiple 
sectors. For the informants, there were a higher number of individuals with permits enrolled in a 
sector (71% vs. 58%), with 57% enrolling in NEFS XI or XII. Through FY 2012, the distribution 
across the various sectors is fairly consistent, with the largest changes being that the number of 
people not enrolling permits in a sector increased and the number enrolled in NEFS XI or XII 
decreased. The distribution is even more consistent longitudinally for the informants. 
Environmental Assessment (EA) for NEFS XI and XII and other reports reveal a slightly 
different picture than the above data, derived from NMFS permit databases and sector operations 
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plans. In February 2010, the EAs stated that 36 permit owners would be enrolled in the sectors, 
who hold 56 multispecies permits and planned to fish using 42 vessels (NEFS-XI, 2010a; NEFS-
XII, 2010). The sector manager reported that by the time the fishing year started in May 2010, 
the sector membership dropped to 24 active permit holders, holding 41 permits and using 24 
active vessels. In addition, eight permit holders were members of the sectors for lease-only 
purposes, to lease all their allocations to other fishermen (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 
2011). The fishery performance report indicated that there were just six New Hampshire vessels 
that entered the common pool that year (Kitts, et al., 2011). Thus, five vessels dropped out of the 
fishery in FY 2010 (38 total vs. 43 in FY 2009). For FY 2011, two more vessels dropped out, but 
there were 56 multispecies permits enrolled in NEFS XI or XII, owned by 36 individual permit 
owners. Despite variation in the specific numbers, there seemed to be a decline in participation in 
the fishery across the time series. 
OTHER INFORMANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
Informants were asked several demographic questions during the interviews. The age of most 
informants fell into either the 40-49 (38%) or 50-59 (33%) brackets (Table 17). On average, the 
year that informants first obtained a groundfish permit ranged from 1984 to 2008, averaging 
1993 (Figure 4). The age of informants does not trend well with the year that they first obtained a 
groundfish permit, though the one informant in the 30-39 age range was the second most recent 
to obtain a permit, in 2004 (Figure 5). Half of the informants obtained their first permit before 
the 1994 moratorium on groundfish permits (Table 1). Thus, it is likely that half of the 
informants were “gifted” a permit from NMFS and the other half purchased all of their permits 
from other permit holders. Just one informant (4.8%) did not work as a commercial fisherman 
(as a crew member) prior to holding a groundfish permit (Table 18). Informants have had the 
same homeport and landingport on average since 1987 and 1991, respectively, though the range 
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for both was 1964-2010. The mean number of vessels owned by informants was 1.1±0.06, and 
33% noted that they recently bought or sold a vessel. The vessels that informants fished 
groundfish with were on average 41±8 ft in length (range = 24-61 ft) and had 315±55 hp engines 
(range = 220-402 hp). 
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The New Hampshire fishing industry is small relative to its neighboring states, and it, along with 
the entire fishery, had declines in landings and the number of active fishermen since FY 2010 
with the advent of the catch share program and ACLs. New Hampshire is home to ~5% of the 
permit holders in the fishery (~1,400 total). Fishery-wide, the number of active groundfish 
vessels has declined. In FY 2009, there were 570 vessels fishery-wide with a valid limited access 
multispecies permit and revenue from at least one trip, and 40 (~7%) based in New Hampshire 
(Table 11) (Murphy, et al., 2012). In FY 2013, the number of active vessels lowered to 400, with 
25 based in New Hampshire (Murphy, Kitts, Demarest, & Walden, 2015). Revenue from New 
Hampshire vessels constitutes 5-6% of the fishery and revenues have declined since FY 2009 
(Table 12). Vessels in the fishery range up to 90’, so the New Hampshire-based vessels were 
generally smaller than average (61’ maximum). The declines in active vessels were largest for 
vessels under 50’, such as common in the New Hampshire fishery. The largest ports in the 
fishery are Gloucester, New Bedford and Boston, Massachusetts and Portland, Maine, though 
vessels hail from as far south as New Jersey. 
As dramatic as these declines are, fishery effort has been contracting since the mid-1990s, when 
there were over 1,000 active vessels in the fishery. Thunberg and Correia (2015) found that 
concomitant with this decline, fleet diversity (number of ports, vessel sizes, gear types) has also 
declined. However, since 2008, the fishery has not redistributed to favor a particular niche, with 
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two exceptions: there has been a disproportionate drop in Maine-based fishermen, and a slight 
increase in the proportion of larger vessels that have remained active. 
KEY OUTCOMES 
1. Ports in New Hampshire were highly important to the informants. 
2. The 22% decline in the number of permit holders within the research population over 
three years is more likely due to people selling or not renewing permits, rather than 
moving out of state. 
3. Across the time series, there were very few shifts in whether informants enrolled permits 
in sectors or the common pool, and few shifts in sector membership. 
4. New Hampshire constitutes about 5% of the total fishery, both of which have had 





CHAPTER V. OUTCOMES - FISHING PRACTICES 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
EFFICIENCY 
Data collection focused on understanding how the informants perceived the efficiency of their 
fishing operations. The degree of efficiency is generally defined as the amount of marketable fish 
caught for the amount of effort spent in harvesting the fish. This dissertation does not consider 
quantitative data for either component of this measure of efficiency (e.g., NMFS trip declaration 
data and landings), so formal estimates of Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) were not made. 
When asked which program, Days-At-Sea or sectors, allows greater efficiency of fishing 
operations, the informants, on the whole, did not have strong agreement. Some informants (n=6; 
29%) felt that fishing under DAS was more efficient, while others (n=8; 38%) felt that efficiency 
had improved under sectors (Table 21). A few informants (n=3, 15%) answered that the two 
programs were about equal in efficiency, while others (n=4, 19%) were either unsure or did not 
provide a clear answer to the question. Examining the question by informant type, informants 
who were currently sector members leaned towards saying that sectors have been more efficient 
(n=7; 50%), rather than DAS (n=4; 29%). Three sector members (21%) thought the two 
programs have been about equal in efficiency or were unsure. Among the informants who were 
members of the common pool or former fishermen, there was no strong trend in the answers. 
The informants who indicated that DAS used to be more efficient for their fishing practices 
spoke of having focused effort on catching cod and that it had been fairly easy to catch the daily 
trip limit: 
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…we were going and getting our 800 pounds [of cod] out of like five or six [gill]nets. 
So, we were done at like eight or nine o’clock in the morning, and then we’d go 
lobstering the rest of the day. 
These informants did not feel constrained by trip limits. One informant indicated that he has been 
working harder under sectors for less money. For him, economic aspects of efficiency were 
important considerations. 
The informants who indicated that the sector program led to more efficient fishing practices 
indicated that the removal of the daily trip limit was a key factor in increasing efficiency. These 
informants said that they could catch their annual allocation of groundfish ACE within a shorter 
period of time than the DAS that they had, in a matter of days to a few months depending on 
their amount of ACE, environmental conditions, and the timing of other fisheries that they 
participate in: 
Because there’s no daily limit, so you go, I mean, if the cod fish were there, the 
prices were decent, you could just go ... scoop up your quota, make your year’s pay 
and be done. 
They spoke of finding a concentration of fish and then fishing on that concentration as long as 
possible. Being able to target fish concentrations was seen as an efficiency benefit of the sector 
program. Informants also indicated that they have had fewer discards under sectors, so they were 
wasting less time at sea handling catch that would not be sold (See Chapter VII). 
The informants who felt that the DAS program was more efficient tended to own smaller vessels 
(mean 37±10, n=6, range 24-50’) than those who felt that sectors were more efficient (mean 45±, 
n=8, range 39-61’), though the means were within the error. Of the nine informants with 75-
100% of their income derived from groundfish in FY 2011, 44% indicated that sectors were 
more efficient and 33% said that DAS were. Thus, there was not a strong majority by reliance on 
groundfish, though perhaps the larger vessels were more able to take advantage of the lack of trip 
limits under sectors. 
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Since FY 2010, sectors have received exemptions from the rolling closures, including an 
exemption from the June closure of the inshore Gulf of Maine off the New Hampshire coast. 
Several sector members cited the ability to fish in June as a key benefit of enrolling in sectors. In 
that area, fish tend to concentrate in the spring (e.g., Howell, et al., 2008), so fishermen want to 
take advantage of fishing on that concentration of fish. 
FLEXIBILITY 
When asked which program provides greater flexibility for fishermen to decide where, when, 
and how to fish, a majority of the informants (n=11; 52%) felt that sectors do (Table 23). Some 
informants (n=4; 19%) felt that DAS were more flexible, while others (n=6; 29%) felt that the 
programs were about equal in flexibility, or the informant was unsure or did not provide a clear 
response. Among sector members, a majority thought sectors were more flexible (n=10; 71%), 
while a few (n=3; 21%) indicated that DAS were more flexible or that the informant was unsure 
(n=1; 7%). There was no strong trend in the answers among non-sector member informants. 
Removal of the daily trip limit contributes to a sense of increased flexibility under sectors, 
without which there was less pressure to maximize daily catch. Under DAS, fishermen felt that if 
they did not catch the cod limit, their trip was a waste of effort. Under sectors, there is an annual 
goal rather than a daily one. Removing the incentive to achieve a daily goal opens options for 
how to fish. A few informants indicated that fishing in a sector allows for a bit more planning, 
which could improve efficiency at sea and the flexibility of one's overall business strategy. Since 
the sector allocation is known at the beginning of the year, the members could try to time their 
fishing with market fluctuations. One informant indicated that fishing in the sector program had 
allowed him more time to have other income sources besides groundfish. He could catch his 
allocation and then move on to other fisheries. Another reason that informants felt sectors have 
81 
more efficiency and flexibility is the ability to trade one's allocation. This allows better matching 
of fishing effort with fish availability (in the ocean and through the lease market). 
The researchers predicted that sector members who fish with gillnets would be taking advantage 
of the exemption that allows use of 150 gillnets per permit rather than 50 nets. This exemption 
was first allowed in FY 2011 (NEFS-XI, 2010b). This allowance was designed to promote 
flexibility and efficiency. The sector member informants were asked which exemptions were 
important to them, and just two of five who listed important exemptions included removal of the 
gillnet limit as important. 
Another exemption that NEFS XI had received since FY 2010 is that gillnets can be shared 
among sector participants who join a Community Fixed Gear Group, allowing multiple vessels to 
coordinate to share a set of nets that remain out in the ocean. This measure was intended to 
increase the efficiency and flexibility of the gillnet fleet by reducing the number of individual 
trips necessary to set and check gear, thereby reducing the number of nets in the water as well as 
the costs to repair and replace gear (NEFS-XI, 2010a: 22). However, the informants did not take 
advantage of this opportunity. Two informants indicated that there was no need to share, because 
they could keep all the fish that they catch, up to their annual limits (See Chapter VIII for more 
discussion). 
The informants who indicated that DAS had been more flexible (n=4; 19%) tended to be those 
who did not feel constrained by the trip limits. In addition, they cited the increased observer 
coverage under sectors: 
Well, one thing that drives me crazy is, you know, the 48-hour notice we have to give 
to go out under the sectors and that’s more for the observer coverage. You know, 
that drives me crazy because, you know, as a day boat we’re completely dependent 
on the weather and, you know, to try to predict 48 hours in advance, although it 
doesn’t sound like a long time, it’s an eternity sometimes. So that, you know, 
flexibility with that is very constrictive for me. 
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The observer program increased the pre-trip notification time, requiring commitments to make a 
trip further in advance. 
A DIFFICULT COMPARISON 
A few informants (n=2; 10%) said that it was difficult to compare the two management 
programs, because fishing efficiency and deciding where, when, and how to fish depend 
primarily on the presence of fish on the fishing grounds (i.e., fish availability), rather than the 
regulatory program one is harvesting under. These fishermen spoke of striving to adjust their 
fishing practices to be as efficient as possible no matter which program is in place. As one 
informant put it: 
That’s tough. I had really geared my whole business towards those days at sea, but 
it’s pretty efficient now, I have to say. I really try to plan it. I mean, with the quota 
that I have, it’s pretty efficient, I mean, if you can go get big sets of cod, I mean, you 
can make a lot of money in a short time. So, you have time now to do other 
fisheries...Pretty efficient both ways. 
ASPECTS OF FISHING 
The informants were asked several questions about their fishing practices in FY 2009, FY 2010, 
and FY 2011, to characterize their fishing practices and determine any temporal changes. Results 
are described here. 
LABOR. Informants were asked how many individuals, in a given year, worked on their vessel(s) 
at a given time. In FY 2009, an average of 2.4±1.2 people worked on their vessels at a given 
time, ranging from 1 to 6 (Table 24). Most informants operated one vessel at a time, but one 
informant had two vessels in operation throughout the time series. That number varied 
depending, in part, on what they were fishing for at the time. Of the 19 informants who had some 
groundfish income in FY 2009, 16 employed at least one crew member while groundfish fishing 
(2.4±1.3 on board on average). Two informants said that they would fish alone for groundfish, 
and another would fish alone for groundfish about half of the time. Through FY 2011, the 
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average of all the informants did not vary outside the error, though the range dropped to a 
maximum of four or five. Of the 17 informants that had some groundfish income in FY 2011, 
they had an average of 2.3±1.0 people on board. Thus, the number of crew members employed 
while groundfish fishing did not vary substantially during the time series. 
Informants were also asked how many crew members they employed over a given year. 
Informants employed an average of 2.3±1.7 crew members (not including themselves) 
throughout FY 2009, ranging from 1 to 6. The average did not vary outside the error through FY 
2011, though the range increased to a maximum of 10. 
GEAR. Informants used either trawls, gillnets, hand gear, or a combination of these gear types 
(Table 25). There was some variation since FY 2009, but an approximately equal share of 
informants used trawls or gillnets (19-33%) and a smaller number used hand gear (10-19%). In 
FY 2011, the hand gear fishermen fished in the common pool, as did one gillnet vessel. All of 
the trawl vessels fished in a sector. Between FY 2009 and FY 2011, a majority of informants 
(52-67%) made no changes to their groundfish gear. Those who made changes to gear cited 
several reasons. Trawl nets were swapped out depending on the specific fish that was being 
targeted. Some reduced the number of gillnets, while others increased them. One tried to use a 
larger gillnet mesh in FY 2010 to target larger fish, but then switched back, because the net was 
inefficient. Two informants indicated that they no longer share gillnets at sea. One informant said 
that he changed nets based on whether he was carrying an observer or not (who would be 
measuring his discards). A majority of informants indicated that that the rate of gear loss did not 
particularly change through the time period, though the percentage increased who indicated that 
their gear loss increased from FY 2009 (5%) to FY 2011 (19%). These fishermen mentioned that 
84 
they observed larger vessels in their fishing area that were disturbing the seabed or interacting 
with fixed gear. 
We’re starting to lose more twine now because these boats are moving around big 
rocks and stuff. They’re changing the bottom. I mean, there’re places now I'm having 
a tough time towing that I didn’t used to have a tough time towing. The bottom’s 
getting changed and, you know, again, it’s not the local boats that are doing it, 
because they haven’t got that kind of power. 
TRIP. Informants indicated that they most often fish in the inshore area of the Gulf of Maine on 
single-day trips, which is to be expected considering the size of their vessels (≤ 61’). The average 
trip length cited by informants was 12-15 hours, which did not change through the time series, 
outside the standard error (Table 26). However, the range in trip length narrowed, from 5-42 
hours in FY 2009 to 8-16 hours in FY 2011. There were fewer of the longer trips through time. 
Prior to FY 2010, nine informants indicated that they fished within 20 miles of the New 
Hampshire and northern Massachusetts coast, while 5 indicated that they fished deeper water 
further offshore for part of the year (e.g., Platts Bank), typically catching monkfish while 
catching groundfish in transit. Of the informants participating in sectors, nine said that they were 
fishing in similar areas, while four said that they moved to better match their allocation with 
what they catch. One informant’s rationale follows: 
(Informant) … changed the fishing area. I went from eight or nine months in 
Gloucester to, only 33 days. Half the days were out of Portsmouth and half the days 
out of Gloucester. 
(Interviewer) Now, why did you make that decision? 
(Informant) Because of my allocation. I only had so much fish to catch – and one of 
the benefits, the only benefit [laugh] to going to sectors is that you can keep more 
fish [no trip limit]. So I just fished when the prices were high and timed it right. And 
I mean, the fish were there to catch, so I just used my allocation, you know, to 
maximize my profits. 
EFFORT. The informant above found that the lack of trip limits had allowed for more efficient 
use of time at sea. Informants were asked think qualitatively about their fishing effort and how it 
may have changed since fishing under sectors. In cases where effort decreased, fishermen 
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referred to fishing a fewer number of days or taking shorter trips. Where effort increased, a few 
indicated that they increased trip length or the number of days. Three informants said that they 
had to increase their trip length, because there had been fewer fish around. 
AREA CONFLICTS. The majority of informants said that relative to year prior, fishing area 
conflicts were either unchanged or had increased through time. Just 5% of informants (n=1) said 
that area conflicts were decreasing each year (Table 26), but when asked to think about overall 
changes to the groundfish fishery, 14% said that there were fewer conflicts under sectors because 
there were fewer vessels fishing. Of the larger portion of informants who had seen increased gear 
conflicts, 38% spoke of there being new, larger vessels fishing in their traditional fishing area. 
There was a good deal of concern about the impact these vessels were having on the resource. 
I don’t see anything really good going on with the sector fishing right now. I have 
some friends that, actually, day-fish out of Gloucester still, and there’s no fish 
coming in anymore in Gloucester. I’m sure you heard the story, a month ago a bunch 
of the big offshore boats that were in the sector program came right inside and, just 
pounded, and that was all the fish the guys were going to try to catch up over the 
course of the winter. 
Described further in Chapter VI, the local vessels were communicating less with each other over 
the radio, in part to detract interest in their fishing areas: 
We’ll talk to each other about... where the fish are. We used to do it on the radio. 
We’re back to not doing it on the radio anymore, because we know that these big 
boats are listening, because the minute you say something, one of them [a large 
vessel] appears, and if one of them finds something, they’re like a pack of wolves. 
Once one of them finds something, then a bunch of them appear, and they don’t go 
away till there’s absolutely nothing. I mean they exterminate every last fish. 
Another cause for area conflict was between gillnet and trawl vessels, or with other stationary 
gear. Several informants cited the overall decline in groundfish effort, particularly by trawl 
vessels, had opened areas for lobster gear and gillnets to expand into: 
They had the ability, and they knew the ability that we had. They kept pressing their 
luck and keep, they kept settin’ their gear wherever they wanted. And that’s what it’s 
come to now, is that there’s just lobster gear as far as you can see. 
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This informant was describing how lobstermen were setting gear in voids left by the declining 
groundfish fishery. 
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
Comparisons with regional data must be made with caution due to differences in the data 
used. However, comparisons of general trends can be made. The annual groundfish fishery 
performance reports produced by the NOAA Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) 
are very informative for fishery wide trends and are referred to here.  
The New Hampshire informants did not, on average, have a change in the number of people 
employed while groundfish fishing or the number employed over a given year, outside the error 
of the data. Fishery-wide, crew employment data suggest that the number of crew positions and 
crew trips (number of crew members on a trip) had declined between FY 2009 and FY 2013, by 
16% and 30%, respectively (Murphy, et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2014). With a greater decline in 
crew trips than positions, if could be that opportunities for income have declined for those who 
remained in the fishery.  
The NEFSC tracks fishing effort each year in terms of three indicators: the number of “active” 
vessels making groundfish trips (defined as landing at least one pound of groundfish in a year, 
the number of trips, and the number of days that vessels are at sea (i.e., “absent from port”). 
Chapter IV details how, fishery-wide, the number of active groundfish vessels had declined since 
FY 2009. The total number of groundfish trips, had also declined, by 61% between FY 2009 and 
FY 2013. The total number of days spent fishing (i.e., days absent) on a groundfish trip had 
declined by 31%. However, average trip length increased from 1.35 days per trip in FY 2010 to 
1.68 in FY 2013(25% increase; Murphy, et al., 2015; Murphy, et al., 2014). So, in general, 
fishermen were taking fewer, but slightly longer trips. Several of the informants, said that they 
were making fewer trips as well, but the trips were getting shorter in length, not longer. If effort 
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is considered in terms of revenue, total groundfish revenue divided by the number of days absent 
on groundfish trips decreased from $3,353 per day in FY 2009 to $3,245 in FY 2013, just a 3% 
reduction. Perhaps those who remained in the fishery are, in general, the more efficient vessels. 
In the Norwegian cod fishery, regulations changed in the 1990s under the assumption that fishing 
effort had been proportional to technological capacity (e.g., vessel length), whereas Maurstad 
(2000) found that effort had been influenced more by socioeconomic factors (e.g., debt, lifestyle 
choice). When fishing rights were set in the 1990s based on technical capacity (e.g., vessel size), 
effort increased as an unintended consequence, as the participants with below average effort 
were then incentivized to maximize their catch. In the Northeast U.S. groundfish fishery, the 
opposite effect may be happening. Under DAS trip limits, smaller vessels were incentivize to 
maximize catch, and larger vessels were constrained. Under catch shares, it appears that effort is 
decreasing with the removal of trip limits and low annual catch limits. 
Pollnac et al. (2011) asked 138 Rhode Island-based fishermen in 2010 to describe the advantages 
and disadvantages of fishing in a sector, and the most frequent responses were “not familiar” or 
“no opinion.” The study suggested that the new program was not well understood at the time. 
However, it should be noted that just 17 (12%) of the informants indicated that groundfish was 
their primary fishery. This dissertation focused entirely on groundfish fishermen and two years 
into the program, all informants expressed options about the advantages or disadvantages of the 
sector program. Most commonly cited advantages were: more choice in how to fish, less pressure 
to fish hard or maximize daily catch, and less wasted fish. Key disadvantages were: biological 
impacts to local schools of fish, the costs and obligations associated with working with a sector 




The informants expressed a variety of opinions about which program, DAS or sectors were more 
efficient and flexible for their fishing operations, and there was not strong agreement in the data. 
Those who felt that sectors were more efficient generally felt that the removal of trip limits and 
having an annual allocation to fish, allowed for more concentrated effort, harvesting their annual 
limits in fewer trips. Those who were more dependent on groundfish for their income did not 
necessarily feel that one program was an improvement over another, though the data suggest that 
the informants with larger vessels tended to feel that sectors was the more efficient for them, that 
they could take advantage of the lack of trip limits better than before. The smaller-scale 
operations were less impacted by removing trip limits. There were no substantial changes in 
crew employment overall. Most of the informants did not make any particular changes in their 
gear since FY 2009, though some had increased gear loss. While some vessels used to make two-
day trips, informants indicated that they were generally all taking one-day trips under sectors. 
Most informants saw either no change in area conflicts or increases as new groundfish vessels 
move into their fishing area or stationary gear takes up more fishing areas with declines in 
mobile gear. Regionally, employment and effort has dropped in the fishery through time and 
there was some evidence that those who have remained in the fishery are perhaps the more 
efficient operators. 
KEY OUTCOMES 
1. There was no strong agreement among informants about whether sectors were more 
efficient and flexible for fishing operations than Days-At-Sea, though sector members 
with larger vessels seem to have greater efficiency in the absence of trip limits. 
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2. Some informants saw increased gear conflict as new groundfish vessels moved into their 






CHAPTER VI. OUTCOMES - SOCIAL CAPITAL 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY 
The informants were asked to identify which, if any, trade associations they were members of. 
There was not a close correlation between membership in a sector and voluntary membership in 
another trade association. Apart from sectors, 90% (n=19) of the informants indicated 
membership in at least one trade associations (Table 27). There were ten different industry 
organizations (besides sectors) that the informants belong to, most common is the Northeast 
Seafood Coalition (62%). However, members of NEFS XI and XII are automatically members of 
the Northeast Seafood Coalition (NSC), so this rate of affiliation is expected.  
The second most common organization informants were members of was the New Hampshire 
Commercial Fishermen's Association (NHCFA; 33%, n=7). This association is open to all 
commercial fishermen (including lobstermen) with an interest in supporting the New Hampshire 
fisheries. The reasons cited for NHCFA membership include that it was a means to solve 
problems within the state, particularly between the groundfish and lobster industries. New 
Hampshire is a small state relative to its neighbors and members felt that it was important to 
have a united voice in regional management arenas. Also, there are vessel and health insurance 
discount benefits. 
Of the sector member informants, fewer (29%)  were members of the NHCFA than the common 
pool informants (57%), and apart from the required membership in the NSC, 45% (n=5) of the 
members of NEFS XI or XII were not a member of any other trade association. Thus, there was 
not a particular leaning to be involved with both organizations. Rationale for why an informant 
91 
was not a NHCFA member included disagreements with individuals who  were members as well 
as with positions that the NHCFA has taken, including decisions of how federal disaster relief 
funding was distributed within the New Hampshire groundfish fishery and opposition to the 
NHCFA’s support of a lawsuit filed against NMFS that focused on the distributional 
implications of the allocation formula used in Amendment 16 (Lovgren, 2010). Informants who 
were members of other sectors were all affiliated with another trade association (e.g., Associated 
Fisheries of Maine). Just two informants did not belong to any industry trade organizations, one 
former fisherman and one common pool member. Forty-three percent of the informants had 
served in a leadership in a trade association. Of the sector members, 50% had served in a 
leadership position and 29% of the others had. Though most of the informants indicated that they 
were a member of an industry association, there was no evidence from the interviews that the 
advent of sectors impacted the involvement of informants in trade associations, apart from the 
NEFS XI and XII joining the NSC if they had not already. 
One theory could be that the institutional framework of sectors has encouraged civil involvement 
more than involvement in other industry organizations. While this theory was not explored in 
depth, the general sense was that the informants were already involved in industry organizations 
prior to joining sectors, in part, for joint political power in management arenas. Sectors may 
build on existing will for political involvement, more than serve as a catalyst. One informant did 
speak of their manager as a political advocate, and another as a liaison with NMFS, saying:“who 
would want that job [sector manager] is beyond me. [laugh]  That’s like whoa, buffer zone 
between NMFS and the fishermen.” A few informants indicated that belonging to a sector 
resulted in better advocacy in the management arena, citing a case where their sector manager 
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helped negotiate a resolution to potential gillnet time and area closures associated with protection 
of marine mammals. 
One informant, a member of the NEFS XI and XII Board, expressed that he had too many 
obligations, to his sector as a Board member, to the NSC, and to individuals as an industry 
leader. He became more civilly involved, but was doing so begrudgingly, because others in his 
community were not willing to, and it was increasing his fatigue levels: 
(Wife) He signed up for another obligation, committee meetings nonstop. They want 
him to do, there’s so much work. He doesn’t go to bed at night till 8:30, nine o’clock. 
Every night, paperwork, paperwork, paperwork. 
(Informant) It’s gotten pretty bad. 
(Wife) Phone rings off the hook. It’s insane. It’s insane. 
(Informant) It wasn’t like it with Days at Sea. 
(Interviewer) Because you were working more on your own? 
(Informant) Yeah, kind of, yeah…. Just involved with so many groups. 
(Interviewer) Do you find that it’s worth it in the end or are you kind of frustrated 
with it? 
(Wife) No. 
(Informant) No. You know what really bothers me is the way that I feel as though it’s 
my responsibility now to help other fishermen when they just do nothing. And they 
don’t care. And they just say, “We won’t fail because [I] won’t fail. We can just be 
like [me]. That burns my ass a little bit. What are you going to do? I can’t not do it, 
because they’re not going to do it. 
(Interviewer) Could there be term limits on the Board to rotate the responsibilities? 
(Informant) Yeah, but nobody’s going to do it. No one would, no. No one would. 
DEGREE OF BUSINESS COLLABORATIONS 
Whether the advent of catch shares has changed the way that fishermen did business with each 
other was investigated. 
LENDING EQUIPMENT. A possible expression of social capital is a willingness to lend equipment 
to fellow fishermen. Of those who answered the question or to whom it was relevant, 47% 
indicated that they tended to share equipment with fellow fishermen, and 53% did not (Table 
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28). More of the sector members indicated a tendency to share (54%) than the other informants 
(33%). A few informants indicated that it was more difficult to share trawl gear than other gear 
types (e.g., gillnets). However, a cross tabulation of the question of if they were willing to lend 
and their principal groundfish gear type in FY 2011 revealed that there was no difference 
between the answers given by those who fished for trawls and those who fish with gillnets; 50% 
of both groups said they were willing to share, and 50% said they were unwilling to. 
TALKING ABOUT CATCH AND FISHING AREAS. The majority (76%) of informants indicated that they 
did share information about fishing areas with other fishermen (Table 28). Slightly more of the 
sector members (79%) than the others (71%) were willing to share information. Just two 
informants, sector members, indicated that they share information with the entire community. Of 
those who share with just part of the community, the average number of fishermen that they 
share with was 7±6, ranging from two to 20. Sector members shared with six and others shared 
with nine, though with high standard deviations, the averages were the same within the error. 
One sector informant indicated that he was sharing information on catch and area more freely, 
because everyone was working off of a set quota, so there was less competition. Two sector 
informants indicated that they became more secretive about their fishing areas, that they talked 
less freely on the radio, because vessels from outside their community that do not usually fish in 
the area come in once they hear word of a fish aggregation. As one put it:  
We’re back to not doing it [talking] on the radio anymore, because we know that 
these big boats are listening, because the minute you say something, one of them 
appears, and if one of them finds something they’re like a pack of wolves. Once one 
of them finds something, then a bunch of them appear, and they don’t go away till 
there’s absolutely nothing. I mean they exterminate every last fish. No, most of it’s 
done with cell phones and scramblers now. 
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This also indicates desire to increase well-being within one’s community, as opposed to 
outsiders, positive but bounded social capital. Another sector member fishing with fixed gear had 
always been secretive, because strategic positioning of one’s nets was critical: 
I only need to tell one person and then everybody knows, but it takes a little time and 
see, that time delay is exactly what I’m looking for. Position is everything in the 
gillnetting business. By the time so-and-so figures it out it’s too late. I’m a young 
guy. You have to respect your elders. There’s some kind of chain; you have to earn 
your respect…it’s been the same ocean for so long and the fishermen have been 
there. …Most of the time they’re going; they’re not coming, but sometimes there’s 
one or two that’s coming, and then we have to deal with the guys from Gloucester on 
occasion when they want to come up and fish in our area. You’re going to have to 
either work with them or box them out...That’s how fishing is, so who you share 
information with... you better trust…But you don’t really need to share information, 
because there’s people watching you. That’s what fishing is. If you’re not watching 
what’s going on around you, you’re not going to be a very good fisherman. 
SHARING ALLOCATION. A sector is allocated ACE according to the PSC of the permits enrolled in 
it, held by individual fishermen. Technically, the allocation is shared by the sector, so there may 
be opportunities for members to collaborate more so than outside the sector framework. In 
practice, NEFS XI and XII have distributed the ACE within the sector to individuals in 
proportion to the PSC that they each bring to the sector, and there is a right of first refusal, where 
ACE must be offered within the sector prior to making it available outside the sector. When 
informants were asked whether they would accept a lower price for leased ACE to keep it in the 
community, 50% indicated that they were not willing to do so, and 50% were willing to take less 
than fair market value. While the responses were split evenly, 50% shows a fairly strong 
willingness to support others in the community. The majority (71%) of informants felt that it was 
important to keep allocation within the New Hampshire fishing community and 10% felt that it 
was unimportant (Table 29). Sixty-four percent of sector members felt that it was important and 
86% of common pool members do. For the members of NEFS XII and XII, 73% felt that it was 
important and the remainder (27%) felt neutral.  
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For the common pool, the PSC of enrolled permits is pooled into an annual Total Allowable 
Catch that is implemented by trimesters. There was no common agreement across the common 
pool about how the ACE will be fished, thus creating the potential for a derby fishery each 
trimester. Among the informants enrolled in the common pool members, the data did not reveal 
any substantial efforts to work together to catch allocation. In fact, there was some degree of 
competition among the common pool members.  
There was little evidence that the informants were using social capital to coordinate fishing areas 
to reduce gear conflicts or bycatch. Three fishermen felt that gear conflicts were generally on the 
decline, because there were fewer vessels fishing in their fishing area in recent years (see 
Chapter V). However, 11 informants felt that gear conflicts were increasing: seven observed that 
there were new vessels coming into the area, and several noted that there was more stationary 
gear, particularly lobster gear. The interviews did not reveal that the informants work together 
any more under sectors to reduce bycatch. Although sector members are all responsible (subject 
to accountability measures) should the sector exceed its ACE for a stock, the sector informants 
did not indicate a tendency for members to work together to avoid bycatch.  
MARKETING. The catch share program had some impact on how the fishermen work together to 
market their fish. NEFS XI and XII members and its manager initiated New Hampshire 
Community Seafood, a community-supported fishery as a way to foster local markets and 
increase revenue. In the opposite direction, the certainty of one's catch allocation helped one 
informant have the confidence to try opening his own fish market rather than continuing to land 
fish at a fishing cooperative, though with persistently low ACLs, this market did not remain 
viable.  
96 
MERGERS. Perhaps the highest degree of social capital is for individual fisherman to decide to go 
into business together. One informant indicated that he elected to partner with another fisherman 
by jointly owning a vessel, sharing use of it. However, this merger was done begrudgingly. He 
was determined to survive as a fisherman and felt that it was a necessary measure to cut costs 
and remain viable. 
REGARD FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FISHERY AS A COMMUNITY 
Many informants expressed the importance of keeping opportunities to catch fish within the New 
Hampshire community and helping local fishermen. The research investigated if the informants 
who already felt connected to the New Hampshire community opted to join NEFS XI and XII 
and if having sectors based in New Hampshire fostered a new or increased sense of community. 
The majority of informants (67%) indicated that it was more important to help fishermen from 
inside his community than from outside (Table 29). A higher majority of the sector members 
(71%) felt this way rather than other informants (57%). One sector member indicated that a 
reason why he joined a sector based in New Hampshire was due to concern about the future 
viability of the local fleet and he felt that forming a sector and working together would help 
secure its future. Many were very supportive of the idea, but for some, their sense of community 
was not necessarily tied to the state. It does not seem like the advent of NEFS XI and XII 
particularly changed things. One informant indicated that the sector had not brought the 
community any closer together than it already was. Two informants indicated that keeping ACE 
in the community was not particularly important. One sector member had become a fish dealer to 
help the fisherman in his port remain viable, and with that, the shore side infrastructure necessary 
for his own operations. 
One informant indicated that he had lost his connection to the New Hampshire fishing 
community, in part due to differences of opinion about the catch share program. He opted to join 
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a different sector, because he felt that the fishermen in his home community were focused on 
what they do not have, rather than what they do, in the decision of the New Hampshire 
Commercial Fishermen’s Association to join the lawsuit against NMFS regarding the catch 
history formula used. The informant was committed to making his business work within the 
program, whatever program is in place, as best he could, and felt that the sector he joined was 
more forward thinking. 
DEGREE OF CONFLICT 
The majority of informants (67%) indicated that there were fishermen who they avoid talking 
with in their community (Table 29). There was no differentiation between the sector members 
and others in this response. For some informants, these personal conflicts were significant 
enough to dissuade the informant from joining a sector with the other individual. Others just 
avoid the individual if possible, though they could be in the same sector. One informant spoke of 
the sector as a forum to work out conflicts. However, two informants expressed that the creation 
of the ACE leasing market within and between sectors had created greed within the industry, 
which they abhorred. They felt that fishermen were charging lease prices above fair market price 
to maximize personal benefit, and that it was unfair that some permit holders can gain income 
from just leasing their allocation without going through the effort and expense to fish. 
DEGREE OF TRUST OF FELLOW FISHERMEN 
The majority of informants (67%) indicated that they "sometimes" trust other fishermen in their 
community in business dealings, with 19% indicating that they never trust others and 14% 
indicating that they always trust others (Table 29). Results were similar for sector members, but 
none of the other informants indicated that they always trust others and 86% indicated that they 
sometimes trust. For the sector members, 79% indicated that they trust members of their sector 
about the same as other fishermen. Thus, though there were some opportunities to work together 
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within a sector, the sector members were not overwhelmingly more trusting of each other than 
others in the fisher. Tendencies towards individualism persist. One informant indicated that that 
there can be "bad eggs" in every sector.  
VIEWPOINTS OF MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY ENTITIES 
The majority of informants (52%) indicated that they “sometimes” trust NMFS to have the best 
interest of the industry in mind (Table 30). The sector members had a more negative view of 
NMFS than the other informants, with 50% of the sector members and 14% of the others feeling 
that NMFS “never” had the interest of the industry in mind, whereas 0% of the sector members 
and 29% of the others indicated that NMFS “always” had the interest of the industry in mind.  
When pressed for specifics on the rationale for their viewpoints, most of the informants 
expressed both positive and negative examples. Twenty informants cited 32 different reasons 
why negative viewpoints were held about NMFS. Most common among those include that the 
agency was too sided towards environmentalists and was not focused on helping the industry, 
that it doesn’t take impacts on human communities into account and had made too many 
mistakes. Informants also felt that NMFS was too confrontational, not willing to negotiate with 
industry. Nine informants with mixed responses most commonly said that fishermen’s 
complaints were misguided, that NMFS was just implementing ideas generated by managers or 
was forced to implement a law (the MSFCMA) that was not flexible enough. Eleven informants 
gave seven different positive comments, most commonly that the current Regional Administrator 
seems willing to work with industry, that the staff tries to do well, and the informants were glad 
that NMFS was willing to listen to industry and shift the times that the fishery would be closed 
due to harbor porpoise protection. 
Several informants felt disgruntled by the uncertainty in scientific stock assessments used to set 
catch targets. Due to the mobile nature of the species involved, the groundfish stock assessments 
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have been very difficult, with significant sources of uncertainty and dramatically varying 
outcomes through time. The 2008 assessment for Gulf of Maine cod indicated that the stock was 
rebuilding and would meet recovery targets. Catch rates were allowed to increase by 18% 
between FY 2010 and FY 2011 (NEFMC, 2011b). Fishermen made business investments 
accordingly. However, the 2011 assessment indicated that the stock was actually much smaller 
than what the earlier assessment revealed, including the years leading up to 2008. Sufficient 
rebuilding to meet legal mandates was, in fact, not occurring (NEFSC, 2011). The 2011 
assessment was determined to better minimize uncertainty and incorporate recent data on fishery 
discards that were unavailable in 2008 (NEFSC, 2013). Allowable Biological Catch was 
subsequently cut by 77% between FY 2011 and FY 2012 (NEFMC, 2013b). Even though the 
fishermen have harvested under the levels that managers felt would end overfishing and rebuild 
stocks, many stocks remain in a state of decline. This implies that there had been too much 
uncertainty in the science undergirding groundfish management. A 2010 industry survey 
indicated that just 7% of respondents felt that the science undergirding management was accurate 
(D. S. Holland, et al., 2010). The industry had little faith that the management process can be 
successful. 
DEGREE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL WITHIN SECTORS 
Sector members tended to feel that their sector works fairly well together, and some were rather 
surprised at how well people were working together, because they had traditionally been so 
competitive. All of the sector member informants felt that they trust members of their sector 
about the same as or more than other fishermen (Table 31). Of the sector members, 36% had 
served on the Board to date and virtually all (93%) indicated that sector members respect the 
rules of the sector. The one informant excepted did not want to answer that question, saying, "I 
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can only speak for myself." All of the sector members said that having a sector manager had 
been helpful. A former sector member said that the manager was not particularly helpful.  
Three informants indicated that a benefit to sectors was that they became part of a group working 
towards common goals. However, one informant indicated that a disadvantage of sectors was the 
need to join with a group of fishermen; he would prefer to remain individualistic.  
A few fishermen indicated that his own network of fishermen was defined by the sector that he 
belongs to, but more people indicated that their network was defined by other attributes, such as 
geographic proximity, type, home or landing port, and a longstanding working relationships or 
trust. One informant indicated that, because fishermen have tended to group into sectors with 
similar fishermen (gear type or port), it had helped strengthen the divisions within the industry in 
a negative way. One informant indicated that he would prefer to lease to people within his own 
personal network, rather than work with some of his sectors. Thus, the sector members were 
generally working well together, but social capital certainly existed within the industry prior to 
sectors, which sectors could build on. 
PERSONAL SOCIAL CAPITAL 
This research was not able to tease out trends in what would make an individual fishermen 
inclined to promote social capital within his community. There were no discernible traits based 
on age, fishing practices or other demographic characteristic of a particularly high- or low-social 
capital informant. In addition, each informant expressed some degree of social capital, though in 
varying ways. One informant was very secretive about his fishing practices, yet was integral to 
the formation of his sector and committed to his success. Another informant joined a sector that 
was based in his landing port and that had a large allocation, motivated by his personal 
convenience and opportunities for profit, but had not sought out collaborative opportunities with 
the membership. He had retained memberships in a fishing organization based in his early-career 
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homeport. He does not like fishing within a sector, constrained by a set of rules, yet appreciates 
having a sector manager as a neutral broker between fishermen. A third informant with relatively 
little PSC joined a sector, but had found that it had not promoted a sense of community. He was 
not a member of the New Hampshire Fishermen's Association, due to personal conflicts, though 
he was very open with other fishermen and finds them trustworthy. Helping New Hampshire-
based fishermen was important to him, yet he felt offended that he was excluded from legal 
settlement funds. 
FISHERIES COMPARED 
This dissertation was not designed to compare the social capital of the groundfish fishery with 
other fisheries in the region, yet several informants offered comparisons with the lobster fishery, 
comparisons that differ from those in the literature, and thus are worth noting here. 
James Acheson (2006) constructed a comparative analysis of the lobster and groundfish fisheries 
of the Northeast, asserting that lobster management “effectiveness,” defined as stock abundance 
and catch rates at all-time highs, is largely due to the conservation measures promulgated by a 
homogeneous industry that operates within a management program that had been responsive to 
industry lobbying. Indeed, lobster is a fairly sedentary species, with most individuals moving within 
a range generally smaller than the management zones lobstermen are confined to operate within. This 
incentivizes local conservation for future access. In contrast, the “top-down” nature of federal 
groundfish management and the diversity of that industry, he asserts, has provided little incentive 
to promote conservation from within the industry and hindered implementation of industry input 
into management, resulting in continued stock depletion. The fishery is prosecuted with several 
different gears and vessel sizes, and fishermen who operate in an area tend to come from 
disparate ports. These are factors that Acheson argues create less social capital and consensus on 
management approaches than exist within the lobster fishery, impediments to collective action. 
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From the lens of rational choice theory, he argues that the characteristics of the lobster industry 
and its management arena have enabled more effective participatory governance and collective 
action.  
There was evidence, however, that the social capital within the groundfish fishery was stronger 
than within the lobster fishery, at least in New Hampshire. For example, the following is an 
excerpt from an informant who exclusively harvested groundfish until the fall of 2010, when he 
switched to full-time lobster. Here, he was responding to questions about gear conflicts and trust 
within the New Hampshire fishery: 
[Groundfish] fishermen, it always seemed like you could, they could get along with 
all of them. Now, since I’ve become a lobsterman, I’m pretty sure they hate their own 
mother. They just don’t like each other. Lobstermen, they don’t talk on the radio. 
They don’t talk with each other. They just, it’s, it’s a cut-throat business when it 
comes to lobster fishing. That’s, that’s the only difference I can see. Fishermen they 
get along, I mean, it’s not like you’re stealing their fish and this and that. But 
lobstermen, you, you catch a lobster, you’re taking one of their lobsters. And that’s 
what it comes down to. …You can see it in Maine; you can see it in Jersey. People in 
Jersey used to shoot each other over lobster fishing. …Fishermen, the ocean’s 
nobody’s. It’s everybody’s, so that’s the way it is. 
Other informants also view the groundfish fishermen as more collaborative and less possessive 
about the resource. However, conflicts between mobile and fixed gear groundfish fishermen are 
a constant source of tension, but the more migrant nature of the groundfish resource likely results 
in less conflict than within the lobster fishery. In practice, the localized nature of the lobster 
resource and its management has resulted in a sense of territorial ownership within the industry. 
This has led to instances of property destruction and, in rare instances, gun violence (AP, 2009). 
Although enforcement is swift (Dicolo & Friedman, 2012), the troubles lead to questioning the 
social cost of territorialism. 
As Ostrom (2010) describes, there are “no panacea” approaches to natural resource management. 
Acheson concludes his analysis by postulating that the lobster and groundfish “cases seem to 
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argue for bottoms-up management” (J.M. Acheson, 2006), implying that groundfish would be 
better managed at the local level. There have been a few industry-initiated proposals discussed 
by the NEFMC over the years that would split current groundfish management segments into 
smaller zones to be co-managed by communities of users (NEFMC, 2007b). The proposals have 
failed to gain much traction, largely because the zones were too small to manage stocks 
appropriately, and there was insufficient industry-wide support and participation in their 
development. The industry-wide sector approach adopted in FY 2010 does delegate some 
decisions to communities of fishermen. Those communities were left to the fishermen to define, 
who they align with socially rather than geographically. 
In the case of groundfish, the geographic range and the diversity of the stocks and the fishermen 
who harvest them, make the current management structure the most appropriate. There is 
sufficient participation of the industry in the management process and social capital to garner 
collective action. What is still necessary is improved science undergirding decisions and a better 
alignment of regulations with ecological processes.  
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
Results from region-wide analysis by Holland et al. (2010) of social capital indicated that a high 
degree of trust existed within the groundfish fishery in 2010, just prior to catch share 
implementation. Of the groundfish permit holders surveyed at that time, 71% indicated that they 
trust most of the other fishermen in their fishing community. This agrees with the results of this 
dissertation, that 67% of informants “sometimes” trust fellow groundfish fishermen, and 14% 
always do. In the larger study, 83% agreed that fishermen in their community “trust one another 
in matters of lending.” In terms of networking, 93% indicated that they share information with a 
group of fishermen. On average, these networks comprise 12 fishermen, within the range that 
informants for this dissertation indicated as the number of people they share information with 
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about fishing areas and catch. For the survey participants who had joined a sector, 67% were 
expecting the sector to work well together. 
Holland et al. (2013) further analyzed the survey data, creating statistical scoring of social capital 
indices: bonding, bridging, linking, information sharing and trust, and at individual and sector 
levels. Results suggest that groundfish fishermen self-define their communities and place 
substantial value on social capital, expressed in various ways. This contrasts to the reputation of 
rugged individualism within the groundfish fishery. In that dataset, the sectors with relatively 
small vessels from a smaller geographic region tend to have stronger ties with fellows sector 
member, and example of bonding social capital, than sectors with larger more geographically 
dispersed, in which relationships and information sharing outside the sector were more 
important. The social capital data were compared with economic performance for the first two 
years of sectors. While there were some significant correlations, causality was unclear. 
Olson and Pinto da Silva (J. Olson & Pinto da Silva, 2014) found through interviews of sector 
managers in 2011 that, region-wide, those sectors with more financial resources and social 
capital have tended to fare better. However, many factors were influencing success. Sectors have 
benefitted from varying degrees of external organizational and financial support and catch 
allocation. Sectors began as a community-based effort through Amendment 13, but were 
formalized fishery-wide in Amendment 16 through a top-down process. Indeed, 46% of 
respondents to the Holland et al. (2010) survey in 2010 felt that sectors were forced on them. 
Each sector is governed by a board of directors, and has a professional sector manager, to 
distribute quota and ensure compliance with sector rules. The potential for collaborative, 
decentralized governance exists, though all sectors have returned quota to fishermen in 
proportion that each contributes PSC to the sector. Some sectors view the role of their manager 
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as an agent for tracking ACE used by the sector. Others, such as NEFS XI and XII, use the 
manager as an advocate in the management arena, as facilitator of improved business practices 
and liaison with the National Marine Fisheries Service, fostering social capital within their 
sector. Overall, sectors were behaving more as a facilitator of individual allocations more than a 
forum for localized collaborative management as perhaps envisioned (J. Olson & Pinto da Silva, 
2014). 
SUMMARY 
There was some evidence that sectors increased social capital, but it was not a strong conclusion, 
as there was also evidence that social capital was not dependent on sectors, and that in some 
ways, sectors reduced social capital due, for instance, to increased organizational responsibilities. 
Sector informants do not appear to be more inclined to voluntarily join trade organizations than 
other informants. Sector informants tended to lend equipment and share information on fishing 
areas and catch more than others. There was little evidence that the informants were using social 
capital to coordinate fishing areas to reduce gear conflicts or bycatch. Though many felt that 
supporting the New Hampshire community was important, it was not uniform. It appears that the 
selection of the specific sector that an informant joined was determined in part by the level of 
social capital that already existed with fellow industry members. Sectors can build on whatever 
social capital may already exist within the industry. There was no particular set of traits that 
distinguish high-from low-social capital informants. Perhaps this could be investigated in future 
research that examines social capital across the industry as a whole, a larger and more diverse 
population than the fishermen of New Hampshire. These conclusions align with regional 




1. Contrary to the hypothesis, the sector program did not increase networking, reciprocity, 
and trust among informants uniformly. 
2. In some cases, social capital was reduced as increased organizational responsibilities 
were seen as a burden and fishing became more competitive and secretive. 
3. Sector members tended to be more willing to lend equipment to fellow fishermen and 
share information about fishing areas. However, some became more secretive to gain a 
competitive edge in finding fish aggregations. 
4. Informants showed that the social capital of a fishing community could be augmented by 
fishing within a sector, but that the sector is not necessarily a source of social capital. 
5. There was no particular set of traits that distinguish high-from low-social capital 
informants, though traits may emerge in a larger data set. 
6. Networks were defined less by their sector, but more by geographic proximity, gear type, 
home or landing port, trust, or longstanding relationships. 
7. Sector members were not collaborating to reduce bycatch, despite being collectively 





CHAPTER VII. OUTCOMES - BYCATCH 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE OF BYCATCH REDUCTION 
Most all of the informants (90%, n=19) indicated that reducing bycatch was important to them 
(Table 32). Two informants indicated that they felt neutral about bycatch reduction. These were 
both sector members, though groundfish was not their primary source of fishing revenue. One 
was a lease-only member, not actively fishing for groundfish himself (was active in the lobster 
fishery). The other actively fishes using both gillnet and trawl gear. No one said that bycatch 
reduction was unimportant. 
The dominant reason why reducing bycatch was important, cited by ten informants, was that it 
was important to keep fish in the ocean for the health of future stocks. Another common 
response (n=8) was that reducing bycatch improves efficiency, in reduced deck sorting time. It 
was also important to not waste fish from an economic perspective, that because discarded fish 
have a low likelihood of survival, discarding was viewed as wasting money.  
FISHING UNDER DAS 
Many informants spoke about their time of fishing under DAS trip limits, with seven indicating 
that there were more discards than under sectors, and that the trip limits forced the discards. The 
informants were constrained by trip limits in diverse ways. One fisherman described his decision 
in 2006 to cease groundfish fishing, because he had an enforcement violation for being over his 
landing limit: 
…the $5,000 fine was a big hit, but it wasn’t going to end my career or anything. I 
was just ashamed…I am like beyond goody-two-shoes, and it hurt my feelings so bad 
that I was just like, ‘I can’t do this’ because if I get caught again, I’ll just be, I’ll be 
done, everything. I’ll just sell my boat and be done… I’ve always had a reputation of 
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being pretty honest …It just blew my mind that I did something dishonest, not even 
trying to. 
The overage was unintentional, and although he was planning to fish for many more years, the 
embarrassment and potential for damage to his reputation caused him to switch to full-time 
lobster harvesting. At the time of the interview, he was just leasing his groundfish quota within a 
sector. 
Other fishermen felt disdain towards management and demoralized by being forced to discard, 
but kept on fishing while many pounds of large cod went over their rails each trip. When asked 
about the advantages of the sector program, one such respondent said: 
The primary advantage is biological, is that we’re not throwing any fish over. I 
mean, in my small dragger in 2007, we probably wasted a million pounds of cod, you 
know, we got our 800 or 1,600 [trip limit] and we had days that we caught 20,000 
three times a day. It was stupid. 
One respondent identified that the volume of unreported discards prior to catch shares had 
negatively impacted the cod stock assessments: 
When they call it “retrospective pattern,” that’s us throwing fish over, but nobody 
will admit it…It’s true, yeah. When there’s a retrospective pattern in the population 
of cod, it’s the fish that were thrown over that weren’t reported, you know. 
A retrospective pattern occurs when the estimates of fish population and mortality rates back in 
time differ between two different stock assessments. These patterns create uncertainty in the 
stock abundance levels, which then creates uncertainty in the acceptable catch levels for the 
fishery (Mohn, 1999). 
BYCATCH UNDER CATCH SHARES 
When asked how their level of bycatch had changed since May 2010, removing the four 
informants to whom the question was not relevant (e.g., former fishermen and a lease-only 
member of a sector), 47% of informants indicated that their bycatch had decreased, 35% said that 
it was unchanged, and 18% said that it had increased (Table 32). Comparing sector members to 
109 
other informants, 50% of the sector members and 40% of the other informants indicated that 
their level of bycatch had decreased. So, both groups saw a distinct decrease in bycatch. Under 
DAS, seven informants recalled that there were more discards than under sectors, and that the 
trip limits forced the discards. Six informants indicated that their discards had reduced since May 
2010, because there are no legal discards under sectors, but five informants felt that their bycatch 
had not changed much. Eight informants felt like they did not have much bycatch prior to FY 
2010, so comparisons are difficult when totals under both DAS and sectors were low. 
By gear type, more informants who fish with trawls (66%) noted reductions in bycatch relative to 
gillnetters (33%). Two fishermen who used handgear, a commercial fisherman and a charter 
fisherman both in the common pool, indicated that their gear type had very little bycatch in 
general. Four gillnetters also felt that they have little bycatch, catching few undersized fish. 
Though six sector member informants felt that their bycatch had decreased under sectors, and 
just one said that it had increased (Table 32), there were a few lines of evidence that bycatch may 
still be an issue. Under catch shares, gillnet vessels fishing sectors may share gear, which was 
enacted to reduce bycatch (e.g., harbor porpoise). However, the interviews revealed that was not 
occurring in the fishery. Those fishermen who were secretly sharing gillnets under DAS were no 
longer. By allowing fishermen to keep what they catch under sectors, the advantages to using 
one’s own gear outweigh the advantages of sharing. Generally, the informants did not make 
significant gear configurations with the advent of catch shares. There was evidence that bycatch 
may be occurring related to the multispecies nature of this catch share fishery, discarding of 
allocated legal-sized stocks. One respondent described it this way: 
Let’s say you get 50,000 pounds of cod to catch, and you have say, 1,500 pounds of 
black backs [winter flounder] you’re allowed to keep, and all the sudden you’re up 
against all these black backs. You still have 8,000 pounds of cod to catch. What are 
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you going to do with the black backs? You’re going to throw them over. You know, 
because you can’t, I mean the lease quota on these fish is outrageous. 
The ACE for stocks of low abundance was in high demand, so it was very expensive to lease. 
When unobserved, this gives fishermen an incentive to discard. That respondent was a leader in 
his sector, and as such, felt that he should not discard as a moral example. However, he was 
aware of it occurring in the fishery. 
ACTIONS TAKEN TO AVOID BYCATCH 
The majority (67%) of informants indicated that they go above and beyond the regulations to 
avoid bycatch, with a stronger majority (79%) among sector members (Table 32), though 57% of 
the common pool members indicated that they do. One informant referred to there being two 
types of fishermen. One type were the people who fished in a way that avoided bycatch, like 
fishing on the edge of an aggregation of fish or who would stop fishing when they got close to 
the DAS trip limit. Other fishermen "had no qualms" about discarding a lot of fish under DAS, 
"dumping 15, 17,000 pounds of dead fish over the side.”  
Gillnetters spoke of strategies they had taken under DAS program to reduce bycatch. Three 
informants shared how under DAS trip limits, gillnet fishermen were willing to violate 
regulations so that discarding could be avoided. Specifically, it was against the DAS regulations 
to share gillnets at sea among vessels. However, informants described how a fisherman with a 
large catch in his nets would get on the radio and invite others to harvest some of his nets rather 
than set their own, minimizing waste. This occurred on trips that were not monitored by 
observers and where enforcement was out of sight. Here was how one gillnet fisherman 
described the practice: 
I’d haul till I get my limit and then bring those nets home, and then finish the string 
up the next day. I got really good at that. I mean you got to the point where we 
wouldn’t throw anything away, or if it got that bad we’d have other people come and 
haul. 
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To them, collaboratively reducing bycatch was more important than obeying regulations. 
Alternatively, one fisherman spoke of how reduce bycatch without violating regulations. He 
would haul nets until he got his trip limit, take those nets out, leave the rest, and then come back 
the next day. One fishermen spoke of these measures as a way of taking steps to "police 
ourselves" in bycatch reduction.  
Under sectors, one member said that he takes steps to reduce bycatch only if it improves his deck 
sorting time. Another spoke of a gear modification experiment that he was doing that was 
successfully avoiding undersized cod, but he felt that he was not catching much cod to begin 
with anyway. People spoke of making some adjustment to mesh size to reduce undersized fish, 
because of the quota limitations, trying to catch just legal-sized fish. Four informants spoke of 
using a larger mesh than required to avoid bycatch, and eight spoke of moving their gear to avoid 
aggregations of fish that they want to avoid. One informant indicated that he would fish more 
selectively with an observer on board. 
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
ESTIMATING BYCATCH 
Determining the level of bycatch in the Northeast groundfish fishery was challenging due to the 
diversity of vessels, gear configurations, fishing trip durations, the unique reaction of species to 
different gears, natural environmental variability, and limited human resources to collect data 
and make calculations. For over a century, the government has collected data from commercial 
fishing trips, but during the past few decades, bycatch estimations have dramatically improved. 
During the 1990s, the Northeast Fisheries Observer Program (NEFOP) of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) focused their limited resources on monitoring the interactions between 
fixed-gear fisheries and protected species (e.g., harbor porpoise takes in the gillnet fishery). 
Monitoring discards of all Northeast fisheries increased substantially in 2001, and an observer 
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program is now required for all Fishery Management Plans (FMPs), though rates of observer 
coverage vary. NEFOP records weights of kept and discarded species and biological data (e.g., 
age, sex), and has vessel selection protocols to minimize systematic bias. In addition to the 
federal observers, there has been mandatory self-reporting for the landing and sale of all 
Northeast species since 1994. Vessel Trip Reports (VTRs) and dealer reports are submitted to 
NMFS and now contribute to catch calculations (NMFS, 2011b). 
A substantial amount of data imputation is required in creating bycatch estimates. For the 
Northeast groundfish fishery, the observer program has been in operation since 1990. Prior to 
that, there were no direct, systematic measures of bycatch in the fishery (NEFSC, 2013). At-sea 
observer coverage levels from 2005 to 2009 ranged between 2% and 10% of the fishery trips, 
and rates before 2005 were even smaller (NMFS, 2011b). The coverage level increased to about 
30% with the advent of the catch share program in May 2010. Inaccuracies in catch data can be a 
significant source of uncertainty in stock assessments (Hilborn, 2003), and how much bias exists 
within the observer data is a topic of ongoing debate. 
An “apples-to-apples” comparison of the bycatch caught by the vessels participating in the catch 
share program with their prior performance was not possible with the data that have been 
reported publicly. The post catch shares data are reported by fishing year (May 1 – April 30) and 
the earlier data report by calendar year. Prior to FY 2010, the commercial discards reported for 
each stock combines all effort, direct and indirect. From FY 2010 forward, the data are broken 
down by all fishery components with sub-ACLs (e.g., sector, common pool, herring fishery). 
However, since 99% of the effort targeting groundfish is through the sector, qualified 
comparisons can be reasonable. 
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BYCATCH PRIOR TO CATCH SHARE MANAGEMENT 
A FISHERY-WIDE SNAPSHOT. The first U.S. National Bycatch Report was produced by NMFS in 
2011 and contains a snapshot from 2005 of landings and bycatch data across 274 federal, state, 
international and tribal commercial fisheries (NMFS, 2011b). The Northeast Multispecies fishery 
is prosecuted with several different gear types, and the bycatch data for each are summarized in 
Table 1, broken down by each species in the multispecies complex. The data include all fishing 
trips with these gear types, not just those targeting groundfish under the federal Multispecies 
FMP (e.g., monkfish trips).  
Due to the aforementioned caveats, the data presented here cannot be attributed to just the 
Northeast Multispecies fishery operating in federal waters. That said, there was 28,824.9 mt of 
bycatch from gear types that can target the groundfish fishery in 2005, and 10.3% of that was of 
groundfish species. More than half of the bycatch was skates. The total bycatch ratio 
(bycatch:catch) was 0.35. Trawl gear had the highest bycatch ratios, 0.32-0.44, followed by 
gillnets, 0.17-0.32. Longlines and handlines had the smallest bycatch ratios, 0.08-0.22. The 
largest bycatch of a single species in the multispecies complex was Atlantic cod, at 819.0 mt, 
27.5% of the total multispecies bycatch, followed by windowpane flounder and haddock (NMFS, 
2011b). 
By 2005, the groundfish fishery had been managed for 11 years under a Days-at-Sea effort 
control system, since 1994 (NEFMC, 1993). Measures in place included minimum mesh and fish 
sizes, and rolling and year-round area closures to avoid certain stock aggregations. Although trip 
limits were imposed for haddock (1994-1997) and cod (1997-2009) to reduce mortality, 
discarding was known to be an issue. Cod and haddock caught in excess of the trip limits or of 
sublegal length had to be released at sea, i.e., as “regulatory discards” (NEFMC, 2009a). Thus, 
the high bycatch of cod in 2005 (Table 33) was likely due to the trip limits in place. 
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TIME SERIES. A time-series of catch data (landings and discards) back to 1960 is available from 
NEFSC stock-assessment reports. Data from before 1990 are back calculations, due to the 
absence of observer data. From 1990 forward, numbers are estimated by compiling observer, 
VTR, and dealer datasets. The data are of all commercial catch, not just from vessels targeting 
the groundfish stocks under the Northeast Multispecies FMP. Generally, discards of multispecies 
stocks have decreased dramatically since 1990, and for most stocks, this is largely due to gear 
changes. Tables 2-5 provide catch calculations for Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank haddock 
and cod since 1986, the first year of the FMP (NEFSC, 2012a, 2012b). 
Some correlation of discards with trip limits is evident for Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank 
haddock (Table 34 and Table 35). Trip limits of 500-1,000 lbs/day were in place between 1994 
and 1997, the years with the highest percent discards, 30.2-43.8% for Gulf of Maine haddock. 
Other than those years, discards constitute a minor fraction of total Gulf of Maine haddock catch, 
≤13.3%. For Georges Bank haddock, 1994-1997 had some of the highest discard rates in the time 
series, particularly 1994 (91.0%). The catch in 1994 (2,302 mt) was similar to years prior, but the 
catch in 1995-1997 was substantially lower (309-1,151 mt). It is possible that the trip limits 
incentivized the offshore vessels to fish inshore, in the Gulf of Maine stock area during that time. 
After 1998, Georges Bank haddock discards remained under 4.5% until 2004, when the stock 
had another pulse of high discards on western Georges Bank that has lasted through 2010. This 
may be due to the large 2003 year class that was progressing through the fishery (NEFSC, 
2012b). 
For Gulf of Maine cod, the years of low trip limits also correspond fairly well to the years with 
higher total discards (Table 36). Commercial trip limits were first imposed in 1997 at 1,000 
lbs/day to reduce effort on this species that was considered overfished. The cod trip limits were 
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reduced several times over the next few years, getting as low as 30 lbs/day in 1999. The highest 
discards were recorded in that year, 49.5% of the catch. The subsequent trip limit years also had 
higher discard rates (6.5% - 32.8%) than the period prior to 1999 (2.8% - 12.3%). The low trip 
limits caused a substantial amount of discarding, such that in 2004, the limit was raised to 800 
lbs/day and remained as such until the advent of the catch share program in May 2010, when trip 
limits were removed entirely (NEFMC, 2009a). The catch in FY 2010 included just 4.3% 
discards.  
Trends in Georges Bank cod discards do not correlate with the trip limits that were in place from 
1997-2009 (Table 37). Discards were ≤8.0% of the catch from 1986-2004, but in 2005, the 
discards jumped to 27.4% and have been between 17.3-31.0% ever since (NEFSC, 2012b). 
While landings have generally declined since the 1980’s, discards have remained fairly stable, 
pushing the discard rates higher recently. The discards may be comprised of sublegal-cod or cod 
caught as bycatch in other fisheries (e.g., scallops). 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CATCH SHARES 
The implementation of a catch share program (i.e., sectors) for the Northeast Multispecies FMP 
brought many changes. New ACLs for each stock constrain all vessels, eliminating the need for 
many of the former effort controls (NEFMC, 2009a). Sectors were expanded fishery-wide and 
99% of the directed effort is now subject to this catch share program. Non-sector vessels, 1% of 
the effort, continue to fish under many of the prior control rules (Kitts, et al., 2011). For sector 
vessels, trip limits were removed and full retention is required of all legal size groundfish. These 
fish were regulatory discards, but are now landed and count against the Annual Catch 
Entitlement (ACE) of the sector to which a fisherman belongs. Fishermen now need sufficient 
quota of a stock, held or leased, to land the stock. Possession limits do remain for certain non-
target stocks in need of rebuilding (e.g., Atlantic wolffish). At-sea observer coverage 
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dramatically increased, to about 30% (NEFMC, 2009a). For the first year, the fisheries also had 
dockside monitoring, but that was eliminated starting in FY 2011, largely because the cost to 
obtain this data outweighed the marginal benefit (NEFMC, 2011b). 
DISCARD RATE CALCULATIONS. Methods to calculate bycatch in the fishery have become more 
sophisticated. The vessels in each sector are divided into strata by similar gear type, species 
fished and fishing area. A set of unique assumed discard rates for each stock are calculated for 
each stratum. These assumed discard rates are used to calculate the level of discards for each 
unobserved trip and count against the ACE. Discard rates set at the beginning of FY 2010 were 
calculated based on observed sub-legal discards during FY 2009. As the fishery proceeds, the 
assumed discard rates are updated weekly, incorporating new observer data. Vessels fishing in 
the same stratum are subject to the same discard rates, so the observed discards of one vessel in a 
stratum affect the assumed discard rates for all other vessels (NMFS, 2010a). In addition to 
mitigating the ethical dilemma of wasting the resource, fishermen have new incentives to 
minimize discards: to reduce their own ACE deduction, to reduce the ACE deduction across their 
sector, and to mitigate the ethical dilemma of throwing over healthy groundfish. 
BYCATCH UNDER CATCH SHARE MANAGEMENT. The Northeast Regional Office tracks sector ACE 
usage (landings and discards), and reports this data on their website (NMFS, 2015b). For the first 
two years of the program (FY 2010 and FY 2011), the sector discards for all stocks in the 
multispecies fishery were 1,215 and 1,575 mt and the discard rates were 4.0% and 4.9%, 
respectively (Table 38 and Table 39). This data do not include other species (e.g., skates). The 
multispecies stocks that are unallocated to the sectors are those with the highest discard rates: 
Southern New England winter flounder, windowpane flounder, ocean pout, halibut, and wolfish. 
Of the allocated stocks, the highest discard rates are of Cape Cod/Gulf of Maine yellowtail 
117 
flounder (10.7%, 10.5%) and plaice (11.4%, 12.0%). Discards of haddock and cod were ≤2.1% 
and ≤4.5%, respectively. Bycatch of Gulf of Maine cod has not been this low since 1998, since 
before the lowest trip limits were in place (Table 36). This suggests that removing the trip limits 
and eliminating the discard of legal-sized fish has lessened bycatch for this stock. Gulf of Maine 
haddock discards have been very low for many years (Table 34) and have remained low under 
catch shares. For Georges Bank cod and haddock, sector discards have been ≤4.5%. Thus, the 
catch share program has resulted in low bycatch rate estimates, at least for the allocated stocks. 
WHAT CHALLENGES REMAIN 
The core of a catch share program is to implement a fishery-wide catch limit and distribute it 
among fishery participants. Will catch share management alone decrease bycatch in the 
Northeast groundfish fishery? Not likely. Attempts to restrict landings on a daily or an annual 
basis both incentivize discarding of “choke” stocks, the species that need to be rebuilt. Fisheries 
with catch shares and 100% observer coverage, like the British Columbia groundfish fishery 
(Branch, Rutherford, & Hilborn, 2006), tend to have the lowest bycatch levels. It may not be 
feasible at present to increase the observer rate for the Northeast Multispecies fishery from 30%. 
To date, observers have been federally funded, and any attempt to shift the burden onto the 
industry has been met with strong political opposition. Profit margins are too slim for many 
fishermen to be able to afford observers. Such a measure may result in rapid consolidation, a 
socially undesirable outcome. In today’s federal budget climate, prospects are dim of increasing 
the line item for this expense. 
If increasing NEFOP observers is not feasible, there are other steps to help monitor the fishery 
and keep bycatch to a minimum. Industry self-monitoring of bycatch hot spots is proving 
successful for the scallop fishery (UMass, 2013). Although informal networks exist among 
groundfish fishermen, the industry could become more organized in this manner. Fishermen have 
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more flexibility to decide where, when and how to fish. This increases opportunity to target 
marketable stocks in their portfolio when there is ready access to markets. Profits can be 
improved by minimizing costs and improving product quality. Economic discards can be turned 
into landings with market innovations. Fishing gear restrictions are effective at avoiding bycatch, 
but gear selectivity can still improve, as can understanding what incentivizes adopting more 
selective gear (Campbell & Cornwell, 2008).  
An important concern remaining for the gillnet fisheries is interaction with harbor porpoise, a 
protected species under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Attaching acoustic pinging devices 
to nets has proven effective at deterring interactions and is required for the fishery, along with 
time and area closures (Palka, Orphanides, & Warden, 2008). However, the sensors to determine 
if the pingers are working are unaffordable for the industry, as are the fines for non-compliance. 
Keeping assumed discard rates low is essential to the future of this segment of the groundfish 
fishery. 
SUMMARY 
The groundfish fishermen informants indicated that the transition to catch shares had decreased 
their bycatch. The data show that for the most part, reducing bycatch was important to these 
fishermen and that they saw their level of bycatch decrease with the advent of the catch share 
program, primarily through eliminating the trip limits and discards of legal-sized fish. Some 
informants had gone above and beyond regulations to avoid bycatch in recognition of the need to 
steward stocks for the future. The quantitative NMFS data suggest that bycatch of legal-sized 
target fish had been eliminated and overall bycatch of groundfish is low. The qualitative data 
from New Hampshire reveal more nuance. Some fishermen noted no longer wasting marketable 
fish, but others identified new pressures to discard when unobserved, driven largely by the high 
lease costs of choke stocks. At the vessel level, quota available had not matched natural 
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abundance. A new management tool to try to reduce bycatch, sharing of fixed gear, is not 
occurring, at least in the New Hampshire fishery. Catch shares did not incentivized the industry 
to make their gear substantially more selective either. High-grading may be occurring in the 
fishery, but there was no evidence in the qualitative data analyzed to date that the practice was 
any more or less widespread than before. Although catch shares have the potential to reduce 
bycatch, evidence from the Northeast groundfish fishery suggests that factors such as inaccurate 
stock assessments and unobserved discards may be buffering gains. 
It seems like the most common theme was that bycatch had either remained the same or 
improved for individual informants, and that collectively, bycatch had improved. Though 
discarding may be reduced, the overall biological benefit is questionable if fishermen have been 
targeting concentrations of fish more. 
KEY OUTCOMES 
1. Consistent with the hypothesis, reducing bycatch was important to informants, and they 
saw their level of bycatch decrease with the advent of the catch share program, primarily 
through eliminating the trip limits and discards of legal-sized fish. 
2. Region-wide, the catch share program had reduced documented bycatch; though discards 
may be lower with reduced trip limits and retention of legal sized fish, pressures remain 





CHAPTER VIII. OUTCOMES - ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
INCOME, COSTS, AND PROFIT 
Questions regarding economic performance began with seeking to understand the degree of 
household and personal dependence on fishing in general (e.g., including lobster), as well as on 
groundfish fishing specifically, and how this dependence changed longitudinally. Answers were 
based on recollection rather than actual earnings. Between FY 2009 and FY 2011, the percent of 
total household income from fishing remained fairly stable, with 52-57% of informants deriving 
76-100% of their income from fishing (Table 40). All of the informants had household income 
from fishing in FY 2009 and FY 2010, but one informant, a former groundfish fisherman had 
none in 2011 (other former groundfish fishermen still had income from other fisheries). In terms 
of their own income, a large majority (76-81%) of the informants derived 76-100% of their own 
income from fishing through the time series, with a slightly higher percentage of informants in 
FY 2009 than in later years. Very few informants (0-5%) derived 26-75% of their income from 
fishing and a few informants (14-19%) derived 1-25% of their income from fishing. In terms of 
dependence on the groundfish fishery, less than half of the informants (43%) indicated that 76-
100% of their fishing income was derived from groundfish, which included about half of the 
sector members. Thus, most households were highly dependent on fishing and most informants 
worked as fishermen for their full-time income, with a minor amount working part-time as 
fishermen. There was little longitudinal change in these results. 
Lobster, shrimp, herring, and monkfish were the most common other fisheries that the 
informants participated in. Informants had several other sources of income during the time series 
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besides fishing, including investment or retirement income, owning another business (e.g., fuel 
company, property management, small contractor), or working at a company (e.g., shipyard, 
marine insurance). Some had gained income through service on the New England Fishery 
Management Council, training federal fisheries observers, or conducting collaborative research. 
For the sector members, the transition from fishing a set number of days to having an annual 
weight of fish that they could catch was daunting. They did not know how quickly they would 
catch different stocks in their allocation portfolio and be then forced to either lease or tie up their 
vessel. This caused some to proceed cautiously during the first year of catch shares. A fisherman 
recalled that in the second year: 
I wasn’t as passive in my fishing practices. I was confident that I could acquire 
quota and utilize it. But in 2010, I didn’t have the level of confidence … that I was 
going to be okay. 
This learning curve impacted income; some sector members noted income increases in the 
second year as they became more comfortable with the catch share program and more savvy to 
fish when they could maximize price. 
Informants were asked, "Since May 2010, how has the profit margin of your groundfish fishing 
operations changed?" For some informants (n=4), the question was not directly relevant, such as 
those who were not active in the groundfish fishery since May 2010 (Table 42). Otherwise, the 
most common response, by sector and common pool members alike, was that groundfish profits 
dropped since the advent of the catch share program, with 12 informants noting this from 
personal experience or having observed the industry. Of the active fishermen, 59% (n=10) 
indicated that profits had decreased, including 50% of the sector members and 80% of the 
common pool members. Just three informants, all sector members, had improved profits. 
Several reasons were given why profit margins declined. Some fishermen mentioned not finding 
as much fish to catch, while others spoke of the low catch limits. One informant mentioned that 
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fuel costs were constraining too. These may be more important factors than being within a catch 
share program per se, given that most of the common pool members had worsening profits in 
addition to sector members. The aforementioned constraints would be felt by the common pool 
as well. A few informants indicated that they were just breaking even, and one was actively 
trying to sell his vessel and permits, primarily because fishing was becoming economically 
unviable. 
An additional constraint for sector members is the amount of PSC assigned to their permits, such 
that leasing ACE is required to harvest the available fish in one’s own portfolio. This was a 
substantial new cost for several informants. One described that he had recently grossed as much 
money as ever, but he netted about the same, because costs increased. A few indicated that they 
were taking on more debt under sectors and had reservations about doing so. For them, the dollar 
earned may have improved, but the dollar spent is rising. 
The sector and former sector members were asked how the costs associated with sectors compare 
to what was anticipated (e.g., membership fees, ACE leasing). Sector costs were as expected for 
57% of informants, and 14% indicated that they were higher than expected. Just one informant 
indicated that costs were lower than expected (Table 42). Two sector members were unsure how 
costs matched expectations; perhaps they had entered the program without knowing what to 
expect. 
Three sector members and a common pool member had no substantial change in profits. One of 
these noted that there had been some ups and downs, but overall, his income had been fairly 
steady. He attributes this to having three permits with the PSC he needs, suggesting that the 
fishermen who have PSC that does not match with what they catch were having a harder time, 
because they were more reliant on leased fish. 
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For the three informants with improved profits, all sector members, there was no particular 
demographic similarity. Their demographics span the range of the population. The lengths of 
their vessels range from 39-61’, they fish out of three different ports, and they first became 
permit holders between 1985 and 1998. They hold one to four permits each, so the number of 
permits held does not correlate with profitability in this case. The profitable informants found 
ways to keep expenses in check: 
The profit to expense ratio is much better now, because your expenses remain the 
same whether you go out under Days at Sea or under the Sector Program. It costs ‘x’ 
amount of dollars to start the boat in the morning, and nine times out of ten you’re 
bringing in more fish per day now. You’re catching your fish in a shorter period of 
time, so I’d say it’s gone up. 
This fisherman explained his improved profits as an outcome of decisions to become more 
efficient. 
Several informants noted unusual circumstances that drove their profit margins up or down. One 
informant had a boat fire that decreased his income for several months as necessary repairs were 
made. In FY 2011, two informants did not see much fish in their typical fishing area, so had low 
profits. One chose to fish less and the other fished more hours for less money, due to increased 
time searching for fish. In FY 2012, fish prices improved and one informant recalled improved 
profits as a result. 
The impacts on the New Hampshire fishermen resemble observations of Bromley (2005), that 
buyers in catch share programs (here, lessees of ACE) were forced into capital markets and risky 
debt obligations. Several informants took on substantial debts to have sufficient allocation. The 
debt allowed revenue to increase but, the “dollars earned per dollar invested had gone down,” as 
one respondent described. In FY 2011, the value of cod that one fisherman leased in exceeded 
the value of his home. He felt that he did not have much choice; “it was either fish or stay 
home.” One wife sitting in on an interview said that it is, “scary how much we have to go into 
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debt to stay in business, with the changes ever looming over your head.” She was referring to the 
uncertainty in the stock ACLs that can sometimes change mid-year as managers acquire updated 
assessment information. 
Several informants mentioned specific steps they took to adjust their business strategy to help 
improve their profits. Several were trying to be active in more diverse fisheries (n=6). The timing 
of fishing had been adjusted to maximize fish prices at the dock (n=2). Permits have been 
purchased to better match PSC with catch (n=2). Costs have been cut by sharing ownership of a 
vessel with another fisherman (n=1). A non-fishing business was purchased (n=1). 
An informant mentioned the permit bank that NEFS XI and XII formed to make ACE more 
readily available to its members (n=1). 
One risk that sector members face is being unable to harvest the entire quota leased in by the end 
of the fishing year. One respondent relayed an instance when he needed to lease more cod, but 
could only find a 10,000 lb. block available, which was much more than he projected that he 
would likely use, but he felt forced to buy it, so he could go fishing. When there got to be just 
two months left in the fishing year: 
I was on the verge of eating that money, and so then I leased it back out, and I lost 
money on that, because I had to sell them for less than I leased it for just to get some 
of the money back to cover what was going to be a catastrophic loss. 
Accessibility to quota was certainly constraining fishing. Near the end of a fishing year, haddock 
and yellowtail flounder were prevalent in the fishing area of one respondent, but he only had 900 
and 500 pounds of ACE left, respectively. The only ACE he could find was in 50,000 pound 
blocks at 60 cents per pound. He was in a bind: 
I don’t even know where to get that kind of money, and so we just ended up tying the 
boat up. And I leased out the bits and pieces I had left. Some of it I literally gave 
away... just so other people could fish. 
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A respondent suspected that it would not be possible to make enough money by relying on 
leasing fish in. He learned:  
…that as a boat owner and an operator, I can’t make any money leasing vast 
amounts of fish … more than 50% of the value of the fish is going to leased fish. And 
that used to be all our money to work with. 
Some fishermen were clearly having trouble adjusting. Other informants, in the face of risk, 
opted for the safer route of simply leasing out their allocation or leaving the fishery altogether. 
The catch share program had increased the complexity of fishing operations. 
BUSINESS PREDICTABILITY 
Informants were asked how the predictability of their fishing business had changed since May 
2010. The question was not applicable to former fishermen (n=2). Two of the sector members, 
who were lease-only fishermen, did not feel like the question was appropriate for them and did 
not provide an answer (Table 42). Neither of them had substantial groundfish income for several 
years since before 2010. Removing those four informants, 59% of the informants felt that the 
predictability of their fishing business had decreased since May 2010. Broken down by sector 
and common pool members, results were similar, 58% and 60%, respectively. By and large, 
factors were cited that would be applicable to both cohorts: the economy, weather, fish 
distribution in one’s fishing area, landing price, annual (and sometimes more frequent) changes 
in catch limits, and the resultant uncertainty about whether one will be in business next year. 
Fluctuating lease prices was also noted as a factor by three sector members. One gillnetter 
indicated that the mobile fleet was having a greater impact on his operations in terms of gear 
conflict. The few informants who indicated that sectors provide a degree of predictability said 
that by knowing their allocation for the year, they could plan ahead a bit more. A few informants 
spoke of the continual need to adapt to continue on as a fisherman, and of the difficulties 
sometimes in doing so. 
126 
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ACE LEASING 
Motivations and connections in the industry and their communities are complex. Some of the 
New Hampshire fishermen were recognizing a transformation in the business climate of the 
groundfish industry, with more focus on maximizing one’s utility. Although a vessel may have 
had very efficient operations, the business might not have been viable if leasing a large amount 
quota was needed. Entering credit markets can expose fishermen to great risk. A risk-adverse 
alternative is emerging, a non-harvesting segment of participants, like it has in the mid-Atlantic 
surfclam and ocean quahog fishery. After nine years of its ITQ program, 60% of the firms in that 
fishery were non-harvesters (Brandt, 2005). 
Most (79%) of the sector member informants both leased and actively fished in FY 2010 and FY 
2011; there were 14% were lease-only participants, and 7% were active harvesters who did not 
lease. These numbers did not change between FY 2010 and FY 2011 (Table 20). By participating 
in a novel market (leasing), fishermen were changing the way they interact, and one fisherman 
felt strongly that the economic impacts were a detriment to his community: 
It has unleashed, in my opinion, the basest of human emotions, which is greed. And 
this whole thing from day one has been all about greed; the allocation formulas, all 
of it. … Scrape away some of the rhetoric and whatnot, and it’s all about, ‘How can 
I get the most out of my neighbor? I don’t care what happens to him one bit.’ 
These individuals who choose to lease out their entire quota rather than actively fish are what 
some refer to as “armchair fishermen.” Informants indicated that some fishermen chose this 
route, because they did not have enough allocation to make fishing viable and they would rather 
not take on the risk of leasing. Others may want to retire from active fishing, and see leasing as a 
way to continue an income stream, and perhaps cover the costs of prior capital investments. For 
active fishermen interviewed, some viewed lease-only participation as unfair. 
Reductions in the employment of active fishermen is a common result of privatizing fisheries 
into catch share programs (J. Olson, 2011). For those active informants who relied on leasing in 
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allocation, some found that the cost to lease in quota is so high that there is not enough left to 
pay competitive wages. Several informants spoke about how good labor was becoming scarce. 
The impact of leasing quota on crew wages may be felt industry-wide, regardless of whether 
fishermen have to lease quota or not. 
SUSTAINING A LOCAL FISHERY 
Creative local marketing has recently been important to sustaining the New Hampshire industry 
and securing its future. Within the last few years, fishermen have worked with university 
extension specialists and community organizations to foster local markets. New Hampshire Sea 
Grant and the University of New Hampshire Cooperative Extension have fostered the “New 
Hampshire Fresh and Local” brand, which has caught the interest of area merchants and 
restaurateurs (UNHCE, 2012). Since 2009, the annual New Hampshire Fish and Seafood Festival 
has boosted public interest in supporting the local industry (PPAF, 2012). New Hampshire 
Community Seafood was founded in the spring of 2013 by sector members and the manager of 
NEFS XI and XII, which offers a community supported fishery for the sectors (NHCS, 2015). 
These creative efforts were helping keep fishing alive in New Hampshire. 
The informant representing the Yankee Fishermen's Co-operative, and others who have been 
members, indicated that the Co-op was becoming less tenable, as the number of members 
landing fish has declined. Business predictability has declined, since the co-op relies on 
groundfish income to survive. Income from lobster, tuna, and shrimp landings was not sufficient. 
The Co-op was trying several strategies to remain solvent though, including local marketing at 
farmer’s markets and opening a retail store onsite. It has offered Community Supported 
Fisheries, for shrimp, lobster, and groundfish (YFC, 2012). When the Portsmouth Co-op closed 
(in 2008), Yankee gained some fishermen who land in Rye by offering to truck their fish. A few 
informants noted that they were not sure how Yankee was surviving, and that losing just one 
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more groundfish fisherman could drive the Co-op under. An informant predicted that if Yankee 
closes, that would spell the end to groundfish fishing in the state, because the aging group of 
fishermen would not have the energy to truck their own fish to Gloucester or other ports. They 
would just stop fishing. 
ACE USE BY NEFS XI AND XII 
A large portion of the available ACE for the New Hampshire-based sectors has gone 
unharvested. For example, in FY 2010, the NEFS XI and XII were allocated roughly 5.8M 
pounds of 16 multispecies stocks, about 3% less than the 6.0M pounds of total landings in 2009 
(Table 41). During that first year of sector operations, about 3.0M pounds of allocation was 
harvested by NEFS XI and XII (50% less than FY 09 landings), 330K pounds were leased to 
non-NH sectors (6% of the allocation), and the remaining 2.47M (43%) was left unharvested (J. 
Wiersma, personal communication, 2011). 
Why were 2.47M pounds of the fish allocated to NEFS XI and XII not harvested in FY 2010? 
Catching the full quota (not only this first year) was inhibited by constraints on particular stocks 
that also have ripple effects on the ability to catch other stocks. Of the total harvest by these 
vessels, just three stocks accounted for 96% of 2010 landings (similar to 2009): Gulf of Maine 
(GOM) cod, pollock, and white hake (Table 41). Some stocks in the allocation portfolio of NEFS 
XI and XII were not useful to the members. For example, Georges Bank haddock distribution 
was too far offshore for their vessels to fish, and there was more overall allocation than can be 
harvested (low demand for leasing this stock). Catching commercial quantities of redfish 
requires using a small mesh trawl. NEFS XI and XII did not yet have such an exemption, so 
redfish was not targeted. These were some of the factors that caused the overall revenue for New 
Hampshire vessels in FY 2010 to be about 50% lower than in FY 2009 (J. Wiersma, personal 
communication, 2011). 
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Focusing on GOM cod and pollock more specifically, NEFS XI and XII started FY 2010 with 
low quota for both stocks, and because GOM cod and pollock are harvested together, the 
fishermen did not target either stock due to the risk of exceeding both quotas. In August 2010, 
NMFS raised the fishery-wide catch limit on pollock five-fold (5M to 25M lbs.), so it became 
more possible to fish. The rapid increase in pollock quota supply caused its lease price to drop 
from $0.50/lb to $0.05/lb. Pollock quota became easier to lease into the sector, but the 
opportunity to harvest pollock was hampered by the high cost of cod. As fishermen tried to target 
pollock, the demand for GOM cod increased, and its lease price increased from $0.75/lb to 
$1.50/lb. (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011). 
PRESSURES TO CONSOLIDATE 
Participation in the groundfish fishery by New Hampshire fishermen was on the decline. Within 
the population this study (n=81), all those individuals who held a permit and listed a New 
Hampshire town as their homeport, landing port or residence during at least one year from FY 
2009 – FY 2012, and time scale of this study, the number of individuals, the number of 
individuals without a groundfish permit increased from 4% in FY 2009 to 25% in FY 2012 
(Figure 2). The following snapshots are how and why some of the informants were inactive or 
former groundfish fishermen under sectors. Informants A and B no longer had groundfish 
permits, C and D were lease-only sector members, and Informant E had no allocation on his 
permit. 
INFORMANT A. He sold his vessel and all of his permits in January 2011 and had shore-side 
employment at the time of the interview. He had been a fisherman for 31 years and thought that 
it was time to try something else, as his health was failing. Groundfish had been a minor fishery 
for him, and he got little allocation under the catch share program, including no cod, due to his 
catch history in the qualification years. The category of his permit got changed to a C permit, 
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which meant that no PSC was assigned to it. He would have had to lease in all fish to participate 
in the fishery. That would have been economically untenable. 
INFORMANT B. He had been an active groundfish fisherman since the late 1980s, and had decided 
to enroll in a sector for FY 2010, but quickly saw his financial prospects dimming, so sold his 
groundfish permit in the fall of 2010 and switched over to lobstering: 
I could see the future and what was going to happen. When my wife and I discussed 
it, we decided to grab the money before the permit was worth nothing. … 
[Otherwise,] we’d be sitting with a boat and a permit and get nothing out of it. … 
and by the looks of it, we did the right thing, because next year, I don’t think they’re 
going to be able to fish. The guys are going to starve to death and they’re not going 
to get anything for their permits. 
He felt that with the declining catch limits, groundfish permits would soon be worthless, so he 
decided to sell while his permit still had some value. 
INFORMANT C. He was an active groundfish fisherman until about 2007. He decided to sell his 
groundfish vessel and a permit when he felt that the regulations “got too overbearing.” Another 
reason was that he found a willing buyer.  
I mean, once you find a buyer, if you have anybody interested in the boat – the boat 
was in excellent condition – once you find a buyer, you hold onto them like Grimm 
Death. 
At the time of the interview, he had retained one groundfish permit, enrolled in a sector, and was 
leasing the ACE associated with it while continuing to be active in the lobster fishery. He felt 
like the sector program was much too complex and preferred to fish (lobster) in state waters. 
INFORMANT D. For at least ten years prior to 2006, groundfish had constituted about 25% of his 
income. His plan was to retire from lobstering at age 55 and then remain a groundfish fisherman. 
One day, while fishing under the 800 lb./day DAS trip limit, he had an enforcement violation of 
exceeding the limit. 
I came in over my limit, and I got like a $5,000 fine. … We had stacked the fish like 
they told us to. We had eight boxes that we could stack; we just had really heavy 
codfish. … I was just like, this is crap. I’m done. [laugh] So we quit. …  The 
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regulations were just too strict anyways. I mean, we were going and getting our 
800pounds out of like five or six nets, so we were done at like eight or nine o’clock in 
the morning, and then we’d go lobstering the rest of the day. So I was just like, “I’m 
just going to go lobstering.” It’s easier, less hassle. 
He also received very little quota, because he was more active in the lobster fishery during the 
qualification years. He was making more money by lobstering and he recalls that managers 
promised that the catch share program would not be based just on catch history, so he thought he 
was “going to be all set.” Later in the interview, he further revealed his rationale for leaving the 
fishery: 
I’m not someone who goes and purposely violates laws and stuff. And that’s why I 
quit. I was so ashamed when I got caught. The $5,000 fine was a big hit, but it 
wasn’t going to end my career or anything. I was just ashamed. I’m like beyond 
goody-two-shoes, and it hurt my feelings so bad that I was just like, I can’t do this 
because if I get caught again I’ll just be, I’ll be done, everything. I’ll just sell my 
boat and be done. … I’ve always had a reputation of being pretty honest, and it just 
blew my mind that I did something dishonest, not even trying to. You know, it was 
just, it was, it was hard. 
Though he has had to rewrite his career path, he retained the groundfish permit, enrolled it in a 
sector, and leased what little fish it had to a friend. 
INFORMANT E. His family has been groundfish fishing in New Hampshire since 1638, but he 
expected to be the last generation to do so. He last fished for groundfish in 1991, as he found 
lobstering to have more predictable income as the groundfish resource declined.  
In the mid-70s, there was only one dragger in Hampton-Seabrook Harbor, and then 
there was a big boom of gillnetters and draggers all the way up through into the 
‘90s. And then the fish stocks petered out. It was difficult to make a living. That’s one 
reason I got out of the fishery is I mean, I had a mortgage to pay back then, and I 
couldn’t do it ground fishing, but I could do it lobstering. So it’s simple economics of 
you either pay the mortgage or you go chase the last codfish in the ocean and hope 
you catch it before the next guy does. 
When the DAS program began (1994), he did not have sufficient groundfish landings to be 
assigned any DAS, and so was issued a C permit. Thus, he had no catch history to be assigned 
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PSC when the catch share program began. Like Informant A, he chose to not join a sector, as 
leasing would be too expensive. 
Though each of these informants mentioned low catch limits as constraining, their stories reveal 
the impact of the allocation formula used in the catch share program, reducing the number of 
people who could be viable by fishing on their own permits. Relying on leasing for all (or a 
majority) the ACE one needs was not economical for them. 
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The groundfish fishery has not been flourishing under the catch share program. Revenue has 
generally declined since FY 2007, apart from an increase in FY 2011, particularly in FY 2012 
and FY 2013 (Table 12). For some of the years, fishermen received overall increased prices for 
fish, but generally, the fishery has not followed normal supply and demand curves. Price 
increases have not kept pace with landings declines, attributable to constraining catch limits 
(Kitts, et al., 2011; Murphy, et al., 2015). 
It was difficult to determine how profitability has changed fishery-wide, as there were new costs 
of sector membership and leasing allocation. Membership fee structures are unique across 
sectors, some charge a flat fee, others charge based on PSC or landings. There are three 
impediments to estimating leasing costs. Leases have occurred primarily at the individual permit 
or vessel affiliation levels, and the data have been only partially available to NMFS. Sectors 
report annually on some of the transaction costs, but there may be other hidden costs associated 
with broker fees, advertizing, and transaction times. Finally, there are no data available to judge 
the magnitude of lost leasing opportunities, where both lessee and lessor would have been better 
off had the transaction taken place (Kitts, et al., 2011; Murphy, et al., 2015). 
The NEFSC reports that, not accounting for leasing (revenue gained by leasing out quota or the 
costs to lease in quota), the average share of revenue from groundfish trips per day for both 
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owners and crew fell to a four-year low in FY 2013. For vessels in the 30’-50’ length range, 
including most of the New Hampshire vessels, the owner’s share declined by 17.9% from the 
year prior. Average trip costs have remained stable since FY 2010, at least in the NEFSC 
calculations, such that the declines in profitability are attributed to changes in revenue (Murphy, 
et al., 2015). 
By various measures, effort in the groundfish fishery had been declining for several years, and 
this has continued under catch shares. The number of “active” vessels fishery-wide, those with 
groundfish revenue from at least one trip, has declined since 1996 when effort controls became 
increasing restrictive to help rebuild stocks. At that time, there were over 1,000 active vessels. In 
FY 2013, there were just 323 (NEFMC, 2015). Between FY 2007 and FY 2013, the decrease was 
50.3% (Table 11). So, although declines in effort occurred in New Hampshire, a 43.2% reduction 
in active vessels during that time span, the declines are keeping pace with the rest of the fishery 
(Kitts, et al., 2011; Murphy, et al., 2015). Declines in active vessels are not uncommon in catch 
share programs. In the Mid-Atlantic surfclam and ocean quahog fishery, after nine years of its 
ITQ program, 60% of the firms were non-harvesters (Brandt, 2005). 
As Amendment 16 was being implemented, the public raised concerns about the potential for the 
catch share program to consolidate the fishery and decrease fleet diversity. There are about 1,500 
individuals who have a holdings interest in the approximately 1,200 Northeast Multispecies 
limited access permits. With the allocation of Potential Sector Contribution based on catch 
history during set qualification years, a relatively small number of individuals hold most of the 
PSC. In FY 2010, the individual who held the most PSC fishery-wide held an average of 7.316 
across the suite of stocks, with the median holding 0.128 and the average individual 0.010. By 
FY 2014, the top individual held and average PSC of 9.358, a 28% increase. Thus, fishery 
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holdings are becoming more consolidated – as hypothesized for this current study of the New 
Hampshire case. 
With the consolidation in fishery effort and holdings, one may assume a concomitant decline in 
fleet diversity. The NEFSC and the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries identified 
“species” of fishing vessels (unique combinations of gear type, vessel length, and primary 
landing port county) and measured species diversity trends since 1996. With the decline in active 
vessels, from over 1,000 in 1996 to under 400 in 2012, diversity has also declined, though a core 
group of vessel species has persisted. Since 2008, the decline in active vessels has outpaced the 
species decline. Thus, diversity has been declining, but the fishery make-up is remaining diverse 
(Thunberg & Correia, 2015). 
A goal of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP was to reduce overcapacity in the 
fleet, and while this has occurred, significantly more consolidation could have happened than 
actually has under the catch share program (NEFMC, 2015), perhaps due to the diversity of 
participants with complex motivations for participation. 
SUMMARY 
The macro-scale view that catch share programs provide economic benefits to participants is a 
stark oversimplification of the socioeconomic dynamics of a fishery. It reduces fishermen to 
rational actors, with undifferentiated economic needs and social relationships. Motivations and 
connections in the industry and their communities are complex. In the New Hampshire case, only 
three informants, or 21% of sector members, noted improved economic performance, contrary to 
the hypothesis explored. Profits and business predictability generally declined, though grass-root 
efforts are helping to sustain participation though use of permit banks and community supported 
fisheries. It was also hypothesized that pressures to consolidate are outweighing incentives to 
maintain a diverse fleet. The consolidation in New Hampshire is also occurring fishery wide. 
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Though some segments of the fishery were experiencing more consolidation than others 
(Murphy, et al., 2015), the fleet is remaining fairly diverse (Thunberg & Correia, 2015). 
Some of the New Hampshire fishermen were recognizing a transformation in the business 
climate of the groundfish industry, with more focus on maximizing one’s utility. Although a 
vessel may have very efficient operations, the business may not be viable if leasing quota is 
required. Entering credit markets exposes fishermen to great risk. As has happened in other 
fisheries, a new cohort of non-harvesting participants (lease-only sector members) is emerging.  
KEY OUTCOMES 
1. Contrary to the hypothesis, participating in the catch share program improved the 
economic performance of just 14% of sector member informants. 
2. The New Hampshire-based fishermen did, on the whole, not fare as well as could be 
assumed based on the theorized benefits of catch shares. 
3. In New Hampshire and fishery-wide, profits and business predictability have declined 
and the number of active vessels and permit holders was declining. 
4. It was difficult to definitively conclude that catch shares was causing this decline, 
because the fishery has had very low catch limits in an effort to rebuild stocks. 
5. Catch shares has, however, transformed the business climate of the groundfish industry, 





CHAPTER IX. OUTCOMES - SAFETY 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The informants were asked whether the rules governing each regulatory program have ever 
compromised vessel safety and to explain why. A majority (n=12; 57%) of informants indicated 
that the DAS program did not compromise safety (Table 43). The response was the same 
between informants who were sector members at the time of the interview and those in the 
common pool or former fishermen. If a large majority of sector members had said that the DAS 
program was unsafe, then that might have explained their decision to enroll in a sector. However, 
the degree to which DAS was perceived to be safe did not correlate with choosing to enroll in the 
sector program. 
The informants who were currently or had fished actively in a sector (n=13) were then asked, if 
the sector regulations they operate(d) under have ever compromised vessel safety. A strong 
majority (77%) indicated that the sector program had not. The most common repeating idea 
when informants were asked to explain their responses to the closed-ended questions on safety 
was that there was no substantial change in safety in the transition to the catch share program. 
There were several fishermen (n=7) who indicated that safety was very important to them and 
they choose to be safe regardless of the regulations, though a few have observed other fishermen 
making choices that are unsafe, choices that were unrelated to the regulatory program. For 
example, gillnets must be tended regularly, because the fish caught in them are perishable. Thus, 
fishermen need to tend their nets regardless of the weather, so they may do so in unsafe 
conditions. One fisherman indicated that he had only had 39 DAS and a low amount of ACE 
under sectors, so it has been pretty easy to pick days to fish with safe weather conditions. 
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Regardless of the regulatory program, cuts in fishing opportunity (i.e., DAS or ACE reductions) 
make it more difficult to afford investment in vessel maintenance, which compromises safety. 
“Days at sea, you could pick your days. You know, you had, oh well at the end there, 
you had 39 days which, you know, you try to stretch out….you could pick your days. 
But you can still pick your days as a sector too.” 
 Some informants said that fishing under the DAS had been unsafe (n=9). The full economic 
potential of a DAS would be lost if a vessel ended a trip early. To the subset of informants (n=5) 
indicating that fishing under sectors was a bit safer, the rationale included that fishing in a sector 
does not have the time constraints of passing the DAS demarcation line: 
I hated having to stay out. That was the stupidest rule they ever had was if you 
caught two days’ worth of fish you had to stay 24 hours. That was very unsafe. There 
was many a nights where we sat off the beach blowing forty or fifty, because we 
couldn’t land, anchored up. It was ludicrous. 
With a bit more flexibility in choosing when to fish, there was less need to fish in bad weather. 
One fisherman who fishes alone indicated that without the “clock ticking,” he was less rushed. 
He has a bit more time to fish and then lay to while he sorts and clean the fish; his deck 
operations have become rushed. Another fisherman indicated that he worked longer hours at sea 
under DAS, so would be more sleep deprived than he was under sectors. 
A few informants indicated that the sector program was less safe than DAS were. One informant 
referred to the fishing practices of vessels that tend to fish offshore for multiple days. Under 
DAS, he said when there was a storm coming, fishermen would be more apt to go to shore rather 
than ride out the storm, using up valuable DAS. He felt that fishermen tend to stay at sea under 
sectors, because the “clock” was no longer running. Generally, the fishermen in the research 
population tend to fish for just a day or two, so they may be less likely to lay-to like he was 
referring to. Another informant felt that the federal observers that come on his vessel do not 
know how to be safe, and since the rate of observed trips has increased, safety has become more 
compromised. He would like the observers to stand in a certain place on his vessel that is safe, 
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but where they can see everything. He does not want an observer to stand where they will have 
collisions with the crew or be near the wenches. The observers do not have a lot of experience 
with being at sea and staying safe on a vessel.  
Informants in the common pool indicated that they felt some pressure to fish in unsafe 
conditions, because fishing opportunities in the summer are more limited with the common pool 
ACLs split into trimesters: 
...Where is the logic? …  Is it safer for a 28-foot boat to fish during the summer, or to 
force them to haul nets out of the water, put them back in the water, jockey them 
around with the seasons and limits. It makes absolutely no sense. 
Some vessels are not made for safe winter fishing. A few informants in the common pool would 
prefer to fish in summer months when the water is calm.  
REGIONAL CONTEXT 
Assessing the safety of the groundfish catch share program region-wide relative to prior 
management approaches was difficult due to scant data on the safety of the Northeast 
Multispecies fishery. Commercial fishing, generally, is one of the least safe occupations. The 
National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) reports that there was a national 
annual average of 46 deaths from commercial fishing during 2000-2010, or 124 per 100,000 
workers, compared four per 100,000 workers among all U.S. industries. Dividing the nation into 
four regions, the highest percentage of those deaths occurred on the East Coast (33%, 2000-
2009). Based on the number of fatalities, the Northeast Multispecies fishery was the fourth most 
deadly fishery from 2000-2009, with 26 fatalities, but measured by the number of workers, it was 
the most fatal fishery, with 600 deaths per 100,000 full-time equivalent employees. NIOSH has 
not yet reported comparative data for the years (2010 onward) since the catch share program was 
instituted (Lincoln & Lucas, 2010). 
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Jin et al. (Jin, Kite-Powell, Thunberg, Solow, & Talley, 2002) modeled accident probability in 
northeastern U.S. fisheries (including groundfish) using data from 1981-1993 and found that the 
probability declined during that time period. Greater accident probability was associated with 
high wind speeds, medium sized vessels, fishing in winter, fishing inshore versus offshore, and 
within the Gulf of Maine versus Georges Bank and Southern New England. Substantial 
management change occurred in 1994. Through Amendment 5, fishing was limited by Days-At-
Sea, placing a premium on the time spent fishing and steaming to and from fishing grounds 
(Table 1). Effort shifted inshore from Georges Bank, though a number of inshore seasonal 
closures may have pressured smaller vessels to fish far enough offshore to be unsafe (Jin & 
Thunberg, 2005). This suggests that the fishery based in New Hampshire may be more 
susceptible to accidents than other communities in the Northeast.  
Given the management changes, Jin and Thunberg (2005) updated the analysis with data through 
2000 and examined potential economic and regulatory influences. Changes in fishery 
management since 1994 did not result in higher accident probability, though it may have 
contributed to higher probability of accidents in the Gulf of Maine versus other areas. Primarily, 
Jin and Thunberg found that safety was more dependent on physical factors such as weather, 
wind speed, and fishing location rather than management programs. However, programs can be 
designed to discourage fishing during unsafe physical conditions. 
Jin and Thunberg (2005) theorized that management programs that allow more flexibility in 
when and where to fish would result in safer fisheries, as poor physical conditions could be 
avoided. The groundfish sector program was designed to provide this flexibility. With a few 
more years of data, the aforementioned regional studies are likely to soon be updated, for better 
evaluation of the influence of the catch share program on vessel safety. 
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SUMMARY 
The informants indicated, overall, that the advent of the catch share program had resulted in no 
major changes in safety, because the informants largely strive to be safe no matter the 
management program. However, removal of trip limits for sectors had brought a degree of 
flexibility and less pressure to fish in unsafe conditions, while the trimester approach to 
managing the common pool was making the common pool members choose between fishing 
more in winter months versus potentially forgoing catch. Comparison of the New Hampshire 
case with the region was hampered by a lack of regional data. However, it was likely the case 
that sector fishermen were generally taking advantage of the increased flexibility of the catch 
share program to fish in safer conditions. 
KEY OUTCOMES 
1. Contrary to the hypothesis, fishing under the catch share program resulted in no major 
changes in fishing safety for the informants, because they strive to be safe no matter the 
regulations. 
2. However, the flexibility inherent in catch chares provides fewer reasons to fish in unsafe 




CHAPTER X. OUTCOMES - WELL-BEING 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
FAIR ALLOCATION 
The informants were asked whether they consider the allocation formula used to calculate PSC 
holdings to be fair (i.e., catch history during the years 1996-2006). Not including one informant 
for which the question was not relevant (a party/charter HA permit holder), 70% of informants 
felt that the allocation was unfair to them (71% of sector members, 67% of other informants; 
Table 44). The most common rationale was that it was not a true measure of fishing history, 
because the informants had shifted effort away from cod during that period: 
… between ’95 and ’01, I was doing what they wanted me to do and do [focus] 
another fishery [besides cod]. I was still a fisherman. I wasn’t a lawyer, or an 
accountant, or I didn’t go back to school. I thought I should get a ‘thank you’ note in 
the mail, and instead, the people that got the big allocations are the people that 
stayed in that fishery and pounded and pounded and pounded. They got rewarded. 
One informant was building a vessel during one of the years, so he had no catch, which brought 
down his average catch in the calculation. Informants had invested in buying permits for the 
number of DAS attached to them not the catch history, so with the allocation formula, they were 
stuck holding permits that had little value. Some felt that allocation by a combination of DAS, 
vessel size and catch history might have been a more balanced approach. 
The New Hampshire Commercial Fishermen’s Association was a plaintiff to a legal challenge in 
2011 to several aspects of nascent catch share program, including the allocation formula used. In 
November 2012, during the time of these interviews, the court upheld the NMFS decisions 
("Lovgren, J. et al. v. Locke, G. et al.," 2012). However, just one informant referenced the 
lawsuit, someone who withdrew membership in the Association in part due to his disagreement 
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with the plaintiffs. This was someone who thought that the allocation formula was fair to him 
and that others in the community were too backwards-looking: 
There’s no entitlement to being a fisherman. If you don’t like, it’s like a plumber or 
electrician or any of it, if it sucks, go do something else. Don’t say that, ‘I can’t do 
something else.’ That’s a cop out. And I’m sick of having the New Hampshire guys 
say that. [Fisherman A]… is the biggest cry baby there ever was. If he put his head 
down and went fishing, but he fishes next to [Fisherman B] … who struck $700,000 a 
year. [Fisherman A] … hasn’t even struck $300,000 right next to him. Don’t blame 
the system; blame the fishermen. 
Another informant who considered the formula to be fair to him had very little fishing history on 
his permits, which drove his decision to fish in the common pool. To him, that offered greater 
potential to catch fish than had he joined a sector. 
UNDERSTANDING REGULATIONS 
The informants were asked if the level of difficulty in understanding the rules of the DAS and 
sector programs was about the same or if one was more difficult. Removing the two informants 
for whom the question was not relevant (had not participated in the DAS or sector programs), 
37% said that the two programs were about equal, 37% said that sectors were more difficult, 
16% said that DAS was more difficult, and 10% were unsure or did not answer the question 
(Table 44). Thus, there was not a strong trend in responses, though a slight lean towards 
indicating that the sector program rules were more difficult to understand. Of the sector 
members, 50% said that the two programs were about the same and 36% said that sectors were 
more difficult. Of the other informants, 40% said that sectors were more difficult. Others were 
unsure, did not answer the question, or thought DAS were more difficult. 
The primary reason why informants thought the DAS was easier to understand was that the trip 
limit on cod was the only catch limit that they needed to keep track of. Under sectors, the catch 
of all stocks needs to be counted against sector ACE. There was also additional complexity with 
working with a sector manager and declaring a fishing trip: 
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Days at Sea were much simpler. Just this registration process nearly drives me 
insane. There’s the whole observer thing. I have to register on the computer two 
days in advance and then I got to wait for this notification and then I got to send 
these trip end hails, catch reports and got to hand all this paperwork in to the sector 
manager. I mean, this is the most bureaucratic system I’ve ever seen, ... and that’s 
saying something. 
One informant indicated that having a sector manager had been particularly useful in helping 
understand the new operating rules. 
FATIGUE 
The informants were asked if their fatigue level at sea had decreased, remained the same, or 
increased since the advent of the catch share program. There were two informants for whom the 
question was not relevant, a former fishermen and a shore-based permit holder who does not go 
to sea himself. For the remainder, none of the informants answered that their fatigue had 
decreased, and 53% indicated that their fatigue level was unchanged while 47% indicated that it 
had increased (Table 45). There was differentiation between sector members and the other 
informants. A majority (62%) of the sector members said that their fatigue level had increased, 
while just 17% (n=1) of the other informants indicated such. 
Many of the informants cited aging as a cause for increased fatigue, however, age did not 
correlate statistically with increased fatigue (R
2
 = 0.02). A few of the sector member informants 
cited that they were working harder at sea under sectors, including the following informant who 
cited that working harder and aging was impacting fatigue: 
I’m just older … we [used to] run 800 pounds of cod a day [under trip limits] and we 
didn’t break a sweat. Now, you know, we had … 11,000 the other day. And we were 
like, “we’re old.” You got to be careful what you ask for. 
Two informants noted that they were more fatigued, because they had too many obligations 
under sectors. An interview included the fisherman’s wife who corroborated the increase in 
fatigue due to sector obligations (see quote Chapter VI). 
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The informants who were not sector members largely said that their fatigue had not changed. 
Several of them were lobstering or had been fishing with hand gear, both of which are less 
physically taxing than groundfish fishing with gillnets or trawls. 
STRESS 
The informants were asked if fishing had become more or less stressful than it was before May 
2010. Removing the one informant for which the question was not relevant (i.e., a former 
groundfish fisherman who had no other fishing permits), 75% of informants said that fishing had 
become more stressful (Table 45). For them, the most common stressful aspect of fishing was the 
general uncertainty of the future: 
It’s, knowing that there’s always something getting ready to take everything you’ve 
got, or thinking you’re going to lose everything you ever invested in … That’s stress 
and that’s enough to be dissatisfied over, sure. 
Other stressful themes include making sure one keeps in compliance with the regulations, and 
specific to participating in sectors, increased paperwork, computer use and fishery observers on 
one’s vessel. Some of the former fishermen indicated that they left the groundfish fishery, 
because it was becoming too stressful. A member of the common pool said that the uncertainty 
of when the common pool would reach the trimester catch limits and shut down was particularly 
stressful. 
Just two informants (10%) felt that fishing under sectors was less stressful, both of whom were 
sector members. One of these informants was leasing his ACE to other groundfish fishermen, 
focusing on lobstering, which was a much less stressful fishery for him. The other was an active 
groundfish fisherman who felt that fishing in a sector was generally less stressful, because he 
was less pressured to maximize catch to fulfill the cod trip limit, though the advent of increased 
at-sea observers had been more stressful. 
145 
Three informants (15%) felt that there had been no change in the level of stress; two of whom 
had focused on lobstering for several years. For the third, groundfish had been a minor 
component of his fishing portfolio, and he makes conscious efforts to live stress-free: 
(Informant) I don't stress … I just don't stress … I mean, way back when I was 
raising my family and my children and stuff, yeah, I mean, there was stress there, I 
mean, yeah of course. 
(Interviewer) But nowadays you don’t really consider it [fishing] a stressful thing. 
(Informant) No, fishing in bad weather and stuff, don’t do it; (laughs) real simple. 
It could be that older fishermen are less stressed than younger, because they might be less 
concerned about ensuring years of productive income or have less business debts. Maurstad 
(2000) found that in the Norwegian cod fishery of the 1980s, other factors besides vessel 
capacity influenced the decisions to fish, particularly financial obligations (i.e., debt). Younger 
fishermen tended to be more debt-laden and more driven to fish harder than older fishermen who 
were relatively debt-free. For this dissertation, the degree of indebtedness was not investigated 
directly, however, a cross tabulation of age with stress reveals that age does have some 
correlation with stress in this case (Table 45). The two informants who indicated that they were 
less stressed under sectors were also in the oldest age bracket, 60-69. The youngest informant, 
the only one in the 30-39 age bracket, felt that fishing had become more stressful under sectors, 
in part, due to the need to take on more debt, by leasing in ACE to remain viable. Chapter VII 
describes further the financial risks fishermen face if they need to lease in ACE to remain viable. 
The stress associated with ACE leasing can be felt by fishermen of any age. 
JOB SATISFACTION 
The informants were asked if their job satisfaction had changed since the advent of the catch 
share program. Of the 18 informants who answered the question, 44% indicated that their 
satisfaction had decreased, 28% said that it had not unchanged, and 28% said that it had 
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increased (Table 45). Of the sector members, 54% indicated that their satisfaction had decreased, 
while 20% of the other informants (n=1) indicated such. Thus, the decline in job satisfaction was 
more pronounced among sector members than other informants. 
For the majority who felt a decline in job satisfaction, the strongest themes expressed were that 
the informants were less happy and lost their love of fishing. For many, their recent loss in job 
satisfaction was part of a longer term decline: 
Oh, I’ve lost my identity completely [laughing]. No, my job satisfaction is just like, 
it’s not even a job. It’s not a job anymore. I’m basically retired right now. I mean, I 
hit my marks and that’s it. I mean, as far as having like a future in this business, it’s 
over, it’s done (pause) for me. You know what really pisses me off? They took my 
swagger, (laugh) by doing this $%^&. They really did. I mean you had pride and 
$%^&. And you don’t have that $%^& going on when you’re walking around. That 
was pretty cool. I miss that. 
Others spoke of being unsatisfied because of profit loss, difficulty with finding fish, and there 
were too many regulations and too much enforcement and observers. 
Job satisfaction had increased for some (28%); two sector members tied the increase to the 
removal of the cod trip limit, one for the bycatch that was being avoided and the other for how 
fishing effort was less constrained: 
(Informant A) Oh, definitely improved … There’s nothing more demoralizing than 
kicking over 10,000 of large cod. It’s just stupid … You know, and to have everybody 
doing it for the sake regulations. 
(Informant B) I think it’s increased, yeah. It kind of sucked going out there knowing 
you could only catch so much no matter what you did. 
Job satisfaction was unchanged for some (28%). One sector member informant felt like a 
curmudgeon; he was never satisfied. A former groundfish fisherman who was solely lobsters was 
still satisfied, primarily because he can be on the water: 
Well, I enjoy my job anyways, so it doesn’t, I mean … you’re fishing. That’s, that’s 
the main thing … If I had to go in the back of a garbage truck, I probably would be a 
little different, but. 
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One sector member was determined to do well despite the regulatory program, and felt like the 
effort put in had been worthwhile: 
(Informant) Seems like what you put in, you. 
(Interviewer) You get out? 
(Informant) Get out, yeah. And you know, it seems like the guys that always did well 
are still doing well, and the guys that did mediocre, some of them have gone by the 
wayside. 
(Interviewer) Others are struggling? 
(Informant) Yeah, yeah. But it’s not the system. It’s the fishermen, you know, but. 
(Interviewer) Do you feel like it’s your personal determination to? 
(Informant) To succeed 
(Interviewer) Make it work? 
(Informant) To make it work, right. 
This example of a successful fisherman opens the avenue for a potential line of inquiry, how 
satisfaction correlates with the opportunities that differing amounts of PSC holdings provide. 
Within this sample of fishermen, though, there were certainly cases of full-time groundfish 
fishermen who were unsatisfied. Further discussion of job satisfaction is contained in the 
regional context section of this chapter. 
RETIREMENT 
The informants were asked if they expect to retire as a fisherman. Just two informants indicated 
that they did not. One, a former groundfish fisherman, had sold his permit and vessel and, at the 
time of the interview, was working in another industry. The second was a sector member who 
currently had his vessel and permits for sale. He was actively looking to exit fishing. All the 
other informants were still active in fishing, but 29% (n=6) were unsure whether they could 
continue as a fisherman until retirement. The majority (62%; n=62%) of informants felt that they 
would retire as a fisherman, whether they were still involved in the groundfish fishery or not 
(Table 45). The distribution of responses among sector members and other informants was 
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similar, 64% of the sector members and 57% of the other informants were sure they would retire 
as fisherman. Sector members generally felt like they have more years left fishing than the other 
informants. The average number of years that informants expect to be fishing was 4.6, ranging 
widely from 0 to 25 (Table 46). That average was higher for sector members, at 6.0±8.2 years. 
The average for the other informants was 1.7±0.8 years, ranging from 0-2. It may be that sector 
members may have more PSC assigned to their permits than others, and thus more assurance that 
they can participate in the fishery. 
It was difficult to identify correlations between the age of an informant, whether they expect to 
retire as a fisherman and how many more years they expect to be fishing. The informants had a 
great deal of uncertainty about the future. Many expressed that they would try to keep fishing as 
long as possible, some out of determination and pride, and others because they felt financially 
stuck or that they would not be able to transition into another career: 
[I’ll be fishing] Till the boat sinks. … What else, like I say, what else is there? 
There’s nothing. What do you do with a boat? Who is that boat valuable to? There’s 
virtually no, nobody needs a boat. Everybody’s got a boat. They need a permit. 
The uncertainty of future fishery regulations was also a concern that constrained retirement 
plans. In the following exchange, the fishermen’s wife seems more determined than the 
fisherman that he would keep going until retirement: 
(Interviewer) Do you expect to keep at this until you retire? 
(Wife) Yes. 
(Informant) Um...It depends on how old you think I’m going to be when I retire. I 
don’t know. (laugh) 
(Wife) It’s in the blood. His father is, his uncle, his other uncle. 
(Informant) Yeah I mean, I don’t know. If I... 
(Wife) You don't know how not to work. 
(Informant) ... I might, I might miss it. I might miss it at some point if I was to stop, 
but I don’t know. It depends on how difficult they made it, you know. I could be 
bought; there ain’t no doubt. 
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ADVICE TO YOUNG PERSON 
The informants were asked if they would advise a young person to enter fishing. The majority 
(71%, n=15) said that they would not. This response was consistent among both the sector 
members and other informants (Table 46). The most common rationale provided was economic, 
that it is too costly to buy into the fishery and that there were better ways to make a living: 
For the amount of capital that it would take to get underway for even a small 
operation like mine, if they spent that on anything else, they’d be further ahead. 
Almost anything else. Lots of other things. 
Some felt that it is a hard life with little reward. Others indicated that, with the uncertainty of 
regulations, it would be hard for a young person to build a business plan. One informant 
indicated that the physical safety risk is not worth the reward. A minority of informants (29%, 
n=6) indicated that they would advise a young person to enter the fishery, but with caution and 
careful thought about the finances. 
OUTLOOK 
Informants were asked if their outlook on the future of the New Hampshire groundfish fishery 
was negative, neutral or positive. The majority (71%, n=15) had a negative outlook and the 
remainder were neutral (29%, n=6). No one had a positive outlook. This response was consistent 
among both the sector members and other informants (Table 46). The strongest reasons for the 
negativity included that the New Hampshire fishermen cannot withstand continued cuts in quota, 
and a sense of disappointment that sacrifices in fishing effort had not paid off: 
...I guess that’s entirely up to the Service. I don’t know where they’re headed with 
this, and that’s our, everybody’s biggest concern is we keep doing all they ask us to 
do, and they keep telling us it’s not enough. So that kind of gives you a negative 
outlook. This system itself is working, because we’re still here. But if they keep every 
year taking away half, you run out of halves after a while. 
The perceived lack of opportunity for young people to enter the fishery, that it is an aging group 
of fishermen, was also a negative.  
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Under the current scenario of catch shares and low catch limits, some felt that only a few 
fishermen would survive, particularly the fishermen who currently hold large amounts of quota. 
There was a sense that fishing would become more corporate as the smaller-scale fishing 
operations go out of business. In terms of their own future, a few informants indicated that they 
did not want to make investments in the fishery or that they may go out of business soon. A few 
felt badly that they would not be able to pass their business onto their children. One likened 
fishing to gambling. Three informants were concerned about overfishing and the lack of fish. 
LIVING LIFE OVER 
Informants were asked if they could live their live over, whether they would still choose to be a 
groundfish fisherman. The majority of informants (67%, n=14) said that they would. However, 
fewer of the sector members than other informants (57% vs. 86%) indicated that they would be a 
fisherman again (Table 46). Those who would be a fisherman indicated that they would do so, 
because they enjoy the work despite the challenges and uncertainties. A few spoke of loving to 
work on the ocean: 
I like the outdoors. I’d go nuts inside every day ... this last summer tuna fishing, I 
seen more sunrises and sunsets than a person probably sees their whole lifetime, 
really, because a lot of people are up after … sunrise,  and sunset they’re usually 
home like with the TV on. But then again, you know, an 8-5 job, weekends off, you 
know, not have to stress. I don’t know, I’d probably still say I’d like to be a 
fisherman. (laugh) Glutton for punishment...ugh. 
Several of those who would not choose to be a fisherman again, reflected positively on many 
years of good fishing, but felt that the downturn of recent years made their career choices not 
worthwhile: 
Just after what I’ve gone through, I mean, you know. I’m 45 years old. I have, you 
know, been in the industry almost thirty years, working on the docks and stuff and, 
you know, what do I got to show for it? You know, now I’ve got to change careers 
basically. So no, I wish I hadn’t. It was fun for quite a few years but, you know, that 




Several researchers have noted the non-economic satisfactions that come from fishing, likely 
drivers for fishermen to continue fishing despite negative economic performance (e.g., Pollnac & 
Poggie, 2008). Assessing the well-being of participants in the groundfish catch share program 
region-wide relative to prior management approaches was difficult due to scant comparative 
data. Notably though, Pollnac and colleagues have conducted several studies of job satisfaction 
among fishermen, identifying components that consistently comprise this variable (e.g., Pollnac 
& Poggie, 2008). Pollnac et al. (2014) surveyed 478 fishermen (owner/captains, captains and 
crew) from Maine through North Carolina in 2012. Informants were asked to rank their 
satisfaction level with several aspects of fishing, fulfilling: basic needs (actual earnings, 
predictability of earnings, safety), social-psychological needs (time away from home, fatigue, 
healthfulness of job), and self-actualization (adventure and challenge of the job, opportunity to 
be your own boss). Informants who participated in the groundfish fishery had the lowest levels of 
satisfaction and were least likely to advise a young person to enter the fishery or choose to be a 
fisherman if they could live their life again. However, the self-actualization aspects of job 
satisfaction were high across all informants. An earlier study focusing on Rhode Island 
fishermen found similar results, that there was little change in self-actualization among 
fishermen between 1977 and 2010 (Pollnac, et al., 2011). This component of job satisfaction may 
be what keeps fishermen fishing despite decreasing economic performance (Pollnac & Poggie, 
2008). 
For this dissertation, job satisfaction questions were used as developed by Pollnac et al. (2014). 
Informants were asked a set of questions about their satisfaction as a groundfish fisherman, and 
if they were no longer groundfish fishing, their satisfaction with their new profession (Table 47). 
Consistent with other studies noted above, the New Hampshire fishermen were highly satisfied 
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with the self-actualization aspects of job satisfaction, with at least 76% of informants indicating 
that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the sense of adventure, sense of challenge and the 
opportunity to be self-employed. The basic needs and social-psychological aspects rated lower. 
Informants were the least satisfied with their earnings predictability and the healthfulness of the 
job. 
Informants who had a current profession other than groundfish fishing were also asked the same 
series of job satisfaction questions related to their current profession. Overall, these informants 
were more satisfied with their current profession than all of the informants were as groundfish 
fishermen. There were only three responses of very dissatisfied or dissatisfied. Those who were 
lobstering indicated that they were not making as much money, but the income was more 
predictable. 
The aforementioned Rhode Island-based study was conducted in 2010 and included examining 
several aspects of the transition to catch shares in the groundfish fishery (Pollnac, et al., 2011). It 
found that the sector members felt that the rules and regulations were less clear than nonsector 
members, which is consistent with this dissertation, which revealed that more New Hampshire 
fishermen in 2012 felt that the sector program was more difficult to understand than DAS. The 
Rhode-Island study surveyed 137 fishermen, with 17 identified as groundfish fishermen, and 
compared results to 1977 data. Longitudinally, there was a statistically significant drop in the 
percentage of informants who would encourage a young person to enter fishing, with 62% 
indicating “no” or “maybe” in 2010. Their 2010 results are consistent with this dissertation (71% 
of informants would not advise a young person to enter fishing), and suggests that this sentiment 
may not be unique to the groundfish fishery. In both studies, a majority of informants indicated 
that they would choose to be a fisherman again if they could live their life over (groundfish 
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fisherman specifically in the New Hampshire case), which points to the self-actualization aspects 
of the job that informants in both cases are satisfied with. 
SUMMARY 
The informants indicated, overall, that they had a decline in well-being since the advent of the 
catch share program. The majority felt that the allocation received though Amendment 16 was 
unfair, not a true reflection of their fishing history. Informants leaned towards feeling that the 
rules governing sector fishing were more difficult to understand than DAS. Informants were as 
fatigued, or more, than prior to FY 2010, and while aging was a factor, sector members in 
particular said that they were working harder and had more obligations. A vast majority of 
informants had become more stressed, including both sector and common-pool members; 
keeping in compliance with the regulations, increased paper and computer use and the increase 
in fishery observers (for sector members) were common themes. A decline in job satisfaction 
was particularly more pronounced amongst sector members, though the self-actualization facets 
of job satisfaction were high. A majority of informants felt that they would retire as fisherman, 
whether or not they were still active in the groundfish fishery. Sector members generally 
anticipated that they would be fisherman for a longer period of time than the other informants. A 
majority of informants would not advise young people to enter fishing and had a negative 
outlook for their community and the future of the groundfish fishery, though most would choose 
to be groundfish fishermen if they could live their life over due to the satisfactions derived from 
aspects such as working on the water. Overall, many of the declines in well-being were outcomes 





1. Contrary to the hypothesis, the well-being of informants had generally declined, 
particularly sector members as they are constrained by the allocation given to them 
through Amendment 16 and fish under a program they felt was more complicated and 
fatiguing. 
2. Informants would not advise a young person to enter fishing and had a negative outlook 
for the future of the New Hampshire groundfish fishing community. 
3. Regional data was scant, but consistent with the current study, that fishing in a sector had 
increased stress among fishermen, though the self-actualization aspects of the profession 




CHAPTER XI. CONCLUSIONS 
A great deal of controversy has attended the introduction of catch shares in fisheries, particularly 
with the Northeast Multispecies program. In addressing the more general question: How has the 
advent of catch shares impacted the Northeast commercial multispecies fishery, particularly in 
New Hampshire?, answers to commonly asked questions about catch shares were sought through 
understanding how 21 commercial fishermen have been impacted by the program first-hand. 
Theories regarding six specific aspects of fishing have been examined to determine their validity 
and limits in this case and, where possible, more broadly across the fishery. 
FISHING PRACTICES. It has been theorized that participating in a catch share program would 
increase the efficiency and flexibility for fishermen to decide when, where and how to fish. This 
theory was confirmed by sector member informants, who generally felt that fishing in a sector 
was more efficient and flexible than the Days-At-Sea program had been, generally due to 
shifting catch limits from a trip basis to an annual one. This had allowed more concentration of 
effort during times with greater potential for profitability (e.g., fish availability, favorable 
markets). However, those who were more dependent on groundfish for their income did not 
necessarily feel that one program was an improvement over another, though sectors were an 
improvement for vessels that were previously constrained by the trip limits (e.g., cod-dependent, 
larger vessels). For the wider fishery, there was evidence that removing trip limits had increased 
the mobility of larger vessels. The influx of vessels into local waters was a concern for several of 
the informants with smaller vessels. In general though, reduced groundfish fishing effort due to 
low catch limits had opened up more grounds for the local lobster fleet. Thus, the local 
groundfish fleet had increased gear conflicts from two sources. 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL. It has been theorized that participating in a catch share program would result in 
greater social capital (i.e., networking, reciprocity, trust) among fishermen in the conduct of 
business, in harvesting sector allocations, and in reducing bycatch. Despite being a novel focal 
point for industry organization, the sector member informants indicated that the sectors, as 
organizations, have been based on and built off of pre-existing social capital, rather than being a 
catalyst for social capital. The advent of sectors did not increase the voluntary involvement of 
informants in trade associations, and those who took new leadership roles in sector operations 
did so begrudgingly. The potential for collaborative, decentralized governance exists, though 
NEFS XI and XII had behaved more as a facilitator of individual allocations, though the 
professional manager had been an advocate in management and facilitator of improved business 
practices. There was little evidence that the informants were using social capital to coordinate 
fishing areas to reduce gear conflicts or bycatch. Though many felt that supporting the New 
Hampshire fishing community was important, it was not uniform. 
BYCATCH. It has been theorized that catch share programs provide incentives and flexibility to 
harvest more selectively, thereby reducing bycatch. This theory was confirmed, at least by the 
quantitative NMFS data that suggest that bycatch of legal-sized target fish had been eliminated 
and overall bycatch of groundfish was low. The qualitative data from the research informants 
reveal more nuance. Reducing bycatch was an important goal of the informants, and the sector 
participants indicated that their level of bycatch had decreased, primarily through eliminating the 
trip limits and discards of legal-sized fish. Some informants went above and beyond regulations 
to avoid bycatch in recognition of the need to steward stocks for the future. Some sector 
members identified new pressures to discard when unobserved, driven largely by the high lease 
costs of choke stocks. At the vessel level, quota available had not matched natural abundance. A 
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new management tool to try to reduce bycatch, sharing of fixed gear, was not occurring, at least 
in the New Hampshire fishery. Although catch shares have the potential to reduce bycatch, 
evidence from this investigation suggests that externalities may be buffering gains. Though 
discarding may be reduced, the overall biological benefit is questionable if fishermen were 
targeting concentrations of fish more. 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. It has been theorized that the economic performance (e.g., profit 
margins and business predictability) of fishing businesses would improve under catch shares, 
though the fishery would consolidate (e.g., fewer permit holders and vessels actively fishing). 
Theory regarding profitability and predictability had not been realized, though the concomitant 
decline in, and persistently low, catch limits for certain key species (cod, yellowtail flounder) 
vanquished any potential that catch shares had for the economic success of this fishery. The 
groundfish fishery has not been flourishing under the catch share program, particularly in New 
Hampshire, though grass-root efforts were helping sustain participation (e.g., permit banks, 
community supported fisheries). Profits and business predictability generally declined. Only 
three of the informants noted improved economic performance; those who were able to cut 
operational expenses and not rely on leasing in fish fared better. Entering credit markets exposes 
fishermen to great risk. As in other fisheries, a new cohort of non-harvesting participants (lease-
only sector members) emerged and fishery participants have had to navigate the nascent quota 
market. Fishery-wide, economic performance has generally been poor. Regarding consolidation, 
the number of people holding permits and the number of active vessels has declined as theorized 
(and as stated in the Amendment 16 goals). The fleet was remaining fairly diverse despite 
consolidation. The sense of self-actualization realized from working on the water, as well as the 
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logistical constraints with exiting the fishery, may be maintaining participation at levels above 
what economic theory might suggest. 
SAFETY. It has been theorized that vessels participating in catch share programs would have 
greater operational safety. This theory was confirmed. The informants indicated, overall, that the 
advent of the catch share program had resulted in no major changes in safety, because the 
informants largely strive to be safe no matter the management program. However, removal of 
trip limits for sectors had brought a degree of flexibility and less pressure to fish in unsafe 
conditions, while the trimester approach to managing the common pool, was making the 
common pool members choose between fishing more in winter months versus potentially 
forgoing catch. Comparison of impacts in the New Hampshire relative to the region was 
hampered by a lack of regional data. However, it is likely that sector fishermen are generally 
taking advantage of the increased flexibility of the catch share program to fish in safer 
conditions. 
WELL-BEING. It has been theorized that catch share programs improve the well-being of 
participants, decreasing stress and concern about the conduct of business and the future of the 
fishery. With declines in fishery participation and dim potential for positive economic 
performance, the sense of well-being and future outlook for self and fishery had diminished since 
the advent of the catch share program. Factors include a sense that the allocation formula had 
been unfair, the rules governing sector fishing were more difficult to understand than DAS, 
increased fatigue due to working harder and increased obligations. A decline in job satisfaction 
was particularly more pronounced amongst sector members, though the self-actualization facets 
of job satisfaction were high across all informant categories. Most informants would not advise 
young people to enter fishing and had a negative outlook for their community and the future of 
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the groundfish fishery, though most would choose to be groundfish fishermen if they could live 
their life over due to the satisfactions derived from aspects such as working on the water. A few 
informants remained optimistic and were determined to remain active in the fishery, no matter 
the specific management program in place. 
----------------------- 
This case study of the groundfish fishermen of New Hampshire revealed that the theorized 
benefits of catch share programs do not necessarily hold true. Of the six key aspects of fishing 
investigated here, only the benefits related to fishing practices, bycatch and safety support what 
has occurred in this local fishery (Table 48). The New Hampshire-based fishermen had, on the 
whole, not fared as well as could be assumed, based on theory. 
The conclusions of this research must be kept in context of the biological status of the groundfish 
stocks and the severe reductions in catch limits implemented concurrently. These constraints 
have likely masked much of the positive potential for catch shares. Success under a catch share 
program is perhaps more likely attained in fisheries not constrained by stock rebuilding plans and 
by those participants able to adapt (e.g., tools, skills, financial resources, business savvy). Catch 
shares create markets for fishery quota that drive a fishery towards greater economic efficiency. 
If this is desired, catch shares may be a justified means, though managers should also expect and 
approve of the social consequences of enabling the privatization of public resources. If the aim is 





CHAPTER XII. EPILOGUE 
The New Hampshire commercial fishery has continued to evolve since the field work for this 
dissertation concluded in 2012. Despite successful efforts to locally market fish through New 
Hampshire Community Seafood, the persistently low catch limits has forced a number of tough 
changes. One informant, a sector member who at the time of the interview had his vessel and 
permits for sale, did find a buyer, but he found subsequent employment in shoreside support 
services. In FY 2015, NEFS XI and XII only have six or seven active fishermen, no longer 
landing enough fish to employ a full-time sector manager. The individual serving that role was 
able to move on to other employment in the field of fisheries policy advocacy. The new part-time 
sector manager used to be a full-time manager for another sector based in Southern New 
England. With declining participation, both sectors were forced to cut costs by making the 
manager a part-time position, but it works well to share one, because the respective memberships 
tend to be active at different times of year. 
A key factor to the viability of the sector program has been the federal funding of the required 
fishery observers, though each year, the continued availability of this subsidy has been in 
question. Unfortunately, in the spring of 2015, NMFS announced that during the summer of 
2015, federal funding for observers would no longer be available, and the sectors would need to 
cover this cost. On a per trip basis, this added cost would make fishing unviable for many 
participants. Federal funds have been extended for a few more months, and sectors and the 
Council are currently developing solutions. Catch share programs tend to require a high degree 
of monitoring to ensure compliance, but there needs to be sufficient value in the fishery to make 
it viable. This added cost alone may drive even the most efficient participants out of the fishery.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 - Timeline of federal actions associated with Northeast Multispecies management 
1976 Magnuson Act enacted 
This federal law established the regional fishing council management system and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, creating federal jurisdiction of waters from 3-200 miles off 
the U.S. coast. The domestic landings of fish increased dramatically with the exclusion of 
foreign boats. 
1986 The Northeast Multispecies fishery management plan (FMP) adopted 
Overfishing was occurring on 28% of the stocks (nationally). In the Northeast, NMFS and 
the NEFMC developed plans to end overfishing on cod, yellowtail flounder and haddock. 
1994 Multispecies FMP Amendment 5 adopted 
To further protect stocks and promote rebuilding of fisheries, the following measures 
were established: permanent fishing closures, minimum net mesh sizes, the Days-at-Sea 
program, and reductions of fishing pressure on cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder. 
Fishermen were required to report landings, and there was a moratorium on new 
multispecies permits issued. 
1996 Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorized (a.k.a. the “Sustainable Fisheries Act”) 
It established new mandates to reduce bycatch, protect essential fish habitats, and create 
specific stock rebuilding time-frames. National standards were included that emphasized 
minimizing the impact of management decisions on fishing communities and improving 
safety at sea. 
Multispecies FMP Amendment 7 adopted 
Area closures to protect juvenile and spawning fish were broadened and fishermen’s 
Days-at-Sea were reduced. 
1999 Multispecies FMP Amendment 9 adopted 
Overfishing definitions and optimum yield standards were established for 12 multispecies 
species, bringing the plan into compliance with the Sustainable Fisheries Act. 
2001 Multispecies FMP Amendment 11 adopted 
Adopted essential fish habitat designations. 
2004 Multispecies FMP Amendment 13 adopted 
Fishing pressure was further reduced and the first two fishing sectors were created (both 
of Cape Cod fishermen). There were measures to address overcapacity in the fleet, 
minimize bycatch, protect habitats, and improve reporting and record keeping 
requirements. 
2007 Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorized 
Amendments included a requirement to end overfishing in the U.S. by 2011 through the 
implementation of annual catch limits and accountability measures. The law also was 
changed to formally allow fishermen to organize into sectors. 
2010 Multispecies FMP Amendment 16 adopted 
Implemented on May 1, the amendment included the authorization of 17 fishing sectors 
region-wide. 
Reference: NEFMC (1993, 2009a). 
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Table 2 - Development of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP 
2006  
Sept. 26-28 NEFMC votes to prepare an EIS and open a public scoping period. 
Nov. 6 Committee holds a workshop with the AP and RAP to develop standards to 
guide development of management proposals for the Amendment. 
Nov. 14-16 NEFMC reviews workshop outcomes and considers adopting 
recommendations. 
Dec. 29 Scoping period closes with eight hearings held. 
2007  
Jan. 18 Committee discusses scoping comments and forwards proposals to 
NEFMC. 
Feb. 6-8 NEFMC agrees to stakeholder proposals for further consideration. 
Summer-Fall The sector concept gains traction. 
2008  
Jan. – Dec. Development of alternatives, including allocation formulas. 
2009  
Feb. 9-11 NEFMC approves Amendment 16 DEIS. 
Apr. 15 NEFMC-approved DEIS submitted to NMFS. 
Apr. 24-Jun. 8 Public comment period on DEIS. 
Jun. 24-25 NEFMC approves Amendment 16 FEIS. 
Oct. 16 NEFMC-approved FEIS submitted to NMFS. 
Oct. 23 NMFS publishes Notice of Availability of FEIS. 
Oct. 23 – Dec. 
22 
Public comment period. 
010  
Jan. 21 NMFS sends letter to NEFMC indicating partial approval of Amendment 
16 as voted on by the NEFMC. 
Apr. 9 NMFS publishes Final Rule on Amendment 16. 
May 1 Amendment 16 implemented. 
Jun. 22-24 NEFMC begins work on what would become Amendment 18. 
 
Table 3 – Control rules for common pool and sector vessels 
Rule Common pool Sectors 
Trip limits Yes (daily) No 
Discard of legal-sized fish Required if over the trip limit Full-retention 
Discard of sub-legal fish Required Required 
Economic discards Not allowed Not allowed 
Hard TAC Since 5/2012 Since 5/2010 





Table 4 - New Hampshire fishery data, 1720-1841 
Year Data Reference 
1669-74 Port of Piscataqua: 
Dry fish exported per year = 1.3 M lbs 
a
 
Van Deventer (1976: 90) 
1694-1695 Port of Piscataqua: 
Dry fish exported per year = 246, 000 lbs 
a
 
Van Deventer (1976: 90) 
1700 Port of Piscataqua: 
Dry fish exported per year = 146,000 lbs. 
a
 
Van Deventer (1976: 90) 
1720 Vessels based in the Piscataqua River = 100 
Fishermen and seafaring men = 400 
Van Deventer (1976: 90) 
1789-1791 Port of Piscataqua: 
Dry fish exported to Europe = 28,000 lbs. 
a
 
Dry fish exported to West Indies = 2.94 M lbs. 
Belknap (1812: 162) 
1791 Piscataqua and its neighborhood: 
b
 
Number employed in the cod and scale fishery 
Schooners   27 
Boats    20 
Tonnage  630 
Seamen  250 
Belknap (1812: 162) 
1839 Landing record of Capt. Oliver: 
Small and large cod = 242,000 lbs. 
Oliver (1815) 
1841 Vessels based in the Piscataqua River = 81 Saltonstall (1941: 197) 
Notes: 
a
 Weight was measured in quintals. One quintal equaled 112 lbs. of dried fish (Rosenberg et al., 
2005). The conversion factor between dried and round cod is roughly 1:3 (K. Alexander, 
personal communication, 2012). 
b








Table 5 - New England fishery data, 1880: employment, vessels, and boats 













Tonnage Number Value 
Maine $3,375,994 $3,614,178 8,110 2,961 806 17,632.65 5,920 $245,624 
New 
Hampshire 
$209,465 $176,684 376 38 23 1,619.95 211 $7,780 
Massachusetts $14,334,450 $8,141,750 17,105 2,952 1,054 83,232.17 6,749 $351,736 
Notes: 
a
 “Vessels” were large enough to venture offshore to the Grand and Western Banks (Wilcox, 1887). 
b
 “Boats” were small and would be used to fish inshore (Wilcox, 1887). 
Reference: 
Goode and Collins (1887). 
 
Table 6 – New England fishery data, 1880: value of products by fisheries 
 General 
a
 Whale Seal Menhaden Oyster Sponge Marine salt 
Maine $3,578,678    $37,500   
New 
Hampshire 
$6,581,204 $2,089,337  $61,769 $405,550  $3,800 
Massachusetts $170,634    $6,050   
Notes: 
a
 Includes all food species except oysters. 
Reference: 
Goode and Collins (1887). 
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Table 7 - Landings in New Hampshire by species, 1950 to 2010 (lbs.) 









s Alewife 7,469         61,300 
American Shad   25 5,942 30,561 38,206 7,300 
Eel  81     65 502 2,230 
Rainbow Smelt 4         2,800 









Atlantic Cod 1,226,518 1,293,047 1,756,330 2,761,019 3,774,455 1,656,700 
Flounder 58,012 264,364 516,813 523,366 649,878 1,290,900 
Haddock 18,427 98,680 134,301 34,234 36,057 104,900 
Pollock 1,041,589 1,996,786 1,337,440 842,404 1,699,460 1,646,500 
Redfish 17,981 32,461 47,992 19,287 31,784 46,600 









Lobster 3,658,884 2,556,232 1,709,746 1,834,794 1,658,200 1,193,881 
Sand Lance             
Bloodworms             
Clam         9,010   
Conch     274 4,544     
Crab 169,729   693,152 120,912 206,616   
Sandworms             
Sea Urchins     792 4,074 59,800   








s Atlantic Herring 2,829,980 12,562,021 5,581,880 320,394 368,000 5,100 
Atlantic Mackerel 343 1,306 7,620 45,812 49,645 14,600 
Swordfish             





Atlantic Halibut 339 515 9,552 802 848 700 
Atlantic Wolffish     21,674 39,915 25,409 39,700 
Bluefish     23,927 186,979 197,075 22,600 
Butterfish   
 
7,335 283 1,207 500 
Cusk 2,348 8,157 81,181 102,031 127,928 46,500 
Goosefish 172,441 1,225,813 1,872,520 932,505 265,089 127,600 
Hake, Other 215,716 101,453 388,841 218,603 582,208 396,600 
Menhaden 390       264,500   
Northern Shrimp 963,294 566,900 467,956 1,658,588 986,194 457,300 
Skates   20,705 84,709 54,281 23,140 5,100 
Spiny Dogfish 1,213,903 152,969 2,334,497 2,106,255 185,175   
Squids       881 810 1,300 
All other 16,721 24,569 87,494 256,165 163,607 90,800 
 Total: 11,819,821 21,280,894 17,885,585 12,684,859 11,468,658 7,619,611 




Table 7 – cont. 









s Alewife     31,000 125,000 95,000     
American Shad 6,900 500           
Eel  6,000 5,600 5,500 5,000 6,000 6,000   
Rainbow Smelt 18,300 25,000 58,000 110,500 37,000 70,000 300 









Atlantic Cod 2,376,300 670,900 189,000 85,000 20,000   4,400 
Flounder 2,418,400 131,100 65,500         
Haddock 1,961,900 59,500 7,000 60,000 20,000   800 
Pollock 2,395,100 1,079,400 2,900 10,000 5,000   1,600 
Redfish 583,900 9,100 8,000         









Lobster 723,900 480,000 688,000 765,000 935,000 850,000 612,700 
Sand Lance   8,700 18,000 25,000       
Bloodworms 4,800     1,000 6,000 2,500 100 
Clam             7,500 
Conch               
Crab 42,000 50,600 60,500 37,000 50,000 20,000   
Sandworms 22,200 28,700 15,000 16,000 3,000     
Sea Urchins               






s Atlantic Herring 6,635,800             
Atlantic Mackerel 13,500 300   1,200 8,500     
Swordfish 93,200             





Atlantic Halibut 3,200 2,100 500 2,800     100 
Atlantic Wolffish 23,500 12,000 300       200 
Bluefish 1,500             
Butterfish               
Cusk 314,800 153,500 1,000 10,000 3,000   1,200 
Goosefish 51,000 17,600           
Hake, Other 89,600 23,200 18,000         
Menhaden               
Northern Shrimp 13,800 64,800 120,000         
Skates 39,500             
Spiny Dogfish 14,800             
Squids               
All other 25,700 24,200 14,500       200 
 
Total: 18,750,600 3,141,900 1,318,800 1,265,000 1,188,500 948,500 645,100 
Reference: NMFS (2012). 
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Table 8 - Landings in New Hampshire by fishing gear, 1950 - 2010. 






 Dredge Urchin, Sea       2,943     
Dredge Scallop, Sea 107   438,556       
Dredge Clam         9,010   





s Gillnets, Other   10       2,804,700 
Gillnets, Drift, Other             





Lines Hand, Other 117,241 160,136 65,107 107,999 65,085 38,200 
Lines Jigging Machine       815     
Lines Troll, Other       304     




Bag Nets             
Cast Nets 6,163           
Dip Nets, Common 8         21,100 
Haul Seines, Beach 29           
Purse Seins 91,819 835,080     632,500 3,500 




s Pots/Traps, Lobster Inshore 832,750 392,273 434,876 572,205 1,011,150   
Pots/Traps, Lobster Offshore   1,595,601 2,067,396 1,395,979 925,641 5,800 





 Otter Trawl Bottom, Fish 3,953,856 12,441,695 1,817,422 1,812,583 1,902,631 2,843,600 
Otter Trawl Bottom, Shrimp 204,710   692,944 1,665,342 1,200,580 670,500 
Otter Trawl Midwater 98,250 111,800 888,061       





Harpoons, Other 1,138 3,227 1,419 201   1,500 
Spears             
Hoes             
Diving outfits, Other   3,883 792 690 59,800   
All Other 125,677 232,017 30,160     1,185,481 
 
Total: 11,819,821 21,280,894 17,885,585 12,684,859 11,468,695 7,619,611 








Table 8 – Cont. 






 Dredge Urchin, Sea               
Dredge Scallop, Sea 49,300             
Dredge Clam               





s Gillnets, Other 5,409,700 1,803,700 125,700         
Gillnets, Drift, Other       1,200 8,500     
Gillnets, 





Lines Hand, Other 142,200 71,900 69,400 156,300 30,000 55,000 5,400 
Lines Jigging 
Machine               
Lines Troll, Other       2,500       
Lines Long set with 




Bag Nets 6,300 3,100 2,500 3,500       
Cast Nets               
Dip Nets, Common 4,800 4,500 11,000         
Haul Seines, Beach   8,700 18,000 25,000       
Purse Seins 6,635,800             





Pots and Traps, 
Lobster Inshore 551,000 492,000 708,000 780,000 985,000   612,700 
Pots and Traps, 
Lobster Offshore 181,400             






Otter Trawl Bottom, 
Fish 5,274,900 392,200 120,600         
Otter Trawl Bottom, 
Shrimp   79,000 149,300         
Otter Trawl Midwater               
Midwater Trawl, 





Harpoons, Other 800 11,200 15,000 7,500       
Spears   1,800 2,500         
Hoes 27,000 28,700 15,000 17,000 9,000 2,500 7,600 
Diving outfits, Other               
All Other               
 
Total: 18,750,600 3,145,700 1,332,800 1,272,500 1,188,500 948,500 645,100 




Table 9 – Population and informant stratification 
Category Population Informants Response Rate 
NEFS XI & XII 27 (32%) 11 41% 
Other sector 11 (13%) 3 27% 
Common pool 22 (26%) 5 23% 
Former fisherman 21 (25%) 2 9.5% 
Dealers 4 (4.7%) 3 75% 
Total 85 (100%) 24* 28% 
Notes: 
*Twenty-two interviews were conducted. Two were of dealers who also 
fit into another category, “NEFS XI & XII” and “former fisherman.” One 
person was interviewed twice, once representing himself and once 
representing a dealer entity. 
 
Table 10 - Calculation of DAS and sector bycatch 
Days-At-Sea Sector Management 
Non-target catch = ND Non-target catch = NS 
Sub-legal target catch = SD Sub-legal target catch = SS 
Regulatory discards 
a
 = RD Regulatory discards 
b
 = 0 
Total bycatch = ND + SD + RD Total bycatch = NS + SS 
Notes: 
a
 Under DAS, regulatory discards are legal-sized fish caught in excess of the daily trip 
limit, which must be discarded at sea. 
b
 Under sectors, there are no regulatory discards, because there is no daily trip limit. 
 
Table 11 – Number of active groundfish vessels, New Hampshire vs. total 
Fishing Year New Hampshire All states (ME to NJ) %NH 
2007 44 658 6.7% 
2008 42 611 6.9% 
2009 43 566 7.6% 
2010 32 446 7.2% 
2011 28 418 6.7% 
2012 25 400 6.3% 
2013 25 327 7.6% 
Notes: FY 2007-2009 data from Kitts et al. (2011); FY 2010-2013 data from 






Table 12- Fishery revenue and vessel length, New Hampshire vs. total 
Fishing Year New Hampshire All states (ME to NJ) %NH 
2007 $3.6M $94M 3.8% 
2008 $4.2M $91M 4.6% 
2009 $4.5M $87M 5.2% 
2010 $3.3M $83M 3.9% 
2011 $4.2M $89M 4.7% 
2012 $3.3M $68M 4.8% 
2013 $1.9M $55M 3.5% 
 <45’ <~90’  
Notes: FY 2007-2009 data from Kitts et al. (2011); FY 2010-2013 data from 
Murphy et al. (2015). Revenue in 2010 dollars. “Active” means vessels with 
revenue from at least one groundfish trip. 
Table 13 - Homeports and landing ports of the permit holder population and informants 
  
Homeport/Hometown Landingport 
State Port Population Informants Population Informants 





















Portsmouth 27.% 43% 31% 38% 
 
New Castle 1.2% 
   
 
Rye 17% 19% 19% 19% 
 
Hampton 22% 14% 17% 
 
 
Seabrook 8.6% 14% 11% 24% 
 
Hampton Falls 2.5% 
 
1.2% 





Gloucester 4.9% 4.8% 8.6% 9.5% 
 
Boston 1.2% 
   
 
New Bedford 1.2% 4.8% 1.2% 4.8% 
NJ Tom's River 1.2% 
 
1.2% 
 VA Greenbackville 
  
1.2% 
 NC Bath 1.2% 
   
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Reference: Interviews for informants. NMFS (2013) for all others in population. 
Note: For non-informants, NMFS data for FY 2012 were used, or the last year that the 
individual was listed as a permit holder. Npopulation = 81; Ninformants = 21. 
Table 14 – Sex of population and informants 
 Population Informants 
Male 91% 100% 
Female 2.5% 0% 
Unknown 6.2% 0% 
n 81 21 
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Table 15 - Permits held by the population and informants in FY 2012 
Number of commercial groundfish permits 
  
Population (n=81) Informants (n=21) 
 
# held Frequency % Frequency % 
 
0 20 24.69% 2 9.52% 
 
1 44 54.32% 10 47.62% 
 
2 7 8.64% 2 9.52% 
 
3 6 7.41% 4 19.05% 
 
4 2 2.47% 2 9.52% 
 
5 2 2.47% 1 4.76% 
 
Mean 1.2±0.1 1.9±0.3 
      Category of commercial groundfish permits held 
 
  
Population (n=61) Informants (n=21) 
 
Category Frequency % Frequency % 
 
A 47 77.05% 14 73.68% 
 
HA 9 14.75% 3 15.79% 
 
C 1 1.64% 1 5.26% 
 
D 1 1.64% 0 0.00% 
 
F 1 1.64% 0 0.00% 
 
multiple 2 3.28% 1 5.26% 
 
Table 16 - Specific sectors individuals enrolled in 
 
FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 
 
pop informants pop informants pop informants 
 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
NEFS XI 30 37% 8 38% 30 37% 8 38% 25 31% 8 38% 
NEFS XII 5 6% 4 19% 6 7% 3 14% 5 6% 3 14% 
SHS 3 4% 2 10% 2 2% 2 10% 3 4% 2 10% 
NEFS II 6 7% 1 5% 7 9% 1 5% 7 9% 1 5% 
NEFS III 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
multiple 2 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
n/a 34 42% 6 29% 35 43% 7 33% 40 49% 7 33% 
Total 81 100% 21 100% 81 100% 21 100% 81 100% 21 100% 
n/a = Individual did not enroll in a sector. 
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Table 17 - Age of informants 
 
Enrollment status as of FY 2012 
 








 Age 30-39 1 0 0 0 1 5% 
Age 40-49 4 2 2 0 8 38% 
Age 50-59 3 0 2 2 7 33% 
Age 60-69 3 1 1 0 5 24% 
Total 11 3 5 2 21 100% 
 
Table 18 - Other informant demographics 
Did you work as a commercial fisherman prior to holding a permit? (n=21) 
 No 1 (4.8%)   
 Yes 20 (95%)   
     
How long has your homeport been your homeport? (n=21) 
 Mean Since 1987±13 years  
 Range 1964 – 2010   
     
How long has your landingport been your landingport? (n=20)* 
 Mean Since 1991±14 years  
 Range 1964 – 2010   
     
How many vessels do you currently own? (n=20)* 
 Mean 1.1±0.6   
 Range 0-3   
     
Did you recently buy or sell any vessels? (n=21) 
 No 14 (67%)   
 Yes 7 (33%)   
     
What is the length of vessel that you fish(ed) groundfish with? (n=20)** 
 Mean 41±8 ft.   
 Range 24 – 61 ft.   
     
What is the horsepower of vessel that you fish(ed) groundfish with? (n=20)** 
 Mean 315±55   
 Range 220 - 402   
* One former fisherman doesn’t have a landingport, since he doesn’t fish at all anymore. 
** No data for one former fisherman. 
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FY 2010 actual FY 2011 actual 
Permit owners tbd 36 24 (6) 
f
 24 (tbd) 
Permits tbd 56 41 
f
 56 
Active vessels 43 
d
 42 24 (6)
 f
 28 (tbd)  





ACE total n/a n/a 5.8M lbs.
 d
 tbd 
ACE harvested 6.0M lbs. 
c
 n/a 3.0M lbs.
 d
 tbd 
ACE leased out n/a n/a 330K lbs.
 d
 tbd 
Fishing trips 3,332 n/a 1,442
 d
 tbd 





 Fishing Year 2009 was prior to sector implementation. 
b
 The figures for FY 2010 compare what was stated in the Environmental Impact Assessment 
with what actually occurred. 
c
 In 2009, there was no TAC. This figure is total landings. 
() denotes vessels fishing in the “common pool.” 
References: 
d
 Kitts et al. (2011). 
e
 Northeast Fisheries Sectors XI (2010a) and XII (2010). 
f
 J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011.  
 
Table 20 - ACE use by informant sector members 
Were you a sector member for lease-only purposes or did you actively fish? 
 
FY 10 FY 11  
Lease-only 13% 14%  
Active 7% 7%  
Both 80% 79%  
n 15 14  
    
 
Were you able to harvest all your allocation? 
 
FY 10 FY 11  
no 33% 21%  
yes 66% 79%  
n 15 14  
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Table 21 - Efficiency 








Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 DAS 6 29% 4 29% 2 29% 
 sectors 8 38% 7 50% 1 14% 
 equally efficient 2 10% 2 14% 
   equally inefficient 1 5%     1 14% 
 unsure 2 10% 1 7% 1 14% 
 unknown 1 5%     1 14% 
 n/a 1 5%     1 14% 
 
 
21 100% 15 100% 7 100% 
  
Table 22 - Informant rationale for perspectives on fishing efficiency and flexibility 
Why sectors are more efficient and flexible: 
 No daily trip limits 
 Knowing one’s allocation at the beginning of the year 
 Ability to trade allocation 
 No limit on the number of gillnets that a fishermen can use at once 
 Better catch per effort for some 
Why DAS were more efficient and flexible: 
 When targeting cod, it was fairly easy to catch the trip limit 
 Better catch per effort for some 
 
Table 23 - Flexibility 
Which program provides greater flexibility for fishermen to decide where, when, and 







Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 DAS 4 19% 3 21% 1 14% 
 sectors 11 52% 10 71% 1 14% 
 equally inflexible 1 5%     1 14% 
 unsure 3 14% 1 7% 2 29% 
 unknown 1 5%     1 14% 
 n/a 1 5%     1 14% 




Table 24 - Labor 
How many individuals worked on your boat(s) at a given time? 
 
 
n Mean Range  
 FY 09 21 2.4±1.2 1 - 6  
 FY 10 21 2.3±0.9 1 - 4  
 FY 11 19 2.3±1.0 1 - 5  
How many total people did you employ as crew throughout the year? 
 
 
n Mean Range  
 FY 09 21 2.3±1.7 1 - 6  
 FY 10 21 2.2±1.6 1 - 7  
 FY 11 19 2.3±2.1 1 - 10  
Table 25 - Gear 
What was your principal groundfish gear type? (n=21) 
  
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
   trawl 29% 19% 29% 
   gillnet 33% 33% 29% 
   handgear 14% 19% 10% 
   combination 5% 10% 5% 
 
 
 n/a 19% 19% 29% 
  












 trawl 4 2 0 0 6 
 gillnet 5 0 1 0 6 
 handgear 0 0 2 0 2 
 combination 0 1 0 0 1 
 n/a 2 0 2 2 6 
 total 11 3 5 2 21 
 
      Did you make any changes to your groundfish gear? (n=21) 
  
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
   no change 67% 52% 52% 
   change 10% 24% 14% 
   unknown 5% 0% 0% 
   n/a 19% 24% 33% 
   




FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
   no change 76% 76% 52% 
   increase 5% 10% 19% 
   unknown 5% 5% 0% 
   n/a 14% 10% 29% 
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Table 26 - Fishing trips 
How long was a typical groundfish fishing trip (hours)? 
 
 
n Mean Range 
 FY 09 17 15±11 5-42 
 FY 10 16 12±6 6-33 
 FY 11 15 12±2 8-16 
How were area conflicts relative to the year prior? 
 
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
  Decreased 4.76% 4.76% 4.76% 
  No change 61.90% 52.38% 38.10% 
  Increased 19.05% 33.33% 33.33% 
  Unknown 4.76% 4.76% 0.00% 
  n/a 9.52% 4.76% 23.81% 
  
Table 27 - Affiliation with industry organizations 
Do you belong to any industry organizations, not including your 
sector? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
no 2 10% 0 0% 2 29% 
yes 19 90% 14 100% 5 71% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 Which industry organizations to you belong to? (n=21) 
Northeast Seafood Coalition 62%  
NH Commercial Fishermen's Assoc. 33%  
National Assoc. of Charter Boat Operators 5%  
Maine Professional Guides Association 5%  
Granite State Fish 10%  
Yankee Fishermen's Co-op 14%  
Associated Fisheries of Maine 10%  
Northeast Tuna Club 5%  
Northeast Hook Fishermen's Assoc. 5%  
Salt Water Party Boat Assoc. 5%  
 Have you served as a leader in any of these organizations? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
no 12 57% 7 50% 5 71% 
yes 9 43% 7 50% 2 29% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
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Table 28 - Sharing within the fishing community 
Do you share any equipment with other fishermen? 
 All informants Sector members Others 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 10 53% 6 46% 4 67% 
Yes 9 47% 7 54% 2 33% 


































  What was your principal groundfish gear type in FY 11? 
 
Trawl Gillnet Handgear Combo.  n/a Total 
No 3 3 1 0 3 10 
Yes 3 3 1 1 1 9 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 2 2 
total 6 6 2 1 6 21 
 Do you share information about fishing areas with other fishermen? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 5 24% 3 21% 2 29% 
Yes 16 76% 11 79% 5 71% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 How many fishermen do you share information with about what you're catching? 
 
All 
informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Whole community 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
part of community 19 90% 12 86% 7 100% 
 
21 100% 15 100% 7 100% 
  
If part of the community, how many? 
 
Mean Mean Mean 
 







Table 29 - Community ties 
How often do you trust fishermen in your community (NH) in business? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Never 4 19% 3 21% 1 14% 
Sometimes 14 67% 8 57% 6 86% 
Always 3 14% 3 21% 0 0% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 Are there some fishermen you avoid talking with? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 7 33% 5 33% 2 33% 
Yes 14 67% 10 67% 4 67% 
n 21 100% 15 100% 6 100% 
 Is helping a fisherman inside your community more important than helping a fisherman 
from outside? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 7 33% 4 29% 3 43% 
Yes 14 67% 10 71% 4 57% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 How important to you is keeping allocation within the New Hampshire fishing community? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Not important 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
Neutral 3 14% 3 21% 0 0% 
Important 15 71% 9 64% 6 86% 
n/a 1 5% 0 0% 1 14% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 6 100% 
 When selling/leasing allocation, are you willing to accept a lower price to keep it in the 
community? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 8 38% 7 50% 1 14% 
Yes 8 38% 7 50% 1 14% 
n/a 5 24% 0 0% 5 71% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
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Table 30 - Views of NMFS 
In general, how often to you trust NMFS to have the best interests of the industry in mind? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Never 8 38% 7 50% 1 14% 
Sometimes 11 52% 7 50% 4 57% 
Always 2 10% 0 0% 2 29% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 
Table 31 - Degree of social capital within sectors 
Have you served on the Board of your sector? 
    
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 10 48% 9 64% 1 14% 
Yes 5 24% 5 36% 
  n/a 6 29% 0 0% 6 86% 
n 21 100% 15 100% 7 100% 
 Do sector members respect sector rules? 
    
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Yes 14 67% 13 93% 1 17% 
Can't say 1 5% 1 7% 0 0% 
n/a 6 29% 0 0% 6 86% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 Do you trust members of your sector more, the same, or less than other fishermen? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
The same 12 57% 11 79% 1 14% 
More 3 14% 3 21% 0 0% 
n/a 6 29% 0 0% 6 86% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 Has working with a sector manager been helpful? 
   
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 1 5% 0 0% 1 17% 
Yes 14 67% 14 100% 0 0% 
n/a 6 29% 0 0% 6 86% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
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Table 32 - Bycatch 
How important is reducing bycatch to you (e.g., decreased deck sorting time)? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Neutral 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
Important 19 90% 12 86% 7 100% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 How has your level of bycatch changed since May 2010? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Decreased 8 38% 6 43% 2 29% 
Unchanged 6 29% 5 36% 1 14% 
Increased 3 14% 1 7% 2 29% 
n/a 4 19% 2 14% 2 29% 

























Decreased Unchanged Increased n/a Total 
Trawl 4 2 0 0 6 
Gillnet 2 3 1 0 6 
Handgear 1 1 0 0 2 
Combination 0 0 1 0 1 
n/a 1 0 1 4 6 
total 8 6 3 4 21 
       Do you go above and beyond the regulations to avoid bycatch (e.g., modify/test gear)? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 6 29% 2 14% 4 57% 
Yes 14 67% 11 79% 3 43% 
n/a 1 5% 1 7% 0 0% 



































American Plaice 191.8 8.1 37.2 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 239.4 
Atlantic cod 304.4 54.0 264.5 33.6 91.8 45.9 1.5 23.2 819.0 
Atlantic halibut 4.6 1.0 2.8 3.3 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0 13.0 
Haddock 20.3 45.4 240.3 1.9 3.1 36.6 30.7 0.0 378.4 
Ocean Pout 65.7 11.1 43.2 1.4 0.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 125.0 
Pollock 6.6 2.6 8.2 13.7 33.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 65.1 
Redfish 34.4 13.5 23.2 2.2 2.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 75.9 
White Hake 6.9 2.1 5.8 10.8 11.0 1.1 1.0 0.0 38.7 
Windowpane Flounder 158.4 64.9 299.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 523.1 
Winter Flounder 118.9 2.5 13.4 2.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 141.0 
Witch Flounder 99.7 10.4 35.6 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 147.3 
Yellowtail Flounder 249.6 43.1 110.4 2.4 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 417.3 
Totals: 
         Multispecies Bycatch 1,261.5 258.7 1,084.5 72.4 161.9 87.3 33.7 23.2 2,983.2 
Other Bycatch 8,199 4,130 9,758 1,476 1,979 258 42 0 25,841.7 
Fishery Landings 19,757 5,584 14,826 7,478 4,573 1,246 609 275 54,348.6 
Total Catch 29,218 9,973 25,669 9,026 6,714 1,591 685 298 83,173.4 
Fishery Bycatch Ratio 0.32 0.44 0.42 0.17 0.32 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.35 
Notes: Some of these fisheries have trips targeting non-Northeast Multispecies stocks or operating in state waters. Values in live weight. Large-
mesh otter trawl is > 5.5 inch mesh. For gillnets, extra-large mesh is > 8.0 in; large-mesh is 5.5-7.99 in. “Other Bycatch” does not include marine 
mammals.  
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Table 34 - Commercial catch (mt, live) of Gulf of Maine haddock 
Year Catch Landings Discards %Discards 
Trip Limit 
(mt/day) (lbs/day) 
1986 1,598.4 1,590.4 8.0 0.5% 
 1987 830.4 829.2 1.2 0.1% 
 1988 417.7 416.2 1.5 0.4% 
 1989 272.5 263.8 8.7 3.2% 
 1990 435.7 433.3 2.4 0.6% 
 1991 435.0 430.9 4.1 0.9% 
 1992 330.9 311.8 19.1 5.8% 
 1993 222.7 193.0 29.7 13.3% 
 1994 213.6 120.1 93.5 43.8% 0.23 500 
1995 300.6 173.0 127.6 42.4% 0.23 500 
1996 353.1 246.6 106.5 30.2% 0.45 1,000 
1997 956.8 588.6 368.2 38.5% 0.45 1,000 
1998 909.3 885.2 24.1 2.7% 
 1999 545.4 542.5 2.9 0.5% 
 2000 775.8 737.9 37.9 4.9% 
 2001 956.2 929.1 27.1 2.8% 
 2002 1,000.5 976.9 23.6 2.4% 
 2003 1,045.6 1,023.0 22.6 2.2% 
 2004 973.1 946.5 26.6 2.7% 
 2005 998.9 961.5 37.4 3.7% 
 2006 667.6 618.2 49.4 7.4% 
 2007 723.9 673.7 50.2 6.9% 
 2008 520.9 508.5 12.4 2.4% 
 2009 499.8 486.0 13.8 2.8% 
 2010 565.7 561.1 4.6 0.8% 
 Notes: Data updated through 2012. Values in live weight. Discards estimated using NEFSC 
observer data. Values from NEFSC. Groundfish Assessment Updates 2012, Tables C1. 
Reference: NEFSC (2012b). 
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Table 35 - Commercial catch (mt, live) of Georges Bank haddock 
Year Catch Landings Discards %Discards 
Trip Limit 
(mt/day) (lbs/day) 
1986 3,339 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
  1987 2,156 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
  1988 2,492 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
  1989 1,718 1,430 288 16.8% 
  1990 2,106 2,005 101 4.8% 
  1991 1,434 1,395 39 2.7% 
  1992 2,053 2,005 48 2.3% 
  1993 827 687 140 16.9% 
  1994 2,302 207 2,095 91.0% 0.23 500 
1995 309 231 78 25.2% 0.23 500 
1996 436 320 116 26.6% 0.45 1,000 
1997 1,151 880 271 23.5% 0.45 1,000 
1998 2,192 1,915 277 12.6% 
  1999 2,628 2,574 54 2.1% 
  2000 3,280 3,203 77 2.3% 
  2001 5,037 4,820 217 4.3% 
  2002 6,741 6,532 209 3.1% 
  2003 5,954 5,760 194 3.3% 
  2004 8,415 7,375 1,040 12.4% 
  2005 7,278 6,604 674 9.3% 
  2006 3,938 2,643 1,295 32.9% 
  2007 4,855 2,930 1,925 39.6% 
  2008 6,207 2,695 3,512 56.6% 
  2009 5,477 5,397 80 1.5% 
  2010 9,310 4,879 4,431 47.6% 
  Notes: 
     Data updated through 2012. 
    Values in live weight. 
    Discards estimated using NEFSC observer data. 
  Values from NEFSC. Groundfish Assessment Updates 2012, Tables B1 and B2. 
Reference: NEFSC (2012b). 
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Table 36 - Commercial catch (mt, live) of Gulf of Maine cod 
Year Catch Landings Discards %Discards 
Trip Limit 
(mt/day) (lbs/day) 
1986 11,029.1 9,669.6 1,359.5 12.3% 
 1987 8,771.2 7,526.2 1,245.0 14.2% 
 1988 8,905.4 7,948.2 957.2 10.7% 
 1989 11,651.8 10,550.7 1,101.1 9.5% 
 1990 17,637.9 15,439.7 2,198.2 12.5% 
 1991 18,892.5 17,959.0 933.5 4.9% 
 1992 11,963.2 11,019.4 943.8 7.9% 
 1993 9,179.1 8,366.7 812.4 8.9% 
 1994 8,311.0 8,030.2 280.8 3.4% 
 1995 6,921.7 6,606.8 314.9 4.5% 
 1996 7,220.2 7,019.8 200.4 2.8% 
 1997 5,547.1 5,432.1 115.0 2.1% 0.45, 0.68 1,000, 1,500 
1998 4,173.8 4,074.3 99.5 2.4% 0.18, 0.32 400, 700 
1999 2,789.5 1,407.4 1,382.1 49.5% 0.01, 0.05, 0.09 30, 100, 200 
2000 5,053.1 3,771.8 1,281.3 25.4% 0.18 400 
2001 6,355.3 4,314.4 2,040.9 32.1% 0.18 400 
2002 5,410.3 3,638.3 1,772.0 32.8% 0.23 500 
2003 4,903.2 3,865.6 1,037.6 21.2% 0.23 500 
2004 4,642.9 3,782.3 860.6 18.5% 0.36 800 
2005 3,988.6 3,557.6 431.0 10.8% 0.36 800 
2006 3,527.8 3,029.4 498.4 14.1% 0.36 800 
2007 4,265.5 3,989.8 275.7 6.5% 0.36 800 
2008 5,958.0 5,443.5 514.5 8.6% 0.36 800 
2009 6,994.7 5,952.9 1,041.8 14.9% 0.36 800 
2010 5,597.5 5,356.4 241.1 4.3% 
 Notes: 
    Data updated through 2012. 
   Values in live weight. 
   Discards estimated using NEFSC observer data. 
 Values from NEFSC. 53rd SAW Assessment Summary Report. 
Prior to 1989, there are no direct estimates of commercial discards. 
Reference: NEFSC (2012a). 
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Table 37 - Commercial catch (mt, live) of Georges Bank cod 
Year Catch Landings Discards %Discards 
Trip Limit 
(mt/day) (lbs/day) 
1986 17,947 17,490 457 2.5% 
  1987 19,301 19,035 266 1.4% 
  1988 26,633 26,310 323 1.2% 
  1989 25,994 25,056 938 3.6% 
  1990 28,818 28,110 708 2.5% 
  1991 25,024 24,219 805 3.2% 
  1992 18,366 16,899 1,467 8.0% 
  1993 15,079 14,590 489 3.2% 
  1994 9,973 9,737 236 2.4% 
  1995 7,135 7,026 109 1.5% 
  1996 7,396 7,261 135 1.8% 
  1997 7,687 7,548 139 1.8% 0.45, 0.68 1,000, 1,500 
1998 7,178 7,041 137 1.9% 0.18, 0.32 400, 700 
1999 8,455 8,313 142 1.7% 0.01, 0.05, 0.09 30, 100, 200 
2000 7,820 7,600 220 2.8% 0.18 400 
2001 11,533 10,749 784 6.8% 0.18 400 
2002 9,777 9,472 305 3.1% 0.23 500 
2003 7,333 6,852 481 6.6% 0.23 500 
2004 3,813 3,509 304 8.0% 0.36 800 
2005 3,794 2,754 1,040 27.4% 0.36 800 
2006 3,265 2,700 565 17.3% 0.36 800 
2007 5,359 3,699 1,660 31.0% 0.36 800 
2008 3,720 3,255 465 12.5% 0.36 800 
2009 3,872 2,999 873 22.5% 0.36 800 
2010 3,251 2,688 563 17.3% 
  Notes: Data updated through 2012. Values in live weight. Discards estimated using NEFSC 
observer data. Values from NEFSC. Groundfish Assessment Updates 2012, Table A1. 




























GB cod 3,302 2,745.8 2,627.7 118.1 4.3% 3,028.9 147.3 4.9% 
GOM cod 4,327 3,617.1 3,537.1 80.0 2.2% 4,091.2 119.6 2.9% 
GB haddock 40,186 8,248.0 8,207.4 40.6 0.5% 8,542.0 111.2 1.3% 
GOM haddock 799 370.5 367.8 2.7 0.7% 388.3 3.4 0.9% 
GB Yellowtail Flounder 803 739.0 672.3 66.7 9.0% 809.7 128.1 15.8% 
SNE Yellowtail Flounder 235 152.5 147.8 4.7 3.1% 314.7 140.0 44.5% 
CC/GOM Ylt. Flounder 729 559.8 500.1 59.7 10.7% 671.4 118.5 17.6% 
Plaice 2,748 1,503.7 1,331.9 171.8 11.4% 1,607.7 224.3 14.0% 
Witch Flounder 827 695.4 638.2 57.2 8.2% 832.5 143.2 17.2% 
GB Winter Flounder 1,823 1,382.4 1,364.6 17.8 1.3% 1,531.3 160.2 10.5% 
GOM Winter Flounder 133 80.7 79.1 1.6 2.0% 193.5 29.9 15.5% 
SNE Winter Flounder n/a 42.3 7.9 34.4 81.3% 370.1 208.3 56.3% 
Redfish 6,756 2,143.3 1,991.6 151.7 7.1% 2,166.9 157.6 7.3% 
White Hake 2,505 2,215.6 2,184.1 31.5 1.4% 2,344.7 48.3 2.1% 
Pollock 16,178 5,449.8 5,371.5 78.3 1.4% 7,532.0 88.4 1.2% 
Northern Windowpane n/a 151.7 0.3 151.4 99.8% 162.6 162.3 99.8% 
Southern Windowpane n/a 52.7 0.1 52.6 99.8% 534.9 488.3 91.3% 
Ocean Pout n/a 56.5 0.1 56.4 99.8% 102.4 101.3 98.9% 
Halibut n/a 25.6 6.1 19.5 76.2% 36.2 21.3 58.8% 
Wolfish n/a 18.9 0.2 18.7 98.9% 22.5 22.2 98.7% 
Total 81,351 30,251 29,036 1,215 4.0% 37,333.8 2,623.7 7.4% 
Notes: 
     
   
Data updated through November 10, 2011. 
   
   
Values in live weight. 
Reference: NMFS (2015b). 
     



























GB cod 4,208 3,215.3 3,071.0 144.3 4.5% 3,405.9 155.3 4.6% 
GOM cod 4,721 4,368.0 4,222.6 145.4 3.3% 4706.8 188.9 4.0% 
GB haddock 30,393 3,828.8 3,746.8 82.0 2.1% 4,252.0 368.9 8.7% 
GOM haddock 770 483.7 476.2 7.5 1.6% 499.1 15.7 3.1% 
GB Yellowtail Flounder 1,122 988.0 939.1 48.9 4.9% 1,117.0 166.0 14.9% 
SNE yellowtail Flounder 404 364.0 345.3 18.7 5.1% 514.9 149.3 29.0% 
CC/GOM Yellowtail 
Flounder 
913 795.1 711.5 83.6 10.5% 853.1 91.9 10.8% 
Plaice 3,038 1,631.6 1,435.9 195.7 12.0% 1,660.7 206.9 12.5% 
Witch Flounder 1,211 992.9 930.9 62.0 6.2% 1,186.0 227.1 19.1% 
GB Winter Flounder 1,993 1,924.2 1,911.0 13.2 0.7% 1,984.8 71.6 3.6% 
GOM Winter Flounder 313 158.2 153.1 5.1 3.2% 287.3 45.9 16.0% 
SNE Winter Flounder n/a 86.9 3.3 83.6 96.2% 298.7 237.5 79.5% 
Redfish 7,505 2,703.2 2,518.8 184.4 6.8% 2,720.6 194.6 7.2% 
White Hake 2,946 3,014.4 2,981.8 32.6 1.1% 3,035.5 36.5 1.2% 
Pollock 13,848 7,543.1 7,433.7 109.4 1.5% 9,064.0 116.5 1.3% 
Northern Windowpane n/a 156.2 0.0 156.2 100.0% 191.3 190.9 99.8% 
Southern Windowpane n/a 83.0 0.2 82.8 99.8% 504.1 462.3 91.7% 
Ocean Pout n/a 56.3 0.0 56.3 100.0% 90.2 90.2 100.0% 
Halibut n/a 41.4 10.3 31.1 75.1% 52.1 33.1 63.5% 
Wolfish n/a 32.2 0.0 32.2 100.0% 33.0 32.9 99.7% 
Total 73,385 32,467 30,892 1,575 4.9% 38,335.9 3,082.0 8.5% 
Notes: 
     
   
Data updated through June 28, 2012. 
    
   
Values in live weight. 
Reference: NMFS (2015b). 
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Table 40 - Economic performance of informants (n=21), FY 2009 - FY 2011  
What % of total household income was derived from fishing? 
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
 0% 0% 0% 5% 
 1-25% 14% 14% 14% 
 26-50% 14% 14% 14% 
 51-75% 14% 14% 14% 
 76-100% 57% 57% 52% 
 What % of your own income was derived from fishing? 
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
 0% 0% 0% 5% 
 1-25% 19% 14% 14% 
 26-50% 0% 5% 0% 
 51-75% 0% 5% 5% 
 76-100% 81% 76% 76% 
 What % of your fishing income was derived from groundfish fishing? 
 
FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 
 0% 10% 10% 19% 
 1-25% 10% 24% 14% 
 26-50% 19% 14% 14% 
 51-75% 19% 10% 10% 
































GB cod, East 717,441 77.9% 2,952 822 0.00% 60 200 0.00% 
GB cod, West 6,563,099 83.7% 27,003 2,625 0.00% 546 189 0.00% 
GOM cod 9,540,389 83.6% 1,375,164 1,213,417 87.59% 126,954 113,323 85.04% 
GB haddock, East 26,262,695 15.3% 9,778 9,778 0.00% 43 1,354 0.00% 
GB haddock, West 62,331,182 22.7% 23,206 23,206 0.00% 102 3,175 0.00% 
GOM haddock 1,761,206 46.4% 58,418 30,900 59.64% 2,384 4,285 8.14% 
GB yellowtail flounder 1,770,451 92.0% 29 29 0.00% 8 3 0.00% 
SNE yellowtail flounder 517,372 65.0% 94 94 0.00% 6 4 0.00% 
CC/GOM yellowtail 
flounder 
1,608,084 76.7% 37,927 18,308 58.26% 8,311 20,862 87.22% 
Plaice 6,058,149 54.7% 117,224 70,250 25.08% 22,789 29,037 38.47% 
Witch flounder 1,824,125 84.0% 34,871 13,464 67.51% 5,171 6,614 65.78% 
GB winter flounder 4,018,496 75.8% 144 144 0.00% 4 2 0.00% 
GOM winter flounder 293,736 60.6% 7,391 4,828 56.65% 1,132 5,128 50.47% 
Redfish 14,894,618 31.7% 283,102 282,718 12.71% 10,127 3,761 1.09% 
White hake 5,522,677 88.4% 271,643 200,772 85.36% 1,948 1,162 4.99% 
Pollock 35,666,741 33.7% 3,379,854 3,399,411 48.49% 19,167 9,597 3.07% 
Total 179,350,461 35.69% 5,628,800 5,270,766 56.48% 198,752 198,696 67.14% 
Notes: 
Run Date: June 29, 2011. 
a
 Allocation at the beginning of the fishing year. 
b
 Accounts for trades into/out of sector. 
c




Table 42 - Other economic performance responses 
Since May 2010, has the profit margin of your groundfish fishing operations changed?  
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Decreased 10 48% 6 43% 4 57% 
Unchanged 4 19% 3 21% 1 14% 
Increased 3 14% 3 21% 0 0% 
n/a 4 19% 2 14% 2 29% 
N 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
 How do the costs associated with sectors compare to what was expected? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Lower than expected 1 5% 1 7% 0 0% 
As expected 9 43% 8 57% 1 14% 
Higher than expected 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
Unsure 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
Unknown 1 5% 1 7% 0 0% 
n/a 6 29% 0 0% 6 86% 
N 21 100% 14 100% 6 100% 
 Since May 2010, has the predictability of your fishing business changed?  
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Decreased 10 48% 7 50% 3 43% 
Unchanged 4 19% 4 29% 0 0% 
Increased 3 14% 1 7% 2 29% 
n/a 4 19% 2 14% 2 29% 
N 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
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Table 43 - Safety 
A. Did the DAS regulations you operate(d) in ever compromise safety? 
 
All informants Sector members Others  
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %  
No 12 57% 8 57% 4 57%  
Yes 9 43% 6 43% 3 43%  
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100%  
       
 
B. Do (did) the sector regulations you operate(d) under ever compromise vessel safety? 
 
All informants Sector members Others  
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %  
No 10 77% 9 75% 1 100%  
Yes 3 33% 3 25% 0 0%  
n 13 100% 12 100% 7 100%  
Note: Question B was not relevant for eight informants (common pool members, former 
fishermen and lease-only sector members). 
 
Table 44 - Well-being A 
A. Do you consider the allocation of PSC to your permits under A16 to be fair or unfair? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Unfair 14 70% 10 71% 4 67% 
Fair 5 25% 4 29% 1 17% 
Unsure 1 5% 0 0% 1 17% 
n 20 100% 14 100% 6 100% 
  B. For which program are the rules more difficult to understand, DAS or sectors? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
DAS more difficult 3 16% 2 14% 1 20% 
Sectors more difficult 7 37% 5 36% 2 40% 
Equally easy 3 16% 3 21% 
  Equally difficult 4 21% 4 29% 
  Unsure 1 5% 
 
  1 20% 
No answer 1 5% 
 
  1 20% 
n 19 100% 14 100% 5 100% 
Note: Question A was not relevant for one informant (HA permit holder fishing as 
party/charter). Question B was not relevant for two informants who did not participate in 




Table 45 - Well-being B 
A. Since May 2010, has your fatigue level at sea decreased, unchanged, or increased? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Unchanged 10 53% 5 38% 5 83% 
Increased 9 47% 8 62% 1 17% 
n 19 100% 13 100% 6 100% 
 B. Is fishing today more or less stressful than before May 2010? 
 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Less stressful today 2 10% 2 14% 0 0% 
No change 3 15% 2 14% 1 17% 
More stressful today 15 75% 10 71% 5 83% 
n 20 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
   C. Correlation of age with stress 
  
Age 
Is fishing today more or less stressful than before May 2010? 
Less stress No change More stress Total 
30-39 0 0 1 1 
40-49 0 0 8 8 
50-59 0 1 5 6 
60-69 2 2 1 5 
Total 2 3 15 20 
   D. Since May 2010, has your job satisfaction changed? 
  
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Decreased 8 44% 7 54% 1 20% 
Unchanged 5 28% 3 23% 2 40% 
Increased 5 28% 3 23% 2 40% 
n 18 100% 13 100% 5 100% 
    E. Do you expect to retire as a fisherman? 
   
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 2 10% 1 7% 1 14% 
Yes 13 62% 9 64% 4 57% 
Unsure 6 29% 4 29% 2 29% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
Note: Question A was not relevant for two informants that do not go to sea today. Question B was 
not relevant for one former groundfish fishermen who doesn’t fish today. Question C was not 
relevant for one informant. Three informants did not answer Question D. 
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Table 46 - Well-being C 
A. How many more years do you expect to be fishing? 
  
 
range mean std. dev n 
  All informants 0-25 4.6 6.9 21 
  Sector members 1-25 6.0 8.2 14 
  Others 0-2 1.7 0.8 7 
  
 
   
   B. Would you advise a young person to enter fishing? 
  
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 15 71% 10 71% 5 71% 
Yes 6 29% 4 29% 2 29% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 
       C. Is your future outlook of the New Hampshire groundfish fishery neutral, negative or 
positive? 
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Negative 15 71% 10 71% 5 71% 
Neutral 6 29% 4 29% 2 29% 
n 21 100% 4 100% 7 100% 
       D. If you had your life to live over again, would you still fish? 
  
 
All informants Sector members Others 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
No 6 29% 5 36% 1 14% 
Yes 14 67% 8 57% 6 86% 
Unsure 1 5% 1 7% 0 0% 
n 21 100% 14 100% 7 100% 






Table 47 – Job satisfaction, questions after Pollnac et al. (2014) 
How satisfied are/were you with the following related to groundfish fishing (n=21)? 
 very 
dissatisfied 











Earnings 10% 10% 29% 43% 10% 
 
Earnings predictability 10% 29% 33% 19% 10% 
 
















Time spent away from home 0% 24% 29% 38% 5% 
 
Physical fatigue of the job 14% 10% 33% 38% 0% 5% 













Sense of adventure 10% 0% 10% 52% 29% 
 
Sense of challenge 10% 5% 10% 38% 38% 
 
Opportunity to be your own boss 5% 0% 14% 33% 48% 
 















Earnings 0% 20% 20% 20% 40% 
 
Earnings predictability 20% 20% 0% 20% 40% 
 
















Time spent away from home 0% 0% 20% 40% 40% 
 
Physical fatigue of the job 0% 0% 20% 40% 40% 
 













Sense of adventure 0% 0% 40% 20% 40% 
 
Sense of challenge 0% 0% 20% 40% 40% 
 
Opportunity to be your own boss 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 Notes: The most frequent response is in bold.  
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Table 48 - Case Study Conclusions 
Factor Hypothetical Impact Case Study Conclusions 
Fishing Practices Increased efficiency and 
flexibility 
No strong agreement, though vessels 
constrained by trip limits have increased 
efficiency and flexibility. 
Social Capital Improved networking, 
reciprocity and trust 
Sectors have built off of pre-existing 
social capital more than been a source 
for it. 
Bycatch Reduced bycatch and 
increased stewardship 
Documented bycatch that has been 
reduced, though pressures exist to 
discard when unobserved. Actual 




Improved business profits and 
predictability 
Business profits and predictability 
declined primarily due to reduced catch 
limits, particularly for fishermen who 
rely on leasing in ACE. Improvements 
for fishermen who have reduced costs or 
diversified fishing portfolio. 
Safety Improved safety at sea No substantial changes, though fewer 
incentives exist to fish in unsafe 
conditions. 
Well-Being Improved well-being and 
outlook for self and fishery 
Overall decline in well-being and 





Figure 1- Determining causality 
Determining causality between the sector management program or other factors, such as the 
















attributable to sectors. 
Comparison of current sector 
and non-sector members. 
Difference attributable 
to sectors. 
No impact of sectors. 
Potential impact of other. 
Comparison of current non-
sector members with their 
former fishing practices. 
Difference 
attributable to other. 
No impact of other. 
Comparison of current sector 
members with their former 
fishing practices. 
No impact of 





Figure 2 - Stratification of the population (n=81) 
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Figure 4 - Calendar year informants first obtained a groundfish permit 
 
Note: Red line indicates the federal permit moratorium. Permits obtained since that time were 
likely bought from other permit holders. 
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APPENDIX A. PRELIMINARY RESEARCH 
STAKEHOLDER OBSERVATIONS FROM FALL 2010 PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were conducted by R. Feeney (2010). 
FISHING PRACTICES. 
 The ability to lease unused quota adds some flexibility to continue fishing. 
 People are fishing when the prices are best and when the quota is available. 
 Now the fishermen try to not catch fish, which goes against the grain. 
 Boats do not fish full days, because fishermen are worried about their allocations. 
 The dockside monitoring events take significantly more time, and costs in payroll time. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL. 
 NMFS and environmentalists want sectors, but 92% of the fishermen do not want sectors, 
because 8% of the boats (politically-connected) own 52% of the quota. 
 Many fishermen and municipalities have joined a law suit against NMFS over the 
allocation formula. 
 The fishermen have showed a degree of cooperation and willingness to make a “bad 
system” work that is far greater than expected. 
 Fishermen have traditionally been competitors; now they are forced to collaborate. 
 Some new industry leaders have emerged. 
BYCATCH. 
 There are fewer discards, but it is the high observer coverage that is reducing discards, 
not a greater sense of ecosystem stewardship. 




 The quota is very expensive to lease. 
 In 2010, fish prices have been the highest ever, because there is less on the market. 
 As of November, 2010, the Yankee Fishermen’s Co-op had 50% less multispecies 
income.  
 Fishermen are opposed to Amendment 16, because the allocation formula changed the 
currency from Days-at-Sea to catch history in a limited number of qualifying years. 
 The Yankee Fishermen’s Co-op is the only remaining dealer of multispecies in New 
Hampshire. The fishermen work hard to make the Co-op succeed, but many members are 
no longer fishing. 
 A lot of fishermen are going out of business. People do not have enough quota. 
 If fishermen have to pay for observers in 2012 as proposed (~$900 per day), it will make 
the small boats operations unviable. 
SAFETY. 
 Fishing is occurring further offshore. 
 The bureaucracy involved in sectors creates more distractions at sea. 
WELL-BEING. 
 There has been added confusion; the data from dockside monitoring is not being used by 
NMFS, which adds to fishermen’s frustration. 
 The uncertainty of future catch limits prevents fishermen from making informed business 
decisions. 
 Fishermen had no other option but to join a sector that they wished did not exist. 
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PRELIMINARY RESEARCH OF DR. J. WIERSMA 
Dr. J. Wiersma, manager of NEFS XI and XII, conducted a survey during FY 2010 of the 24 
participants of his sectors. Of the 16 informants (67%), the average vessel size was 41’ with 340 
hp engines, and 84% said that their 2010 initial allocation was about 28% less than what they 
landed in 2009 under DAS. Vessels with larger horsepower had 2010 allocations closer to their 
2009 catch. He asked whether it was difficult to fish balancing the portfolio of stock allocations, 
and 42% agreed. Profits were down for 42% of respondents in 2010 relative to 2009. The 
additional monitoring required is considered burdensome and costly to 75% of respondents. 
Sector members are now required to submit weekly vessel trip reports (VTRs) to NMFS and 
daily VTRs to the sector manager, and to double the data inputted into their Vessel Monitoring 
System Skymate unit (doubling transmission costs). He asked whether they would be more likely 
to sell their multispecies permit or purchase another; 33% said they would sell. Sector 
management has reduced the enjoyment of fishing for 33%, but 66% said that their catch per unit 
effort has increased (J. Wiersma, personal communication, 2011). 
Although multispecies catch and revenue was down by 50% in 2010 vs. 2009 for NEFS XI and 
XII, total fishing revenue declined only by 7.5% for the survey respondents, due shifts in effort 
to monkfish, herring, lobster, and other fisheries. Of the respondents, 75% fish alone, without 
crew members. They reported that the biggest challenges were the monitoring and reporting 
requirements, as well as avoiding bycatch of “choke stocks” - low-allocation stocks that are 
caught concurrently with higher-allocation stocks. They adapted to these challenges by fishing in 
different areas to avoid bycatch, learned how to use a computer, fished more nets (gillnets) to 
land more fish per day, and they did not feel rushed while fishing. Respondents reported that the 
biggest benefit of sectors is the elimination of regulatory discards, which provides more 
accountability. When asked what management regime they would prefer, 65% said sectors, 10% 
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said DAS, and 25% said neither. A six-fold increase in the price of permits was also observed, 
attributed to the new state-run permit bank in Maine. There are several hidden costs associated 




APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS, VARIABLES, AND CODING SCHEME 
Variable Question Coding 
Informant Was this person interviewed? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
 
Background Demographic Variables 
Sex Record sex 0 = male; 1 = female;  
98 = unknown 
Age What is your current age bracket (years)? 0 = 0-29; 1 = 30-39; 2 = 40-49;  
3 = 50-59, 4 = 60-69; 5 = 70-79 
98 = unknown 
Permit1 How many commercial groundfish permits do 
you own currently? 
record actual number 
Permit 5 What is the permit category? 1 = A; 2 = HA; 3 = C; 4 = D; 
5 = F; 6 = multiple; 99 = n/a 
Permit2 If answered “0” on Permit1: When did you sell 
your last commercial groundfish permit? 
record actual year; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Permit3 In the last few years, did you buy or sell any 
groundfish permits? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Permit4 Please explain: 
Years1 What year did you buy/obtain your first permit? record actual year; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Years2 Did you work as a fisherman prior to owning a 
permit? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
HomePort1 What is your home port? 0 = Portsmouth; 1 = Rye; 
2 = Hampton; 3 = Seabrook; 
4 = Portland; 5 = Gloucester; 
6 = New Bedford; 7 = Kittery; 
8 = Jonesport; 9 = York 
10 = Eliot; 11 = Newburyport 
12 = Newington; 13 = Boston; 
14 = Bath, NC;  
15 = Greenbackville, NC 
16 = Tom’s River, NJ 
17 = New Castle, NH 
18 = Hampton Falls, NH 
HomePort2 How long has it been your homeport?  
 
record actual year; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
LandPort1 What is your primary landing port (75%+)? (same as HomePort1) 
LandPort2 How long has it been your homeport?  
 
record actual year; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Vessel1 How many vessels do you own currently? record actual number; 
98 = unknown 
Vessel2 In the last few years, did you buy or sell any 
vessels? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Vessel3 Please explain. 
Vessel4 What is the length of the vessel(s) you fish 
groundfish with? 
record actual length; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
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Vessel5 What is the horsepower of the vessel(s) you fish 
groundfish with? 
record actual horsepower; 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
FY 2009 Fishing Activity 
09Own Did you own a groundfish permit in FY 09? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
09Income1 What percent of total household income was 
derived from fishing in FY 09? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
09Income2 What percent of your own income was derived 
from fishing in FY 09? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
09Employ If less than 100, what other employment did you have in FY 09? 
09Income3 What percent of your fishing income in FY 09 
was derived from groundfish? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
09Income4 If less than 100, what other fisheries contributed to your income? 
09Labor1 How many individuals worked on your boat at a 
given time on average in FY 09? 
record actual number 
09Labor2 How many total people did you employ as crew 
in FY 09? 
record actual number 
For all fishermen with FY 09 groundfish income 
09Gear1 What was your principal groundfish gear type in 
FY 09? 
0 = trawl; 1 = gillnet; 2 = handgear; 
3 = combination; 99 = n/a 
09Gear2 Describe any changes in groundfish fishing gear 
you made in FY 09? 
0 = no change; 1 = change;  
98=unknown; 99 = n/a 
09Trip How long was a typical groundfish fishing trip in 
FY 09? 
record actual hours; 99 = n/a 
09Area1 What was your general groundfish fishing area in FY 09? 
09Conflict Compared to FY 08, did area conflicts with other 
fishermen decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
09Gear3 Compared to FY 08, did your rate of lost 
groundfish gear decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
09DAS1 How many groundfish DAS were you allocated 
for FY 09 or did you lease? 
record actual DAS; 99 = n/a 
09DAS2 Did you fish or lease all your DAS in 2009? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
 
FY 2010 Fishing Activity 
10Own Did you own a groundfish permit in FY 10? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
10Income1 What percent of total household income was 
derived from fishing in FY 10? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
10Income2 What percent of your own income was derived 
from fishing in FY 10? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
10Employ If less than 100, what other employment did you have in FY 10? 
10Income3 What percent of your fishing income for FY 10 
was derived from groundfish? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
10Income4 If less than 100, what other fisheries contributed to your income in FY 10? 
10Labor1 How many individuals worked on your boat at a 
given time on average in FY 10? 
record actual number 
10Labor2 How many total people did you employ as crew 
in FY 10? 





For all fishermen with FY 10 groundfish income 
10Gear1 What was your principal groundfish gear type in 
FY 10? 
0 = trawl; 1 = gillnet; 2 = handgear; 
3 = combination; 99 = n/a 
10Gear2 Describe any changes in groundfish fishing gear 
you made in FY 10? 
0 = no change; 1 = change;  
99 = n/a 
10Trip How long was a typical groundfish fishing trip in 
FY 10? 
record actual hours; 99 = n/a 
10Area1 What was your general groundfish fishing area in FY 10? 
10Conflict Compared to FY 09, did area conflicts with other 
fishermen decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
10Gear3 Compared to FY 09, did your rate of lost 
groundfish gear decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
10Sector1 Were you a member of a sector in FY 10? 
 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = both 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
For sector members 
10Sector2 Which sector(s) were you a member of? 
 
0 = NEFS XI; 1 = NEFS XII; 
2 = SHS; 3 = NEFS II; 
4 = NEFS 3; 5 = multiple 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
10Sector3 Were you a sector member for lease-only 
purposes or did you actively fish in FY 10? 
0 = lease-only; 1 = active; 2 = both; 
99 = n/a 
10Exempt What exemptions from DAS did you utilize in FY 10? Which were most important? 
10Harvest1 Were you able to harvest all your allocation in FY 
10? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
10Harvest2 Please explain. 
10Pool1 Were you a member of the common pool in FY 
10? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
For common pool members 
10DAS1 How many DAS did you go fishing in FY 10? 
 
record actual DAS; 99 = n/a 
10DAS2 How often did you meet your trip limit in FY 10? 0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 3 
= 51=75%; 4 = 76-100%;  
99 = n/a 
 
FY 2011 Groundfish Fishing Activity 
11Own Did you own a groundfish permit in FY 11? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
11Income1 What percent of total household income was 
derived from fishing in FY 11? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
11Income2 What percent of your own income was derived 
from fishing in FY 11? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
11Employ If less than 100, what other employment did you have in FY 11? 
11Income3 What percent of your fishing income in FY 11 
was derived from groundfish? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 
3 = 51-75%; 4 = 76-100% 
11Income4 If less than 100, what other fisheries contributed the most to your income in 2011? 
11Labor1 How many individuals worked on your boat at a 
given time on average in FY 11? 
record actual number 
11Labor2 How many total people did you employ as crew 
in FY 11? 
record actual number 
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For all fishermen with FY 11 groundfish income 
11Gear1 What was your principal groundfish gear type 
in FY 11? 
0 = trawl; 1 = gillnet; 2 = handgear; 
3 = combination; 99 = n/a 
11Gear2 Describe any changes in groundfish fishing 
gear you made in FY 11? 
0 = no change; 1 = change;  
99 = n/a 
11Trip How long was a typical groundfish fishing trip 
in FY 11? 
record actual hours; 99 = n/a 
11Area1 What was your general groundfish fishing area in FY 11? 
11Conflict Compared to FY 10, did area conflicts with other 
fishermen decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
11Gear3 Compared to FY 10, did your rate of lost 
groundfish gear decrease, remain unchanged, or 
increase? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
11Sector1 Were you a member of a sector in FY 11? 
 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = both 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
For sector members 
11Sector2 Which sector(s) were you a member of? 
 
0 = NEFS XI; 1 = NEFS XII; 
2 = SHS; 3 = NEFS II; 
4 = NEFS 3; 5 = multiple 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
11Sector3 Were you a sector member for lease-only 
purposes or did you actively fish in FY 11? 
0 = lease-only;  
1 = actively fished; 2 = both; 
99 = n/a 
11Exempt What exemptions from DAS did you utilize in FY 11? Which were most important? 
11Harvest1 Were you able to harvest or lease all your 
allocation in FY 11? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
11Harvest2 Please explain. 
11Pool1 Were you a member of the common pool in FY 
11? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
For common pool members 
11DAS1 How many DAS did you go fishing in FY 11? record actual DAS; 99 = n/a 
11DAS2 How often did you meet your trip limit in FY 
11? 
0 = 0%; 1 = 1-25%; 2 = 26-50%; 3 
= 51=75%; 4 = 76-100%;  
99 = n/a 
 
FY 2012 Fishing Activity 
12Own Did you own a groundfish permit in FY 12? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 
 
12Sector1 Were you a member of a sector in FY 12? 
 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = both 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
12Sector2 Which sector(s) were you a member of? 
 
0 = NEFS XI; 1 = NEFS XII; 
2 = SHS; 3 = NEFS II; 
4 = NEFS 3; 5 = multiple 
98 = unknown; 99 = n/a 
Fishing Practices Generally 
Flexibility1 Which program would you say provides greater 
flexibility for fishermen to decide when, where, 
and how to fish: DAS or sectors? 
0 = DAS; 1 = sectors; 2 = equally 
flexible; 3 = equally inflexible; 4 = 
unsure; 99 = n/a 
Flexibility2 Please explain. 
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Efficiency1 Which program would you say allows greater 
efficiency for fishing operations: DAS or 
sectors? 
0 = DAS; 1 = sectors; 2 = equally 
efficient; 3 = equally inefficient; 4 = 
unsure; 99 = n/a 
Efficiency2 Please explain (e.g., fuel, sorting efficiency, better operational management and 
planning). 
Understand1 Are the rules more difficult to understand for 
Days-at-Sea or sectors? 
0 = DAS; 1 = sectors; 2 = equally 
easy; 3 = equally difficult; 4 = 
unsure; 99 = n/a 
Understand2 Please explain. 
Advantages What are the advantages of belonging to a sector? 
Disadvantages What are the disadvantages of belonging to a sector? 
Chose What are the main reasons why you chose to join a sector/remain in the common pool? 
 
Social Capital 
Organize1 Do you belong to any fishermen’s 
organizations (besides sectors)? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2A Which? Northeast Seafood Coalition? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2B Which? New Hampshire Commercial 
Fishermen’s Association? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2C Which? National Association of Charter Boat 
Operators? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2D Which? Maine Professional Guides 
Association? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2E Which? Granite State Fish? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2F Which? Yankee Fishermen’s Co-operative? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2G Which? Associated Fisheries of Maine? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2H Which? Northeast Tuna Club? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2I Which? Northeast Hook Fishermen’s 
Association? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Organize2J Which? Salt Water Party Boat Association? 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Leader1 Have you served in a leadership position in 
any of these organizations? 
 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Lend1 Do you to share any equipment with other 
fishermen? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Lend2 Please explain. 
Communicate1 Do you tend to share information about fishing 
areas with other fishermen? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Communicate2 Please explain. 
Trust1 In general, how often do you trust fishermen 
in your community (NH) in business dealings? 
0 = never; 1 = sometimes;  
2 = always 
Trust2 Please explain. 
Network1 Describe the network of fishermen you communicate with, without naming 
individuals (on land and/or at sea; talk about fishing and/or management; from New 
Hampshire or beyond; sector members or not?). 
Network2 Are there some fishermen you avoid talking 
with? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Network3 How many fishermen do you share 
information with about what you’re catching? 
Record actual number;  
98 = whole community; 99 = n/a 
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Network4 Is helping a fisherman inside your community 
more important to you than helping a 
fisherman outside your community? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Allocation1 How important to you is keeping allocation 
within the NH fishing community? 
0 = not important; 1 = neutral;  
2 = important 
Allocation2 When selling/leasing allocation, are you 
willing to accept a lower price to keep the 
quota within your sector? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Trust3 In general, how often do you trust NMFS to 
have the best interest of the industry in mind? 
0 = never; 1 = sometimes;  
2 = always 
Trust4 Please explain. 
For sector members 
Leader2 Have you served on the Board of your sector? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Compliance3 Do sector members respect sector rules? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 98 = can’t say;  
99 = n/a 
Trust5 Do you trust the members of your sector more, 
the same, or less than other fishermen? 
0 = less; 1 = the same; 2 = more; 99 
= n/a 
Manager1 Has working with a sector manager been 
helpful? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Manager2 Please explain. 
Bycatch 
Important1 How important is reducing bycatch to you 
(e.g., decreased deck sorting time, higher 
quality catch, stock rebuilding purposes)? 
0 = not important; 1 = neutral;  
2 = important 
Important2 Please explain. 
For all active fishermen 
Change1 Do you feel that your level of bycatch since 
May 2010 has decreased, is unchanged, or has 
increased? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
Avoid1 Do you go above and beyond the regulations 
to avoid bycatch (e.g., modify/test gear, adjust 
fishing area)? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Avoid2 Please explain. 
 
Economic Performance 
Predict1 Since May 2010, has the predictability of your 
fishing business decreased, remained the 
same, or increased? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
Predict2 What conditions most affect business predictability? 
Profit Since May 2010, have the profit margins of 
your fishing business decreased, remained the 
same, or increased? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
Sell Describe where you sell your fish and if that has changed in recent years. 
For sector members only 
Cost How do the costs associated with the sectors 
compare with what was expected? 
0 = lower than expected; 
1 = as expected; 
2 = higher than expected; 





Safety1 Do (did) the DAS regulations you operate(d) 
under in the groundfish fishery ever 
compromise vessel safety? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Safety2 Please explain. 
Safety3 Do (did) the sectors regulations you operate(d) 
under in the groundfish fishery ever 
compromise vessel safety? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 99 = n/a 
Safety4 Please explain. 
 
Well-Being 
Fairness Do you consider your initial allocation under 
Amendment 16 to be fair, unfair, or are you 
unsure? 
0 = unfair; 1 = fair; 2 = unsure; 99 = 
n/a 
Stress1 Is fishing today more or less stressful than 
before May 2010? 
0 = less stressful today; 
1 = no change;  
2 = more stressful today 
99 = n/a 
Stress2 What aspects of fishing do you consider stressful? 
Fatigue1 Since May 2010, has your fatigue level at sea 
decreased, remained the same, or increased? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
Job1 Since May 2010, has your job satisfaction 
decreased, remained the same, or increased? 
0 = decreased; 1 = unchanged; 
2 = increased; 99 = n/a 
Retirement Do you expect to retire as a fisherman? 0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = unsure 
Job2 How many more years do you expect to be 
fishing? 
record number of years;  
98 = unsure 
Young1 Would you advise a young person to enter 
fishing? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 
Young2 Please explain. 
Outlook1 Is your outlook for the future of the New 
Hampshire groundfish fishery negative, 
neutral, or positive? 
0 = negative; 1 = neutral;  
2 = positive 
Outlook2 Please explain. 
Life1 If you had your life to live over, would you 
still fish? 
0 = no; 1 = yes; 2 = unsure 
Life2 Please explain. 
 
From Richard Pollnac: 
How satisfied are you with the following items related to the occupation of groundfish fishing? 
(For former fishermen, ask “how satisfied were you…”) 
Earnings1 Your actual earnings? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Predict3 Predictability of your earnings? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Safety5 Job safety? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
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Time1 Time spent away from home? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Fatigue2 Physical fatigue of the job? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Health1 Healthfulness of the job? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Adventure1 Adventure of the job? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Challenge1 Challenge of the job? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
Boss1 Opportunity to be your own boss? 1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 
3 = neutral; 4 = satisfied;  
5 = very satisfied; 6 = unsure 
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APPENDIX C. DEFINITION OF ACRONYMS 
 ACCSP Atlantic Coastal Cooperative Statistics Program 
ACE  Annual Catch Entitlement 
 ACL  Annual Catch Limit 
 AM  Accountability Measure 
 CC  Cape Cod 
 DAS  Days-at-Sea 
 EA  Environmental Assessment 
FMP  Fishery Management Plan 
 FY  Fishing Year 
 GB  Georges Bank 
 GOM  Gulf of Maine 
 IFQ  Individual Fishing Quota 
 IPA  Interpretive Phenomenological Discourse Analysis 
 IRB  Institutional Review Board 
 LAPP  Limited Access Privilege Program 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 MSFCMA Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
 NEFMC New England Fishery Management Council 
 NEFS  Northeast Fishery Sector 
NEFSC Northeast Fisheries Science Center 
 NMFS  National Marine Fisheries Service 
 NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
 NSC  Northeast Seafood Coalition 
 PSC  Potential Sector Contribution 
 SNE  Southern New England 
 TAC  Total Allowable Catch 
 TURF  Territorial Use Right for Fishing 
 UNH  University of New Hampshire 
 VTR  Vessel Trip Report 
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APPENDIX D. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
 

